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(337) (420)  
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TITLE: INTERNAL SITUATION IN  
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Registry  
C.W.L.

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Mr Makin

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USEFUL INFORMATION RELATED TO CONTENTS OF THIS FILE

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NEXT FILE: PART 'G'

OTHER RELATED FILES: \_\_\_\_\_

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(237)

CYPHER/CAT A

SECRET

ASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NO. 2134

23 SEPTEMBER 1970

(EMERGENCY UNIT)

SECRET 231230Z

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE

MIDDLE EAST CRISIS.

*per  
am  
2/11/70*

FOLLOWING IS ABRIDGED SITREP AT 0600Z  
BEGINS

1 : THE MILITARY SITUATION  
AMMAN.

THE CURFEW WAS LIFTED FOR A SHORT TIME DURING YESTERDAY MORNING, BUT CONTINUED FEDAYEEN ACTION NECESSITATED ITS REIMPOSITION. BEIRUT TELNO. 488 SUGGESTS THAT TROUBLE AROUND AMMAN AIRPORT SHOULD BE EXPECTED TODAY, BUT KING HUSSEIN HAS GIVEN AN ASSURANCE ABOUT RELIEF AIRCRAFT GETTING IN.

NORTH JORDAN.

2. BOTH THE IRAQI AND SYRIAN TROOPS HAVE MOVED POSITIONS, BUT NOT SO FAR AS TO SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE MILITARY SITUATION.
3. ISRAELI SOURCES REPORT SYRIAN TANK STRENGTH DOWN TO 180-200. THERE ARE HOWEVER REINFORCEMENTS TO THE NORTH. LOGISTIC MOVEMENTS HAVE CONTINUED. MORALE ON THE JORDANIAN SIDE IS SAID TO BE HIGH. REPORTS OF DEFECTIONS FROM THE 40TH BRIGADE ARE DISCOUNTED.
4. TEL AVIV REPORT THAT IRAQI FORCES HAVE BEEN PROBING UNTIL THEY MADE CONTACT AND CAME UNDER ARTILLERY FIRE.

SOUTH JORDAN.

5. AMMAN TEL. NO. 639 REPORTS THAT THE JORDANIAN ARMY HAS CLEARED ALL RESISTANCE TO THE SOUTH EXCEPT IN MADABA.

/ISRAELI

SECRET



## ISRAELI FORCES.

6. TEL AVIV HAVE REPORTED (TEL. NO. 886) THAT A CONSIDERABLE REDEPLOYMENT OF ISRAELI FORCES NORTHWARDS HAS TAKEN PLACE, BUT MR BARNES DOES NOT CONSIDER (TEL. NO. 887) THAT THIS NECESSARILY INDICATES ISRAELI INTERVENTION.

## II : H.M. EMBASSY, AMMAN

7. H.M. AMBASSADOR WAS ABLE TO TAKE A FEW HOURS OFF WHEN HIS COUNSELLOR, HEAD OF CHANCERY AND DEFENCE ATTACHE REACHED THE EMBASSY YESTERDAY. THERE IS INTERMITTENT TELEPHONIC CONTACT BETWEEN THE EMBASSY AND THEIR AMERICAN COLLEAGUES. THE AMERICAN FUEL SITUATION IS NOW SATISFACTORY.

## III : AIRCRAFT

TMA DC6, BEIRUT/AMMAN/NICOSIA, 23 SEPTEMBER.

8. THE INTENTION IS TO SEND A CHARTERED TRANS-MEDITERRANEAN AIRWAYS (TMA) DC6 FREIGHT AIRCRAFT FROM BEIRUT TO AMMAN LATER TODAY WITH THE RELIEF CBO, GENERATOR SPARES, BEER AND RATIONS FOR THE EMBASSY, 2 1/2 TONS OF MEDICAL DRUGS AND AN RAMC MEDICAL LIAISON OFFICER. THE REMAINING CARGO SPACE ON THIS LEG HAS BEEN OFFERED TO THE I C R C. IT IS PLANNED THAT AT AMMAN THE DC6 WILL PICK UP WOMEN AND CHILDREN AND TAKE THEM TO NICOSIA.

AN M E A CARAVELLE IS STANDING BY IN BEIRUT. LATER DEVELOPMENTS ARE CONTAINED IN TELEPRINTER CONFERENCES WITH AMMAN AT 0630Z AND 0845Z AND 1245Z

RAF ARGOSY, CYPRUS/BEIRUT, 23 SEPTEMBER.

9. AN RAF ARGOSY IS TO FLY THE 2 1/2 TONS OF DRUGS AND THE R A M C LIAISON OFFICER TO BEIRUT TO LINK WITH THE T M A FLIGHT. IT WAS DUE TO ARRIVE AT 0830, BUT BEIRUT HAVE ASKED THAT IT SHOULD REMAIN AT AKROTIRI UNTIL THEY CALL IT FORWARD (BEIRUT TEL NOS. 487 AND 489).

/LATER



S E C R E T

TELNO. 2134 TO WASHINGTON

-3-

LATER FLIGHTS BEIRUT/AMMAN/NICOSIA.

10. BEIRUT HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED TO ARRANGE FOR ONE MIDDLE EAST AIRLINES CARAVELLE OR CORVAIR TO STANDBY FROM 24 SEPTEMBER ONWARDS, AND TO OBTAIN AN OPTION ON A SECOND TRIP THE SAME OR FOLLOWING DAY. THIS WOULD BE FOR A GENERAL EVACUATION OF BRITISH SUBJECTS.

11. THE SPARE CARGO SPACE ON THESE AIRCRAFT FROM BEIRUT TO AMMAN WOULD BE AVAILABLE EITHER FOR I C R C SUPPLIES OR BRITISH MEDICAL EQUIPMENT AT PRESENT PRE-POSITIONED IN AKROTIRI.

I C R C FLIGHTS.

12. I C R C HAVE TWO FLIGHTS GOING INTO AMMAN TODAY BUT HAVE SAID THEY MAY NOT BE USED FOR THE EVACUATION OF FOREIGNERS. ANY PLACES MUST BE GIVEN TO THE WOUNDED (C.G. GENEVA TEL. NO. 55).

IV : EVACUATION.

HMG'S PLANS

13. THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL MINISTERIAL COMMITTEE DECIDED THAT THE I C R C SHOULD BE INFORMED THAT HMG WOULD LIKE A GENERAL EVACUATION OF BRITISH SUBJECTS SET IN HAND UNDER I C R C AUSPICES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

14. ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN PUT IN HAND TO HAVE THE NECESSARY AIRCRAFT STANDING BY IN BEIRUT ON 24 SEPTEMBER.

15. THE T M A DC6 FLYING TO AMMAN TODAY WILL BE USED TO BRING OUT 20 WOMEN AND CHILDREN. T M A WILL NOT TAKE MORE PASSENGERS THAN THEY CAN FIT SEATS FOR (BEIRUT TEL. NO. 489). MR PHILLIPS WILL DO HIS BEST TO SEE THAT JOURNALISTS DO NOT JUMP THE QUEUE.

16. THE CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR EVACUATION THROUGH AQABA IS BEING KEPT UP, IN CASE EVACUATION BY AIR FROM AMMAN FALLS THROUGH.

U S PLANS

17. THE AMERICANS NOW INTEND TO PROCEED WITH THE EVACUATION OF THOSE U S NATIONALS WHO WISH TO LEAVE. THEY ARE CONSIDERING

S E C R E T

/EVACUATION



S E C R E T

-4-

EVACUATION BY AIR FROM AMMAN, EVACUATION VIA AQABA AND, IN THE WORST CASE, THE PROVISION OF MILITARY PROTECTION FOR EVACUATION (WASHINGTON TEL. NO. 2800).

V : HOSTAGES - BERNE GROUP

HOSTAGES

18. THERE IS NO NEWS OF THE WHEREABOUTS OR FATE OF THE HOSTAGES.

BERNE GROUP

19. BOISSIER REMAINED IN BEIRUT AFTER ALL. THE BERNE GROUP MET ON THE EVENING OF 22 SEPTEMBER TO CONSIDER NEW P F L P TERMS (REPORTED IN BERNE TEL. NO. 304). THE P F L P SAID THAT ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EXCHANGE BY THE FOUR WOULD BRING ABOUT THE RELEASE OF THE EUROPEANS AND AMERICANS WHO ARE NOT DUAL NATIONALS. ISRAELIS AND AMERICANS WOULD BE HELD IN A SECURE PLACE (A HOTEL IN BEIRUT, ACCORDING TO BOISSIER) PENDING FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS.
20. AT THE GROUP'S MEETING, THE AMERICAN SAID THAT HIS INSTRUCTIONS FORBADE CONSIDERATION OF ANY DEAL INVOLVING DISCRIMINATION AND THAT THE PRECISE STATEMENT OF NUMBERS WE REQUIRED IMPLIED READINESS TO ACCEPT A DISCRIMINATORY SOLUTION.
21. THE GROUP DECIDED TO ASK BOISSIER TO EXTRACT A PRECISE STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSAL INCLUDING A LIST GIVING NAMES AND NATIONALITIES OF ALL THE HOSTAGES THE P F L P HOLD. BOISSIER SHOULD SUGGEST THAT ALL HOSTAGES SHOULD BE TAKEN WITHOUT DELAY TO A PLACE OF SAFETY.

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FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TO WASHINGTON

TELEGRAM NO.2144

23 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

231630Z

ADDRESSED TO WASHINGTON (FOR SOSFA) TELEGRAM NO.2144 OF 23 SEPTEMBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO UKMIS NEW YORK BEIRUT NICOSIA TEL AVIV  
HQ BFNE C.G. GENEVA ANKARA CAIRO PARIS MOSCOW AND BERNE.

FOLLOWING ARE THE ESSENTIALS OF TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE WITH  
AMMAN AT 1400Z ON 23 SEPTEMBER.

pm  
cu  
2/4

BEGINS.

(LONDON)

WE HAVE HEARD

THIS IS A COPY  
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED  
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

THAT IT WAS VERY LIKELY BUT NOT POSSIBLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE PFLP  
HAD TRANSFERRED THE HOSTAGES TO THE IRAQ ARMY HQ OUTSIDE AMMAN  
YOU MIGHT CARE TO FOLLOW UP THIS WITH ANY SOURCE AVAILABLE.

(AMMAN)

THE CARAVELLE MAY FLY INTO AMMAN TOMORROW UNDER ITS OWN COLOURS  
THE PALACE HAVE SAID THEY WILL PROVIDE AN ESCORT FROM THE ASSEMBLY  
POINT TO THE AIRPORT.

THE OPERATION IS OF COURSE DEPENDANT ON THE AIRFIELD BEING SECURE  
TOMORROW AND THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT SEE NO REASON WHY IT SHOULD  
NOT BE.

I HAVE NOT YET HEARD WHETHER THE DC6 HAS COME AND GONE, BUT

SECRET

/HOPE



SECRET

-2-

HOPE TO DO SO SHORTLY. WE HOPE TO HAVE GOT AWAY ON IT 21 BRITISH AND 9 U.N. OF WHOM 2 ARE BRITISH.

WE HOPE TO GET AWAY TOMORROW 35 BRITISH PLUS 36 U.N. OF WHOM 20 ARE BRITISH OR COMMONWEALTH.

THE BRITISH LEFT AFTER TOMORROW WILL BE IN THREE CATEGORYS

A... THOSE WE CANNOT REACH

B... THOSE WE CANNOT YET SPARE

C... THOSE WHO REFUSE TO LEAVE

CAT C IS SUPRISINGLY LARGE AND INCLUDES NURSES, TEACHERS, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE WHO CONSIDER IT THEIR DUTY TO STAY AND WHO COULD ONLY BE REMOVED BY FORCE.

I AM NOW IN POSSESSION OF ROUGH NUMBERS FOR TWO OF THE ABOVE CATS.. A AND C.

THOSE IN A.. NUMBER 42 OF WHOM 17 ARE IN AMMAN AND OTHERS SCATTERED ABOUT THE COUNTRY INCLUDING 14 AT AQABA WHERE THEY ARE IN NO DANGER. THOSE IN C.. SO FAR NUMBER 19.

THE KING AGREED TO SEE ME YESTERDAY BUT HAD TO CALL IT OFF WHEN FIGHTING BROKE OUT AGAIN ROUND THE EMBASSY THERE IS A CHANCE I MAY SEE HIM THIS EVENING IF I CAN MAKE HOMMAR BEFORE DARK. I.E. WITHIN 90 MINS.

(LONDON)

MANY THANKS FOR YOUR INFORMATION PLEASE CONFIRM THAT YOU HAVE TOLD BEIRUT OF THE FIRST BIT OF INFORMATION REGARDING THE CARAVALLE.

2. I NOTE THE NUMBERS IN THE THREE CATEGORIES WOULD IT HELP IF

SECRET

/THE

THIS IS A COPY  
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED  
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958



SECRET

RCO TELNO. 2144 TO WASHINGTON

-3-

THE BBC WERE TO BROADCAST AN ANNOUNCEMENT FOR YOU - IF SO IN WHAT TERMS?  
(AMMAN)

I HAVE NOT YET TOLD BEIRUT ABOUT THE CARAVELLE COMING IN UNDER ITS OWN COLOURS SINCE I RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION ONLY A FEW MINUTES AGO I WILL SEND A FLASH TELEGRAM AFTER THIS CONFERENCE UNLESS YOU FEEL THAT IT WOULD COME QUICKER FROM YOU.

REGARDING YOUR SECOND POINT I THINK IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE BBC WERE TO MAKE AN ANNOUNCEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH COMMUNITY NOT SO FAR IN TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY SHOULD ENDEAVOUR TO GET IN TOUCH BY ANY MEANS POSSIBLE INCLUDING TELEPHONES SOME OF WHICH ARE WORKING SINCE THERE IS A CHANCE THAT THOSE WHO WISH TO LEAVE MAY RPT MAY BE ABLE TO DO SO DURING THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

I THINK WE SHALL HAVE THAT CARAVELLE TOO FULL TO TAKE EXTRA APPLICANTS.  
(LONDON)

WE WILL SEND THE TELEGRAM TO BEIRUT NOW.

MANY THANKS WE VERY MUCH HOPE THE CARAVELLE WILL BE ABLE TO DO TWO TRIPS TOMORROW. IF THIS PROVES POSSIBLE I ASSUME YOU WOULD PREFER TO ORGANISE ONE RPT ONE CONVOY TO THE AIRPORT WITH THE PASSENGERS FOR BOTH FLIGHTS INSTEAD OF TWO SEPARATE CONVOYS IN VIEW OF POSSIBLE DIFFICULTIES FOR THE JORDANIANS IN ORGANISING ESCORTS. DOES THIS SEEM ALRIGHT?

(AMMAN)

I FEAR WE WILL HAVE TO PLAY THIS ONE OFF THE CUFF AS EARLY AS POSSIBLE TOMORROW BECAUSE I DO NOT KNOW HOW MANY FOREIGNERS INCLUDING BRITISH WE SHALL BE ABLE TO ROUND UP IF WE CAN FILL THE CARAVELLE TWICE OVER THEN CERTAINLY ONE TRIP WILL BE PREFERABLE TO TWO FOR THE REASON YOU MENTIONED. IT IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH MANY POTENTIAL EVACUEES AFTER DARK AND I THINK I SHALL HAVE TO MAKE A FINAL RECOMMENDATION AT SAY 0600Z TOMORROW.

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/(LONDON)



SECRET

-4-

(LONDON)

NOW A FEW QUESTIONS ON LOCAL SITUATION.

1. HAS THE CURFEW BEEN LIFTED.

2. PRINCESS MUNA HAS TWO REPORTS FROM JORDANIANS THE FIRST THAT THE WOMEN OF THE ROYAL FAMILY HAD LEFT FOR AQABA SECOND THAT THEY HAD EVACUATED HOMMAR BECAUSE IT HAD BEEN BADLY DAMAGED BY SHELL FIRE CAN YOU LET US HAVE ANY INFORMATION ON EITHER OF THESE QUERIES.

3. WHAT IS THE SITUATION REGARDING LIGHT , WATER AND FOOD?

4. I ASSUME YOU WILL HAVE NOTHING ON THE GENERAL SITUATION UNTIL YOU HAVE SEEN THE KING.

5. ARE YOU IN TOUCH WITH MANY OF YOUR COLLEAGUES?

(AMMAN)

1.. THE CURFEW HAS NOT RPT NOT OFFICIALLY BEEN LIFTED TODAY BUT A NUMBER OF PEOPLE IN DESPARATION HAVE EMERGED ON THE STREETS WITH VESSELS AND CONTAINERS IN SEARCH OF FOOD AND WATER AND HAVE NOT BEEN SHOT BY THE PATROLLING TROOPS.

2.. THE QUEEN MOTHER WAS SEEN HEADING SOUTH TOWARDS AQABA A DAY OR TWO AGO BY A JOURNALIST COMING THE OTHER WAY. I HAVE

HEARD NOTHING ABOUT HOMMAR BEING EVACUATED AND DOUBT THIS STORY BUT WILL CONFIRM WHEN NEXT IN TOUCH WITH THE KING.

HE TOLD ME WHEN I LAST SAW HIM THERE THAT THEY HAD BEEN ROCKETTED SEVERAL TIMES AT NIGHT.

3.. THERE IS NO ELECTRIC LIGHT (EXCEPT FOR THOSE WHO HAVE GENERATORS) WATER IS SCARCE BUT IS STILL TRICKLING ALONG THE PIPES WHERE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN BROKEN BY SHELL FIRE. FOOD IS SHORT AND GETTING SHORTER. THE EMBASSY IS ALRIGHT FOR THE TIME BEING SINCE WE ARE LIVING OUT OF THE TINS AND PACKETS IN THE SHOP (EMBASSY) I BELIEVE THE RED CROSS HAVE BEEN FLYING IN SOME FOOD AS WELL AS MEDICAMENTS BUT AS SOON AS THE FIGHTING REALLY STOPS A BIG RESCUE OPERATION IS CLEARLY GOING TO BE NEEDED.

4.. MY FIRST SEC. IS ON THE LINE TO HOMMAR AT THE MOMENT I MAY HAVE SOMETHING TO TELL YOU LATER THIS EVENING IF WE HAVE ANOTHER TELECONF.. AT SAY 1630Z IF THIS SUITS YOU? I SHOULD BY THEN KNOW IF THE DC6 HAS TAKEN OFF, WE NOW KNOW IT ARRIVED ALRIGHT.

SECRET

/5. I AM



SECRET

FCO TELNO. 2144 TO WASHINGTON

-5-

5.. I AM IN TOUCH BY TELEPHONE WITH MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE SINCE YESTERDAY. I CAN REACH THE FRENCH AND GERMANS IN AN ESCORTED MILITARY VEHICLE. THE INDIAN CHARGE AND THE IRANIAN AMBASSADOR CAN ALSO AND HAVE BEEN CONTACTED BY TELEPHONE. THE TURK I GATHER IS ONCE MORE IN TOUCH WITH HIS PEOPLE BUT I HAVE NO NEWS OF THE PAKISTANI. THE RUSSIAN IS ALRIGHT.

(LONDON)

ARE YOU IN TOUCH WITH THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE AND IS HE LIKELY TO BE ANY HELP WITH EVACUATION?

WHAT ARE THE INTENTIONS OF YOUR COLLEAGUES REGARDING EVACUATION OF THEIR NATIONALS?

PLEASE LET US KNOW AT YOUR NEXT CONFERENCE AT 1600Z WHAT WE CAN DO TO ENSURE THAT YOUR REQUIREMENTS BOTH AS REGARDS EVACUATION AND THOSE WHO REMAIN ARE MET AS FAR AS POSSIBLE.

(AMMAN)

THE ICRC REPRESENTATIVE HAS VERY RECENTLY SURFACED AND WE PROPOSE TO GET IN TOUCH WITH HIM FIRST THING TOMORROW MORNING. I THINK HOWEVER THAT AT THIS STAGE HE IS UNLIKELY TO BE OF MUCH HELP AND THAT WE SHOULD BE BETTER COORDINATING OUR OWN ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE JORDANIAN ARMY.

OF MY COLLEAGUES ONLY THE AMERICANS HAVE A SUBSTANTIAL NUMBER OF NATIONALS AND THEY ONLY TODAY DECIDED TO START EVACUATING IN A BIG WAY. WE ARE IN TOUCH WITH THEM AND WILL BE DISCUSSING JOINT PLANS TOMORROW, MEANTIME I AM GIVING FIRST PRIORITY TO FOLLOWING UP OUR OWN INITIATIVE WITH THE CARAVELLE.  
YOUR LAST PARA NOTED.

SECRET

- /I HAVE



CONFIDENTIAL

-6-

I HAVE JUST HAD A MESSAGE THAT THE KING IS EXTREMELY GRATEFUL FOR THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM TEL AVIV COULD YOU PLEASE KINDLY PASS TO TEL AVIV FLASH THE ANSWER TO THEIR QUERY ABOUT KING HUSSEIN'S INTENTIONS (THEIR TEL NO 895) WHICH ARE TO CLEAR THE SITUATION IN THE NORTH IF HE CAN BUT NOT PERSUE THE SYRIANS INTO SYRIA HE WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF TEL AVIV COULD CONFIRM THAT BRIGADE REPORTED IN IRBID IS INFANTRY AND NOT ARMOUR.

DOUGLAS-HOME

[COPIES SENT TO NO.10 DOWNING ST. AND TO  
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INTELLIGENCE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 327

TO: UNDEL DATED  
23 SEPTEMBER 1970.

CONFIDENTIAL. 231915Z

ADDRESSED TO UNDEL DATED TELEGRAM NUMBER 327 OF 23 SEPTEMBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO UKHIS NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 516 (WHICH WE HAVE REPEATED TO UKHIS NEW YORK AND  
WASHINGTON): JORDAN.

FOR AMERICA, FOR UNDEL FOR JORDAN, IS A VERY IMPORTANT REPORT  
ON THE DEVELOPING SITUATION. FOR YOUR BACKGROUND INFORMATION ONLY,  
WE SHALL TELEGRAPH AN ABBREVIATED VERSION OF THE REPORT FOR 23  
SEPTEMBER BY THE END OF TODAY. THERE WILL BE NO TIME TO TELEGRAPH  
THE REPORT FOR 24 SEPTEMBER BEFORE THE COUNCIL MEETING. BUT EVANS  
WILL TELEPHONE DAVIDSON AT 0930 LONDON TIME ON 24 SEPTEMBER TO GIVE  
HIM DETAILS OF ANY OVERNIGHT DEVELOPMENTS.

2. IN SPEAKING TO THE COUNCIL, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING MAIN  
POINTS:-

(A) WE ARE GREATLY CONCERNED BY THE CRISIS IN JORDAN. WE SYMPATHISE  
WITH KING HUSSEIN'S DESIRE TO PUT AN END TO THE CONSTRAINTS  
UNDER WHICH HE HAS BEEN FORCED TO ACT BY THE GROWING STRENGTH  
AND ASSERTIVENESS OF THE VARIOUS PALESTINIAN ORGANISATIONS  
IN JORDAN. BUT ONLY THE OUTCOME WILL SHOW WHETHER HE WAS WISE  
TO MOUNT A FULL-SCALE OPERATION AGAINST THESE ORGANISATIONS.  
AT THE MOMENT, THE OUTLOOK IS GLOOMY. HE MIGHT HAVE BEEN  
ABLE TO ACHIEVE A MILITARY VICTORY OVER THE PALESTINIAN  
ORGANISATIONS (IF NOT TO WEAKEN THE STRENGTH OF PALESTINIAN  
NATIONALISM AS AN IDEAL) BUT FOR SYRIAN INTERVENTION.

..../(B)

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

- (B) THERE CAN BE NO DOUBT THAT SYRIA HAS INVADED JORDAN. SOME OF THE TANKS WHICH CROSSED THE FRONTIER ON 17 SEPTEMBER AND SUBSEQUENT DAYS MAY HAVE BEEN MANNED BY MEMBERS OF THE PALESTINE LIBERATION ARMY. BUT MANY BELONG TO THE SYRIAN ARMY. EVEN IF THE SYRIANS DO NOT ATTEMPT TO ADVANCE FURTHER (THEY AND THE PALESTINIANS NOW HOLD IRDID AND CONTROL THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY), THEIR PRESENCE GREATLY WEAKENS KING HUSSEIN'S POLITICAL AND MILITARY POSITION. IF HE SEEKS TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE PALESTINIANS, HE WILL HAVE TO DO SO IN THE SHADOW OF THIS PRESENCE.
- (C) WE HAVE DONE OUR UTMOST TO PROMOTE DIPLOMATIC ACTION WHICH WOULD PUT PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW. WE HAVE SPOKEN TO THE RUSSIANS, BOTH IN MOSCOW AND LONDON. WE HAVE COME INTO THE POSSIBILITY OF REQUESTING A MEETING OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. WE HAVE ALSO EXPLORED THE POSSIBILITY OF THE FOUR POWERS ISSUING A JOINT APPEAL. IT HAS BECOME CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS NO IMMEDIATE PROSPECT OF ACTION ON THESE LINES IN NEW YORK.
- (D) IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, WE MUST RELY FOR THE TIME BEING ON THE RUSSIANS AND THE ARABS. THIS IS NOT VERY SATISFACTORY. BUT WE DRAW SOME COMFORT FROM THE FACT THAT BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND PRESIDENT NASSER MUST DISLIKE THE IDEA OF A PALESTINIAN REGIME IN JORDAN (IF ONLY BECAUSE SUCH A REGIME WOULD REPUDIATE KING HUSSEIN'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF NOVEMBER 1967 AND OF THE AMERICAN PROPOSALS OF 19 JUNE).
- (E) IT IS TOO EARLY TO ASSESS THE LIKELY IMPACT OF THE CRISIS ON QUEST FOR A POLITICAL SETTLEMENT IN THE MIDDLE EAST. BUT THIS IMPACT IS BOUND TO BE UNFAVOURABLE. THE CRISIS WILL ADD TO THE COMPLICATIONS OF A SITUATION ALREADY MADE DIFFICULT BY THE STATEMENT OF THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT OF 7 SEPTEMBER THAT

...../IT WOULD

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELNO 327 TO ULLAL NATO

- 3 -

IT WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN TALKS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF DR. JARRING "UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT AND THE STANDSTILL ARE IMPLEMENTED FULLY AND THE ORIGINAL POSITION IS RESTORED".

- (F) WE ARE MOST CONCERNED ABOUT THE FATE OF OUR HOSTAGES IN JORDAN. WE HAVE NO RECENT NEWS OF THEIR WHEREABOUTS. IN CONJUNCTIONS WITH THE OTHER FOUR COUNTRIES CONCERNED, WE ARE CONTINUING TO NEGOTIATE FOR THEIR RELEASE WITH THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE THROUGH THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS. IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS, WE ARE ADHERING TO THE PRINCIPLE THAT DISCRIMINATION AGAINST ANY GROUP OF HOSTAGES IS UNACCEPTABLE.
3. YOU SHOULD NOT VOLUNTEER ANYTHING ON THE SUBJECT OF INTERVENTION. IF QUESTIONED ABOUT OUR ATTITUDE YOU SHOULD CONFINE YOURSELF TO QUOTING THE STATEMENT ON THIS SUBJECT MADE BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE IN NEW YORK ON 23 SEPTEMBER: I.E. "WE HAVE NOT BEEN THINKING IN TERMS OF MILITARY INTERVENTION IN THIS STRIFE AT ALL". YOU SHOULD NOT SAY ANYTHING ABOUT OUR LIKELY ATTITUDE TOWARDS INTERVENTION BY OTHERS.
4. YOU HAVE DISCRETION TO DRAW ON MY TELEGRAMS NO.799 AND NO.858 TO MOSCOW (BOTH REPEATED TO YOU) IN DESCRIBING OUR RECENT CONTACTS WITH THE RUSSIANS.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

[COPIES SENT TO NO 10 DOWNING STREET  
FOR MR. MOON AND TO CABINET OFFICE  
FOR SIR R. HOOPER]

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CYPHER CAT 'A'

S E C R E T

FLASH TEL AVIV

TO MOD UK DI 4

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOH 241245Z

24 SEPTEMBER 1970

S E C R E T

ADDRESSED FLASH MOD UK DI 4 R F I FLASH DA AMMAN  
JIS NE AND WASHINGTON.

NET 1/4

FOH 241245Z SEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

REF MY FOH 240950Z SEPT.

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 241100Z SEPT.

ONE. IDF REPORT IRBID HAS BEEN RETAKEN BY THE ARMY WHO  
ARE NOW QUOTE MOPPING UP IN THE TOWN UNQUOTE.

TWO. THE PLA UNITS IN IRBID AREA ARE SAID TO BE THREE  
COMMANDO BATTALIONS OF THE 'HITTIN FORCE'. THEY HAVE  
NO ARMOUR AND THE IDF RECKON THIS IS ONE AND THE SAME AS  
THE 1 FEDAYEEN INFANTRY BRIGADE.

THREE. THE SYRIAN INVASION FORCE HAS NOW TAKEN UP  
POSITION IN SYRIA. 67 BRIGADE IS IN DERA A AREA.  
88 BRIGADE IN HARAA AND 12 ARMoured REGIMENT IN TAFAS. THERE  
IS NO INFORMATION ON 45 ARMoured REGIMENT.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH WASHINGTON AND DEFCONCEN.

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH JIS NE AND MOD UK DI 4.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.].

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N.E.D.

S E C R E T



EN CLAIR  
FLASH BEIRUT  
TELEGRAM NO. 498

SECRET

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
24 SEPTEMBER 1970

NET 1/4

UNCLASSIFIED 240635Z

FOR EMERGENCY UNIT.

FCO TELEGRAM NO. 2144 TO WASHINGTON DTG 231633Z [TELETYPE CONFERENCE  
REACHED HERE 240557Z. PLEASE ENSURE ALL SUCH WITH AIRMAN 1400Z 23/9]  
TELEGRAMS ARE PASSED TO US FLASH.

MR. EDDEN

FILES  
EMERGENCY STAFF  
H.E.D.  
COMMS DEPT.-----  
D.V.S.

*per*  
*2/4*

SECRET



NES 1/7

Mr. StanleyMr. Stanley

You will wish to know that Sir R. Hooper spoke to me at lunch today in the warmest terms about what he described as the magnificent work of the Emergency Staff since the current crisis began.

(Mr. Stanley)  
Mr. Stanley

per  
 in  
 sh

Copy to: ✓ Mr. Stanley  
 Mr. Hooper  
 Mr. Hooper  
 Mr. Hooper  
 Mr. Hooper  
 Mr. Hooper

Mr. Hooper Being circulated. 17/9  
 Mr. Hooper 17/9  
 Mr. Hooper 17/9  
 Mrs. Hooper 17/9  
 and please ensure that  
 all concerned for other  
 departments and the S/L  
 rings off and show Mrs.

17/9

20  
 17/9



CONFIDENTIAL

NED-to enter

NOTE ON ACTION TAKEN  
THE  
ALBANY

(343)

*The Prime Minister*

Following ~~your~~ talk with Sir Denis Greenhill tonight the following action was taken:-

(i) Sir Denis Greenhill spoke to the Soviet Ambassador. He said that we had received a report that the Syrians had moved some tanks across the Jordanian frontier for a short distance and had been firing on Jordanian positions. He was informing the Ambassador of this so that the Soviet Government might reinforce their representations to the Syrian Government for restraint. The Ambassador undertook to inform his Government.

(ii) Sir Denis Greenhill spoke to Dr. Kissinger and asked:-

a. Had they anything to tell us about the attitude of Mrs. Meir on the question of the hostages and of making a contribution towards their release following Mrs. Meir's talks with President Nixon?

b. Had they anything to tell us about the talks more generally?

/Dr. Kissinger said

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- 2 -

Dr. Kissinger said that there had been no significant movement from Mrs. Meir on the hostages. On the wider question of Middle East negotiations she had been pretty "strong". Her line had been that there could be no negotiations without rectification of the cease-fire violations.

Dr. Kissinger said that they also had received the report of the Syrian tank movements. Sir Denis Greenhill told him that he had just spoken to the Soviet Ambassador about this, which Dr. Kissinger greatly welcomed.

Dr. Kissinger said that they had received a note from the Russians on the situation which they thought conciliatory. He asked what our impression was of it and Sir Denis Greenhill said that we had formed the same view.

Dr. Kissinger said that he would ask Mr. Sisco to ring us back on the question of the hostages. He did so some half hour later to confirm that there had been no headway. The Israelis seemed to be waiting to see how the Jordanian situation came out. He said that they were considering what could be done on our initiative in the Berne group. Sir Denis Greenhill said that we also had been looking at

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/that



that and that they would be receiving some fresh ideas from us. Mr. Sisco promised to study them.

(iii) I spoke to Sir Colin Crowe in New York.

I told him of the report of the Syrian tank movements a limited distance across the border and of the firing. I asked him to take this up with U. Thant and to urge U. Thant to speak to the Syrians to have them withdraw. He should make it clear to U Thant that he should not associate us with his approach to the Syrians. Sir Colin Crowe confirmed that this would be possible since there was already sufficient information about the Syrian movement from public sources on which U Thant could base himself. Sir Colin Crowe when I spoke to him was at a dinner at which U Thant was also present, and he said that he would carry out the instructions straightaway.

(iv) A telegram was sent to Cairo (repeated to certain other posts) asking our Ambassador to speak to the U.A.R. Government to urge them to restrain the Syrians drawing attention to the dangers of an Israeli intervention.

c.c. Sir Denis Greenhill

September 19, 1970

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344

*Re dmm*

*25/9*

SECRET

IN WENDS 13P22/70 NO/10 STANDARD  
TO ENTER 1322 PRIORITY

NET 1/4

INFO IT CITE/OTTEL PARIS TELNY LBN PRIORITY DE CIT CANDELNATO  
PRIORITY DE LBN DEUT TNAV CAIRO PRIORITY LE PARIS  
SAG MOSCO IERAN DE OTI

*pm 2/10*

REF CURTEL 2610 SEP22  
JORDAN

COURTESY CALL ON 147 CLINE, DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH  
FOR STATE DEPT PRODUCED MORE DISPASSIONATE ASSESSMENT OF JORDANIAN  
SITUATION THAN DRAMATIC PRESS AND OTHER REPORTS CURRENTLY IN  
CIRCULATION. CLINE DID NOT/NOT DISPUTE GRAVITY OF DEVELOPMENTS BUT  
FELT THAT ASSESSMENTS OF SYRIAN INTENTIONS AND REDUCED STATUS OF  
JORDANIAN MILITARY FORCES WERE LARGELY EXAGGERATED. AS EXAMPLE HE  
NOTED THAT SYRIANS HAD NO/NO CHOICE BUT TO ATTEMPT TO DISCREDIT  
HUSSEIN REGIME AND BACK FETTYEN IN LIGHT OF CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT  
AND POSSIBLE MOVEMENT TOWARD MIDEAST SETTLEMENT. NEVERTHELESS  
THEIR INITIAL INTERVENTION WAS THROUGH SYRIAN-TRAINED PLO FORCES  
ALTHOUGH, AS IS NOW KNOWN, SYRIAN ARMY UNITS WERE SUBSEQUENTLY  
DEPLOYED TO IBID AREA. WHETHER THESE FORCES WILL MOVE FURTHER  
SOUTH IS OPEN TO CONJECTURE BUT CLINE NOTED THAT THEY NOW  
APPEAR TO BE QUOTE DICING IN UNQUOTE AND APART FROM MINOR FORAYS,  
MAY HAVE REACHED LIMITS OF PENETRATION OF JORDANIAN TERRITORY.

2. GIVEN WIDER SYRIAN AMBITIONS, CLINE STILL FELT THERE WAS A NUMBER OF  
INHIBITING FACTORS TO DETER FURTHER PENETRATION OR DRAMATIC



PAGE TWO 2422 SECRET NO/NO STANDARD

DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION. ALTHOUGH HE WOULD NOT/NOT OR COULD NOT/NOT ELABORATE, CLINE INDICATED HE BELIEVED THE RUSSIANS WERE WORKING ACTIVELY BEHIND THE SCENES TO QUOTE DAMPEN SYRIAN ARDOUR UNQUOTE AND IF HE BELIEVED SO, CLINE BELIEVED SOVIET INFLUENCE WOULD BE DECISIVE IN CURBING SYRIAN AMBITIONS. FURTHERMORE, SHOULD SYRIANS MOVE TOWARDS NORTHERN AREAS CLINE FELT THAT ISRAELIS MAY WELL INTERVENE TO PREVENT ANY THREAT TO THEIR VULNERABILITY IN GOLAN HEIGHTS AREA. FROM IRAQI POINT OF VIEW, CLINE NOTED THAT GOVT HAD BEEN VACILLATING BUT AT LEAST THE MILITARY FORCE DEPLOYED IN THE IRBID AREA HAD STOOD ASIDE AND AWAY FROM CONFLICT. RATIONALE FOR THEIR NON-INVOLVEMENT THIS WAS OPEN TO INTERPRETATION BUT BOTH HUSSEIN REGIME AND FEDAYEEN HAD CLAIMED IRAQI STANCE WAS FAVOURABLE TO THEIR RESPECTIVE POSITIONS.

IN FURTHER COMMENT, CLINE NOTED THAT JORDANIAN REGIME HAS BEEN MODULY PESSIMISTIC AND THAT DESPITE CURRENT CHAOS IN AMMAN, KING'S GROUPS ARE LARGELY IN CONTROL OF CITY AND TOTALLY CAPABLE OF MOP-UP OPERATIONS. CHALLENGE FROM SYRIANS IN NORTHERN AREAS IS MORE DIFFICULT BUT IF SITUATION DETERIORATED DRAMATICALLY, CLINE BELIEVED ISRAELIS WOULD PROBABLY INTERVENE TO PRESERVE HUSSEIN'S REGIME.

IN CLOSING CONVERSATION CLINE RETREATED SLIGHTLY AND INDICATED SITUATION COULD TURN IN ANY DIRECTION AT ANY TIME UNQUOTE. HE NOTED HOWEVER THAT OBSERVERS SHOULD NOT/NOT BE SWAYED BY DRAMATIC AND SENSATIONAL REPORTS OF HOSTILITIES WHICH IS NOT/NOT SUBSTANTIATED BY FACTS. ALTHOUGH SITUATION IS CONFUSED AND CLOUDED WITH UNCERTAINTIES, THE JORDANIAN FORCES HAVE NOT/NOT BEEN DEFEATED.

RFT 222206Z



C O N F I D E N T I A L

FM WSHDN SEP22/70 NO/HO STANDARD

TO ENTER 2610 IMMED

INFO TT CANFORCELAD INMED PARIS PRINY LDN DE OTT B RUT TAVIV INMI

TACRO GENIV DE 4-TIPIS CAIDELANTO DE LDN

THE MOSCO TEAM LA OTT

REF LON TEL 3180 9 11

JORDAN:STATE DEPT JITHSP

INFO AVAILABLE TO STATE DEPT AS OF 1000 HOURS EDT SEP22 SUGGESTS  
THAT SYRIAN ARMORED FORCE ~~HAS~~ TAKEN UP DEFENSIVE POSITIONS A FEW  
MILES SOUTH OF IREED. THEY MOVED OUT OF THESE POSITIONS BRIEFLY  
YESTERDAY BUT THIS APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN RESPONSE TO JORDANIAN

THESE ARE THE MAIN ELEMENTS OF THE MOVEMENT. THERE IS SHORT  
NO INFORMATION AS TO THE LIFE OF THE MOVEMENT. THE SIDES APPEAR TO  
THE MOVEMENT. THE SIDES ARE THE SIDES. THERE ARE INDIVIDUALS SYRIANS  
THE SIDES ARE THE SIDES. THE SIDES ARE THE SIDES. THE SIDES ARE THE SIDES  
ON SYRIAN OBJECTIVES.

[illegible]







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IN CANDELARIO 0012/75 10/10 STANDARD

TO TT ENTER 0121 PRIORITY DE LDU

IN LDU AT PARIS 0012/75 10/10 STANDARD DE LDU ROME ANKRA DE  
PARIS USHDC DE 012

IN LDU AT PARIS 0012/75 10/10 STANDARD DE LDU ROME ANKRA DE  
012 0012/75 10/10 STANDARD DE LDU ROME ANKRA DE

SELEEN INFORMED MORRIS LUNCH OF PERMEPS TODAY THAT BECAUSE OF  
STANDBY EVACUATION MEASURES MIGHT INVOLVE  
TEMPORARY WITHDRAWAL OF SOME USA FORCES ASSIGNED TO ACE, HE HAD  
IMMEDIATELY CONTACTED USA AUTHORITIES AND SACEUR. RESULT WAS  
THAT UNTIL CRISIS IS RESOLVED, FULL INFO ON DEVELOPMENTS IN AREA  
WILL BE FURNISHED BY USA TO NATO SO THAT NATO PROCEDURES  
CAN BE FULLY OBSERVED SHOULD NATO ASSIGNED FORCES BE INVOLVED.  
HE STRESSED THAT NO NATO OR NATO ALERT MEASURES WERE  
CONTEMPLATED ALTHOUGH USA HAD INTRODUCED CERTAIN MEASURES OF NATO  
VIGILANCE.

2. USA ACTING PER PER EMPHASIZED THAT USA NATO PRECAUTIONARY  
MEASURES WERE CONFINED SOLELY TO CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR PERS  
EVACUATION IN JORDAN, SOME ACC IN NUMBER. ADMIN RECOGNIZED THAT  
THERE WAS NO POSSIBILITY OF RALLYING PUBLIC SUPPORT BEHIND  
ANY BROADER INTERVENTION GIVEN PUBLIC DISENCHANTMENT OVER VIETNAM  
INVOLVEMENT. IF IMPLEMENTED, MILITARY RESOURCES WOULD BE BORNE BY  
USA AIRBORNE BRIGADE IN GERMANY AND BY 82ND AIRBORNE REGIMENT



010 110 0 11 11

IN USA, AND THEIR ASSOCIATED AIRLIFT. NATO PROCEDURES FOR  
WITHDRAWAL OF ASSIGNED FORCES WOULD BE STRICTLY OBSERVED. HE WAS  
UNABLE TO SAY WHETHER WIDESPREAD LEAKS ABOUT CERTAIN MILITARY  
PREPARATIONS WERE INTENDED AS A DELIBERATE WARNING SIGNAL TO PREVENT  
FURTHER OUTSIDE INTERVENTION OR WAS SIMPLY PRODUCT OF FREE PRESS

1. HE SUMMARIZED LATEST DEVELOPMENTS AS FOLLOWS

2. THAT USSR HAD REPLIED YESTERDAY TO EARLIER USA REQUEST  
TO CEASE TO RESTRAIN SYRIA BY CONFIRMING THAT THEY WERE IN  
CONTACT WITH SYRIAN GOVT AND WITH FEDAYEEN AND HOPED USA WOULD  
EQUALLY RESTRAIN ISRAEL.

3. LATEST REPORTS ON IRAQI FORCES IN AREA FACING NORTHEAST  
JORDAN WERE THAT THEY WERE ACTIVE AND MOVING SOUTH. IRAQIS WERE  
MAINTAINED IN A STATE OF ALERT BUT AS FAR AS USA KNEW WERE  
RESERVING DEFENSIVE PRECAUTIONS ONLY.

4. DISCUSSION WHICH FOLLOWED BROUGHT OUT THAT FRENCH CAUTIONARY  
STATEMENT ON OUTSIDE INTERVENTION WAS MEANT TO APPLY EVENHANDEDLY  
TO SYRIA'S IRAQIS AND ISRAEL.

5. CONSENSUS WAS THAT ARAB SUMMIT COULD PROMOTE A CEASE FIRE LEAVING  
FEDAYEEN IN CONTROL OF NORTH JORDAN, THUS IN EFFECT CREATING A  
DIVIDED COUNTRY AND A TERRITORIAL SANCTUARY FOR PLO. SUCH  
AN OUTCOME MIGHT SUIT USSR SINCE IT WOULD MARK SOME GAIN FOR  
ARAB STATES IN ORDER TO DISCUSS PROPOSALS, TEMPORARILY  
IN ORDER TO BRING ABOUT A WORKING, TO SEE A NEGOTIATED, INTERGOVTL.  
SETTLEMENT OF THE ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT. REOPENING OF SUEZ CANAL  
WAS RECOGNIZED AS A FURTHER OBJECTIVE OF USSR, ATTAINABLE ONLY  
ALONG LINES OF ROGERS PROPOSALS

CAMPBELL

RFT 221831Z



SECRET

FM CANDELNATO SEP22/79 NO/NO STANDARD

TO IT EXTER 2110 DE LON

INFO IT PIRATE DE LON 2101 FROM CAIRO DE PARIS CFHQ WSHDC PRHNY  
DE OTT

BAG MOSCO DE LON TERAN DE OTT

SITUATION IN JORDAN

USA DEL HAS CIRCULATED REPORT ON VISIT PAID TO STATE DEPT BY  
SOVIET CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES BURTON WHICH HE QUOTE EXPRESSED HIS GOVTS  
CONCERN OVER SHARP AGGRAVATION OF SITUATION IN JORDAN WHICH  
COMPLICATED PEACE SETTLEMENT IN THE EAST AND MIGHT ADVERSELY AFFECT  
CONTINUING EFFORTS TO FIND WAYS OF ACHIEVING POLITICAL SETTLEMENT  
OF MIDEAST CONFLICT. UNQUOTE. HIS GOVT URGED PRUDENCE ON ALL STATES  
QUOTE IN CONNECTION WITH PREVAILING COMPLEX SITUATION IN AREA  
UNQUOTE. JORDAN REQUESTED TO USE ITS INFLUENCE WITH ISRAEL TO AVOID  
STILL GREYER AGGRAVATION OF SITUATION. USSR HAS URGED JORDAN IRAQ  
SYRIA AND URBAN TO AVOID TO BLOODSHED IN JORDAN AND TO PREVENT  
OUTBREAK OF CIVIL WAR. USSR HAS ALSO SEEKING WAYS TO BRING ITS  
POINT OF VIEW TO ATTENTION OF THE LEADERSHIP OF PALESTINE MOVEMENT.

2. USA DELS LET ALSO REPORTS ON SISCO REPLY SEP20 TO SOVIET  
DEMARCHE REGARDING JORDANIAN SITUATION AND ASKING THAT USSR TAKE  
QUOTE APPROPRIATE ACTION UNQUOTE IN DAMASCUS.

3. USA DEL IS SHARING AT TEMPO OF ITS REPORTS ON SITUATION IN  
JORDAN. THESE ARE BEING CIRCULATED THROUGH SITCEN FOR IN-HOUSE  
DISTR. USA DEL AT TEMPO IS HQ OF PAC GAVE FURTHER DETAILS ON SITUATION  
WHICH WILL BE REPORTED IN SEPARATE TEL.

RFT 221435Z



CONFIDENTIAL

IN CAIRO SEP22/70 NO/NO STANDARD

TO IT EXTER 626 DE PARIS

INFO PARIS TAVIV BEUT IT CANFORCED WSHDC PRMNY DE OTT

LDN DE PARIS MOSCO NATO DE LON

SAG:TERAN TUNIS DE OTT

JORDAN SITUATION-EGYPTIAN VIEWS

CALLED TODAY ON MOHAMED FAYEK MINISTER OF STATE IN MFA. FAYEK TOOK  
1. FAYEK WAS PREVIOUSLY MINISTER OF INFO.  
FAYEK SAID THAT UAR HAD CONSISTENTLY PRESSED FOR A CEASEFIRE  
IN JORDAN AND FOR A RECONCILIATION BETWEEN GOVT AND FEDAYEEN.  
FEDAYEEN COULD NOT/NOT BE PUT DOWN BY MILITARY MEANS. A REVLNARY  
MOVEMENT LIKE THIS WOULD CONTINUE TO EXIST REGARDLESS OF  
ATTEMPTS TO SUPPRESS IT UNTIL THERE WAS SOME SERIOUS ATTEMPT TO  
1. FAYEK REMARKED ON HEAVY CASUALTIES  
IN RECENT FIGHTING AND ALSO OBSERVED THAT IT WAS HUSSEIN RATHER  
THAN FEDAYEEN WHO HAD FRUSTRATED NASSERS EFFORTS TO OBTAIN  
CEASEFIRE OVER WEEKEND. IF HUSSEIN HAD TRIED DIFFERENT APPROACH  
OTHER THAN MILITARY ACTION UAR WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO GIVE HIM  
SUBSTANTIAL HELP. HOWEVER FAYEK OBSERVED THAT THE KING HAD A  
GOOD DEAL OF RIGHT ON HIS SIDE AS WELL. LAW AND ORDER MUST BE  
MAINTAINED AND THIS WAS RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVT. WHAT WAS WANTED  
WAS A MODUS VIVENDI SUCH AS HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN LEBANON.  
2. WHEN I ASKED FAYEK ABOUT THE MOVEMENT OF TANKS ACROSS BORDER  
WITH SYRIA HE SAID THAT THE SYRIANS CLAIMED THAT THE TANKS



PAGE TWO 616 CORFD NO/HO STANDARD

BELONGED TO PLO (NOT TO THEIR ARMY.) OBSERVED VARIOUS REPORTS INDICATED THAT WELL OVER 100 TANKS HAD CROSSED THE BORDER, AND THAT

IT WAS HARD TO IMAGINE SUCH A LARGE NUMBER OF TANKS UNDER PLO

CONTROL. FAYEK SAID THERE WERE CONFLICTING REPORTS ABOUT NUMBER

OF TANKS AND HE THOUGHT THAT FIGURE OF WELL OVER 100 WAS

CERTAINLY EXAGGERATED. IN ANY CASE HE WAS OBVIOUSLY UNWILLING AT

PRESENT TO EXPRESS ANY SCEPTISM ABOUT SYRIAN LINE. HE POINTED

OUT THAT FAYEK HAD HIS DESIRE TO REACH AN ACCOMMODATION

WITH SYRIAN GOVERNMENT, WITH DANGER AND OTHER LEADERS, ALTHOUGH

IT WAS NOT QUITE CLEAR IF HE WOULD TAKE A FORMAL PART IN

SUMMIT NYC.

4. FAYEK SAID THAT UAR WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT MOVEMENTS OF SIXTH

FLEET AND OF POSSIBILITY OF USA MILITARY INTERVENTION. THE UAR

WAS OPPOSED TO OUTSIDE MILITARY INTERVENTION IN JORDAN FROM ANY

QUARTER.

5. HE FELT THAT THERE WAS A GOOD POSSIBILITY FOR A SOLUTION IN

JORDAN AT ARAB SUMMIT WHICH IS TO START THIS AFTERNOON. IT WAS

NOTED THAT KING FEISAL HAD AGREED TO COME. KING HUSSEIN HAD

ORIGINALLY SAID HE WOULD COME BUT LATER SAID HE WAS UNABLE

TO DO SO. HE SAID THAT HE WOULD BE REPRESENTED

BY PM. FAYEK REGRETTED THIS DECISION BECAUSE HE FELT THAT IF

ALL THE ARAB LEADERS WERE THERE (PRESUMABLY ARAFAT) HAD ALL BEEN THERE

THERE WOULD HAVE BEEN GOOD OPPORTUNITY OF ARRIVING AT QUICK

AGREEMENT. HE SAID HE HAD POSSIBILITY OF DISCUSSING SITUATION IN

...3



PAGE THREE SIG CONFO HOFHO STANDARD

JORDAN AT TELFATEK SAID THAT AS THERE WAS TO BE A SUMMIT MTG  
UNDER AUSPICES OF ARAB LEAGUE (THE APPROPRIATE REGIONAL ORGANIZATION)  
HE THOUGHT IT BETTER THAT THE UN SHOULD NOT/NOT TAKE ACTION  
AT THE MOMENT.

WATER





✓

Mr P. Adams.

DNB

21/9

With the Compliments of

MR. MOON

Poll

Mr. S. P. P. /

22/9

22/9

Mr. Hallam (S.M.)

for Mr. Hallam

10 DOWNING STREET,  
WHITEHALL, S.W.1.

NEJ1/4



NEJ 1/4  
(30,000)

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CYPHER/CAT.A.

FLASH FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO WASHINGTON.

TELEGRAM NO.2153

24 SEPTEMBER 1970 (NE)

P  
u  
2/10

CONFIDENTIAL - 241320Z.

Addressed to Washington telegram No.2153 of 24 September.  
Repeated for information to: Amman.

Amman telegram No.645: [Message from American Ambassador].

We have passed this message to the American Embassy  
here.

DOUGLAS-HONE.

F I L E S:

N.E.D.

EMERGENCY STAFF

VVVVV

CONFIDENTIAL

346

Emergency Unit Staff

Would you please ensure that any material for...  
Mr. Godber is also passed to Mr. Rippon through  
Mr. Battiscombe.

NET 51/4

*[Handwritten signature]*

Mr. Battiscombe

*[Handwritten initials]*  
r/u



(347)

FCCO PSE PASS TO AMMAN)

EX-100 CAT 'A'

SECRET

FLASH TEL AMV

NO

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (UK)

TELEGRAM NUMBER FOM 250815Z

25 SEPTEMBER 1971

SECRET

NEJ 1/4

ADDRESSED FLASH MOD UK DI 4 REF 1 FLASH JIS NE, DA AMMAN,  
WASHINGTON.

FOM 250815Z SEPT FROM PRITHILAT.

REF NY FOM 241245Z SEPT.

*Regg. he*  
*Pa on to* (347)  
*Mum*

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 250800Z SEPT.

28/1

ONE. IDF REPORT SITUATION IN IREID IS STILL NOT CLEAR. JORDAN ARMY TANKS ARE IN THE STREETS BUT THERE IS STILL FIRING FROM FEDAYEEN AND COUNTER-FIRE BY THE ARMY. THE IDF SAY IT IS THE SAME STORY AS AMMAN OVER AGAIN, THE MASSIVE USE OF FIRE-POWER BY TANKS AND ARTILLERY BUT NO INFANTRY TO FOLLOW UP AND CLEAR TOWN.

TWO. THE SITUATION IN AMMAN IS THAT THERE IS STILL FIRING BY MORTARS AND RECOILLESS RIFLES AS WELL AS SNIPERS. THE ARMY ARE REPORTED AS HAVING CLEARED THE HUSSEIN REFUGEE CAMP OF FEDAYEEN AND CAPTURED A LARGE NUMBER OF PRISONERS. WANDAT CAMP IS REPORTED QUIET WITH EXCEPTION OF QUOTE A FEW SNIPERS UNQUOTE. THE JEBEL NUWEIDA (WHERE U S EMBASSY IS LOCATED) IS ONE OF THE MAIN AREAS WHERE FIRING CONTINUES. THERE IS STILL NO NEWS OF HOSTAGES.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH DEFCONCEN AND WASHINGTON

DEFCONCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH MOD UK DI 4 , JIS NE.

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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SECRET

MPHER/CAT A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 493

TO PARIS

24 SEPT 1979.

(AMMO. ONLY)

NET 1/4

346 ✓

*mm*

CONFIDENTIAL. 241031Z.

ADDRESSED TO PARIS TELNO 493 OF 24 SEPT. REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON, UKNIS NEW YORK, MOSCOW, AMMAN, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT AND C G GENEVA.

#### JORDAN SITUATION.

THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CALLED ON THE PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY ON 23 SEPTEMBER. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD HAD SEVERAL TALKS WITH THE SYRIANS IN RECENT DAYS. THE SYRIANS HAD ON EACH OCCASION INSISTED THAT THERE WAS NO REGULAR SYRIAN UNIT IN JORDAN AND ASSURED THE FRENCH THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO SEE THE SYRIAN ARMY INVOLVED THERE. GENERAL ASSAD HAD SAID THAT 40 PLA TANKS (NOT A LARGER FORCE), HAD CROSSED FROM SYRIA TO JORDAN AND HAD BEEN JOINED BY 10 JORDANIAN TANKS WHICH HAD DEFECTED.

2. COURCEL SAID THAT THE FRENCH HAD ALSO HAD SEVERAL EXCHANGES WITH THE RUSSIANS, WHO HAD EQUALLY ASSURED THEM THAT THEY DID NOT WANT AN EXPANSION OF THE WAR, THAT THEY WERE URGING THE SYRIANS NOT TO BECOME INVOLVED AND THAT THEY HOPED THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT WERE MAKING THE SAME POINT TO THE AMERICANS.

3. ON THE QUESTION OF MEDICAL ASSISTANCE FOR JORDAN, THE P.U.S. SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESSING THE ICRC TO SHOW A GREATER SENSE OF URGENCY IN THEIR OPERATIONS. COURCEL SAID THAT THE FRENCH GOVERNMENT HAD ALSO BEEN COOPERATING WITH THE ICRC. THEIR IMPRESSION WAS THAT THE ICRC HAD DONE AS WELL AS THEY COULD HAVE BEEN EXPECTED TO IN DIFFICULT CIRCUMSTANCES. THE FRENCH HAD HELPED THEM WITH THEIR COMMUNICATIONS FROM AMMAN. IT SEEMED THAT THE ICRC THOUGHT THEY HAD ENOUGH SURGEONS TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM, AND THAT THEY NEEDED ABOVE ALL CARS AND AMBULANCES TO HELP WITH TRANSPORT IN AMMAN.

/s. COURCEL

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-2-

4. COURCEL SAID THAT HE HAD SEEN A REPORT OF MY TALKS WITH THE FRENCH PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE. HE HAD HAD NO REACTION FROM M. SCHUMANN TO THE IDEA OF AN ANGLO/FRENCH STATEMENT. THE TWO FRENCH PREOCCUPATIONS WERE TO AVOID OUTSIDE INTERFERENCE IN JORDAN (WHETHER FROM SYRIA, IRAQ, ISRAEL OR THE UNITED STATES) AND TO MAKE THE PROBLEM THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS, OR AT LEAST OF THE FOUR POWERS. AN ANGLO/FRENCH STATEMENT MIGHT UNDERLINE THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN OURSELVES AND THE RUSSIANS AND THE AMERICANS. THE FRENCH WANTED TO KEEP THE SUPERPOWERS ASSOCIATED WITH THE TASK OF PEACE-MAKING. THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR IN PARIS, IN CONVERSATION WITH ALPHAND, HAD NOT REJECTED THE IDEA OF A FOUR POWER STATEMENT, WHICH COURCEL THOUGHT COULD STILL BE USEFUL AT A LATER STAGE.

5. ON THE ANGLO/ISRAELI DEBATE IN GENERAL, COURCEL STATED THE FOLLOWING FRENCH VIEW ABOUT THE NEED FOR A FOUR POWER EFFORT. HE SAID THAT BOTH THE RUSSIANS AND THE EGYPTIANS HAD STILL NOT GIVEN UP HOPE OF THE JAZRING TALKS. THE QUESTION OF CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS HAD BEEN EXAGGERATED. THE P.U.S. SAID THAT AFTER STUDYING THE EVIDENCE OF U.A.R. VIOLATIONS VERY CAREFULLY, HE BELIEVED THAT THEY HAD BEEN BOTH SUBSTANTIAL AND CONTINUOUS. IT HAD TO BE REMEMBERED THAT BEFORE THE CEASEFIRE BEGAN, NASSER HAD EFFECTIVELY COMMITTED HIMSELF TO IMPROVING EGYPTIAN DEFENCES. COURCEL REPEATED THAT IT WOULD BE WRONG TO EXAGGERATE THE EXTENT OR SIGNIFICANCE OF VIOLATIONS ON THE EGYPTIAN SIDE. THERE HAD ALSO BEEN VIOLATIONS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE.

DOUGLAS-HOME [COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 D.S.].

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EMERGENCY STAFF

COPY TO:  
SIR R. HOOPER, CABINET OFFICE

(AMERICAN SECTION)  
(SOVIET SECTION)

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S E C R E T

NET 1/4

CYFHER/CAT A

STATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TO UNDEL NATO  
TELNO 328 24 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET. 240520Z.

MY TELEGRAM NO 327.

THE FOLLOWING IS AN ABBREVIATED VERSION OF THE SITUATION REPORT AS  
AT 0500Z ON 24 SEPTEMBER :-

A. MILITARY SITUATION.

2. AMMAN REMAINED QUIET AND A NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT WERE ABLE TO FLY  
IN AND OUT. THE ARMY ARE STILL SHELLING ISOLATED POCKETS OF  
RESISTANCE.

AFTER TAKING HEAVY PUNISHMENT FROM THE JORDANIENS, SOME SYRIAN  
UNITS ARE BEING WITHDRAWN. THE ISRAELIS ASSERT THAT THE SYRIAN  
WITHDRAWAL WAS DUE TO ARAB AND SOVIET PRESSURE AND TO THE FEAR  
OF ISRAELI AND U.S. INTERVENTION. IRAQI FORCES REMAIN IN JORDAN  
WITHOUT TAKING ANY ACTION.

3. THE BUILD-UP OF ISRAELI FORCES IN THE NORTH EAST OF  
ISRAEL CONTINUES AND IS NOW AT THE LEVEL OF FOUR BRIGADES OR  
EQUIVALENT. NO FIRM DECISIONS ARE UNDERSTOOD TO HAVE BEEN TAKEN  
AT AN ISRAELI CABINET MEETING, WHERE THE BALANCE OF OPINION,  
INCLUDING THAT OF DAYAN, IS THOUGHT TO BE AGAINST INTERVENTION.

B. DIPLOMATIC ACTIVITY.

4. THE FRENCH OFFICIAL VIEW IS BROADLY FAVOURABLE TO THE SECRETARY  
OF STATE'S IDEA OF A JOINT FOUR-POWER STATEMENT, ALTHOUGH THEY  
THINK SUCH AN APPEAL MIGHT IMPLY THE COLLAPSE OF THE FOUR-POWER  
MACHINERY. M. SCHUMANN'S VIEWS ARE BEING SOUGHT.

/ 5.

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

- 2 -

5. SIR C. CROWE HAS SEEN THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL. MALIK HAS TOLD THE PRESIDENT THAT HE DOUBTED THE APPROPRIATENESS OF A FOUR-POWER MEETING, BUT ANY STATEMENT TO ISSUE FROM ONE WOULD HAVE TO INCLUDE A REFERENCE TO ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL.

6. REPORTS FROM CAIRO ABOUT THE ARAB SUMMIT INDICATE A DEGREE OF CONFUSION. A JOINT MISSION LED BY PRESIDENT NUNEIRI HAS VISITED AMMAN. IT WAS CHARGED WITH STOPPING THE FIGHTING, LIMITING THE CRISIS SO AS TO PREVENT FOREIGN INTERVENTION AND FINDING A MODUS VIVENDI.

C. EVACUATION.

7. A CHARTERED DC6 BROUGHT OUT 21 BRITISH AND 9 U.N. WOMEN AND CHILDREN (THE U.N. GROUP INCLUDED 2 BRITISH). ON 24 SEPTEMBER IT IS HOPE TO EVACUATE A FURTHER 35 BRITISH AND 36 U.N. (OF WHOM 20 ARE BRITISH OR COMMONWEALTH). AFTER THAT THOSE BRITISH SUBJECTS LEFT WILL BE THOSE THE EMBASSY CANNOT REACH (ABOUT 42) OR CANNOT SPARE AND THOSE WHO CONSIDER IT THEIR DUTY TO STAY.

8. AN I.C.R.C. AIRCRAFT BROUGHT OUT ABOUT 50 WOMEN, CHILDREN AND JOURNALISTS.

9. EVACUATION PLANS FOR 24 SEPTEMBER DEPEND ON THE STATE OF SECURITY AT AMMAN AIRPORT, ON WHICH WE HOPE FOR EARLY ASSURANCES FROM AMMAN.

10. SUBJECT TO CONFIRMATION THAT THE FULL LENGTH OF THE AIRPORT RUNWAY WILL BE AVAILABLE, A H.E.A. CARAVELLE HAS BEEN HIRED TO BE AVAILABLE AT AMMAN AT 0900Z.

/ 11.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

JOINT AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELNO 528 TO UNDEL NATO

- 3 -.

11. BY THE WAY OF BACKUP AND IN CASE ADDITIONAL CAPACITY IS REQUIRED TWO DC3 AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN CHARTERED ONE OF WHICH COULD BE AT AMMAN AT 0900Z AND THE SECOND (IF ITS SERVICABILITY IS CONFIRMED) DURING THE AFTERNOON.

12. IF THE FULL LENGTH OF AMMAN RUNWAY IS NOT AVAILABLE, THE FIRST DC3 MUST LEAVE BEIRUT NOT LATER THAN 0630Z.

13. R.A.F. AIRCRAFT ARE BEING POSITIONED TO BRING EVACUEES TO THIS COUNTRY FROM NICOSIA, WHERE THEY ARE BEING ASSEMBLED AND IF NECESSARY FROM BEIRUT IF THE EVACUEES CANNOT GET TO NICOSIA BY CHARTERED AIRCRAFT.

14. THE I.C.R.C. ARE UNLIKELY TO AGREE THAT EVACUATION AGREEMENTS SHOULD BE UNDER THEIR JURISDICTION BECAUSE OF LEGAL COMPLICATIONS.

15. THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR HAS DECIDED TO EVACUATE ALL UNESSENTIAL MEMBERS OF HIS STAFF AND TO ADVISE THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY TO LEAVE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE CHINESE, GERMANS, DUTCH AND ITALIANS ARE INVITED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE AMERICAN EVACUATION BEGINNING TODAY.

D. RELIEF.

16. FURTHER MEDICAL SUPPLIES WERE FLOWN INTO AMMAN BY THE I.C.R.C. AND OUR DC6.

17. I.C.R.C. GENIVA ARE CONCENTRATING ON HELP OFFERED BY ARAB GOVERNMENTS. THE PALESTINIANS ARE OBJECTING TO HELP FROM CERTAIN QUARTERS, INCLUDING OURSELVES AND THE AMERICANS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

F I L E S

EMERGENCY STAFF

W.O.D.

N.E.D.

MR. BENDALL

MR. ARTHUR

S E C R E T

FFFFF



NE 51/4

348

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER/CAT A

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1261

TO UKMIS NEW YORK  
24 SEPTEMBER 1970. (EM.  
STAFF

CONFIDENTIAL. 241255Z

ADDRESSED TO UKMIS NEW YORK TELNO 1261 OF 24/9 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON UKDEL NATO BEIRUT CG GENEVA TEL AVIV  
MOSCOW ANKARA PARIS CAIRO BERNE.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING ARE ESSENTIALS OF TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN AT  
1930Z:

AMMAN.

I SHALL NOW ATTEMPT TO GIVE SOME DESCRIPTION OF MY TALK WITH  
KING HUSSEIN AT HOMMAR LAST NIGHT.

IT WAS NOT VERY PRODUCTIVE EITHER OF FACTS OR IDEAS AND  
THIS ACCOUNT MAY BE RATHER INCOHERANT SINCE WE ARE IN THE  
MIDDLE OF GETTING OFF A CONVOY TO THE AIRPORT AT THE SAME  
TIME AS THE ARMY ARE BACK AT THEIR OLD GAME OF BLASTING OUT  
SNIPERS WITH ARTILLERY AND THE MAIN ARMOURMENT OF TANKS.

FOR BREVITY I WILL TABULATE THE POINTS THAT EMERGED.

A.. THE KING HAS RECOVERED HIS NERVE AS A RESULT OF HIS SUCESS  
IN DRIVING BACK THE SYRIANS AND ONCE AGAIN SURROUNDING IRBID.  
HE MAY INDEED BY NOW HAVE TAKEN IT.

/B.. HE SPENT

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CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

- B.. HE SPENT SOME TEN MINUTES JUSTIFYING THE AMMAN MASACRE (''A CANCER OPERATION THAT HAD TO BE PERFORMED TO SAVE JORDANS LIFE''). AND SOME TWENTY MINUTES DESCRIBING THE COURSE OF OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SYRIANS.
- C.. RESPONSIBILITY WHICH HAD NECESSITATED AN ALL OUT MILITARY ATTACK ON THE FEDAYEEN LAY AT THE DOOR OF THE TWO FACED POLITICIANS WHO HAD ENCOURAGED AND PROTECTED THEM WHILE PRETENDING TO BE LOYAL SERVANTS OF THE KING. WHAT THE COUNTRY NEEDED AND WOULD GET FOR THE FORSEEABLE FUTURE WAS A MILITARY GOVERNMENT. THERE WOULD BE NO RETURN (SIC) TO PARTY POLITICS. EVENTUALLY A NATIONAL ASSEMBLY MIGHT BE RECREATED.
- D.. THE KING DISAGREED WITH ME WHEN I SUGGESTED THAT THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT MIGHT BE BADLY WOUNDED BUT WAS FAR FROM DEAD. HE SAID IT COULD NOT SURVIVE A ''BROKEN BACK'' HE SCOUTED MY SUGGESTION THAT IT WOULD SURVIVE AND RECOVER IN SYRIA HE THOUGHT IT MORE LIKELY THAT THE SYRIAN GOVERNMENT MIGHT FALL AS A RESULT OF THEIR REVERSE IN JORDAN. THE BAATHIST REGIME BOTH IN SYRIA AND IRAQ MUST HAVE BEEN DISCREDITED BY RECENT EVENTS.
- E.. THE KINGS RELATIONS WITH NASSER WERE UNDER SOME STRAIN AND HE PARTICULARLY RESENTED THE REPROACHFUL TONE ADOPTED BY THE U A R CHIEF OF STAFF WHO HAD VISITED HIM EARLIER IN THE DAY TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES FROM TUNISIA SUDAN AND KUWAIT AND THE U A R AMBASSADOR HAD BEEN MOST UNHELPFUL THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS HOWEVER THE DELEGATION HAD AGREED

/TO SUPOORT

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F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO.1261 TO UKMIS NEW YORK.

-3-

TO SUPPORT THE TERMS WHICH THE KING HAD WORKED OUT WITH ABU AYYAD (THE CAPTURED FEDAYEEN DEPUTY LEADER) FOR A CEASE FIRE PLUS WITHDRAWAL OF ARMED FEDAYEEN FROM THE TOWNS AND REFUGEE CAMPS BACK TO THE BORDER AREA WITH ISRAEL.

AMMAN.

F.. SAMIR KHATIB ANOTHER FEDAYEEN LEADER CAPTURED WAS A "GOOD PALESTINIAN" AND HAD PROVED MOST COOPERATIVE HE WAS NOW PROVIDING A USEFUL HELP AT JORDAN ARMY INTELLIGENCE HQ.

G.. I KEPT TRYING TO GET H.M. TO FOCUS ON THE URGENT PROBLEM OF RESTORING LIFE TO THE DEVASTATED CITY. THE DEAD MUST BE BURIED THE WOUNDED TENDED FOOD SOMEHOW BROUGHT IN WATER MADE TO FLOW AND SOME BASIC FACILITIES RESTORED IN PARTICULAR ELECTRICITY. THE KING SAID ALL THIS WAS VERY MUCH ON HIS MIND AND HE HOPED TO START THE PROCESS OF RESTORATION AS SOON AS IT WAS PRACTICABLE. FEDAYEEN WERE STILL RESISTING IN SOME AREAS. I SAID SURELY RESTORATION COULD START IN SOME OTHER AREAS' THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THIS WAS GOING ON WOULD INCREASE POPULAR RESENTMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN WHO CONTINUED TO RESIST DRAW THE ARMY'S FIRE AND POSTPONE HELP. THE KING REITERATED HE WOULD START THE PROCESS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

/H.. THE KING

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-4-

H.. THE KING CONCLUDED BY THANKING H.M.G. FOR THEIR MORALE SUPPORT THROUGHOUT THE CRISIS AND ALSO FOR THEIR PROMPT RESPONSE TO HIS APPEAL FOR MEDICAL AID. HE NEW THAT MOHAD TEAMS STANDING BY AND THAT AN RAMC LIASON OFFICER HAD ARRIVED. HE HOPED THAT ICRC UMBRELLA WOULD NOT TAKE MUCH LONGER TO UNFOLD.

LONDON.

MANY THANKS FOR THIS EXTREMELY USEFUL SUMMARY.

DO YOU KNOW WHETHER THE CARAVELLE HAS LANDED AND WHETHER IT HAS AGAIN TAKEN OFF????

AMMAN.

SORRY I DO NOT YET KNOW THIS BUT THE CONVOY LEFT FOR THE AIRPORT SOME 53 MINS AGO. MY CONSUL AND A.A. ACCOMPANIED IT AS THEY DID YESTERDAYS CONVOY. WE CANNOT EASILY CONTACT THE AIRPORT AND I WILL HAVE TO WAIT.

WE ARE BEING FLOODED WITH APPLICATIONS FOR EVACUATION FROM A PATHETIC NUMBER OF APPLICANTS TO WHOM I CANNOT GIVE PRIORITY OVER OUR OWN AND COMMONWEALTH AND AMERICAN PASSENGERS.

LONDON.

AS REGARDS THE KINGS ASSESSMENT I FULLY SHARE THE DOUBTS WHICH YOU EXPRESS AND LATER ON TODAY OR EARLY TOMORROW WILL HAVE SOME THOUGHTS TO PUT TO YOU FOR YOUR FURTHER CONSIDERATION AND COMMENTS.

/AS REGARDS

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F.C.O. TELEGRAM NO.1261 TO UKMIS NEW YORK

-5-

AS REGARDS THE ICRC AND THE BRITISH CONTRIBUTION.  
WE ARE GLAD THAT THE KING REALISED THAT WE HAVE STOCKPILED  
A LARGE QUANTITY OF MEDICAL STORES IN CYPRUS. WE HAVE ALSO  
POSITIONED THERE A LARGE MEDICAL STAFF FULLY TRAINED TO OPERATE  
IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH OBTAIN IN AMMAN.

UNFORTUNATELY OUR DELEGATION TO GENEVA YESTERDAY MET A BLANK  
REFUSEL BY THE ICRC TO CONTEMPLATE ALLOWING BRITISH MEDICAL  
PERSONNEL EVEN UNDER THEIR UMBRELLA TO GO INTO JORDAN.  
WE ARE CONSIDERING URGENTLY WAYS OF CIRCUMVENTING THIS EMBARGO  
PERHAPS BY APPEALS TO SOME ARAB GOVTS. IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE  
YOUR MENTIONING THIS TO THE KING WITHOUT HOWEVER AT THIS STAGE  
LANDING THE ICRC COMPLETELY IN THE WHAT NOT BUT THERE IS  
VERY STRONG FEELING HERE THAT THE ICRC BUREAUCRATIC OBSTRUCTION  
SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND IN THE WAY OF HUMANITARIAN HELP.  
THE ICRC MAIN CONCERN IS THAT THEY WOULD HAVE TO OBTAIN THE  
CONSENT OF THE FEDAYEEN AND WELL OF THE JORDAN GOVT BEFORE  
THEY COULD GIVE THEIR UMBRELLA TO BRITISH DOCTORS OR NURSES  
AMMAN.

THE REPUTATION OF THE ICRC HERE STANDS PRETTY LOW WITH THE  
JORDANIAN GOVT. AND I DO NOT THINK THE FEDAYEEN PIN (SIC) THEM  
MUCH EITHER RATHER THAN LEAVE THE WOUNDED TO SUFFER  
I SHOULD PREFER THAT THE OPERATION CAME IN UNDER THE UNION JACK.  
AND HANG EVERYBODY.  
THE JORDANIAN GOVT. WOULD CERTAINLY AGREE.

LONDON.

THIS IS A POSSIBILITY WE ARE CONSIDERING. BUT MINISTERS WILL NEED  
TO BE REASSURED THAT BRITISH MILITARY AIRCRAFT ARRIVING AT AMMAN  
AIRPORT WITH MEDICAL PERSONNEL AND STORES WOULD NOT BE RUNNING  
UNACCEPTABLE RISKS.

COMMENTS PSE.

/AMMAN.

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-6-

AMMAN.

AS THE SITUATION IS AT PRESENT I THINK THE JORDANIAN GOVT. COULD GUARANTEE THE SAFE LANDING AND DISPERSAL OF FULLY SELF CONTAINED MEDICAL TEAMS. BUT I FULLY UNDERSTAND MINISTERS NEED FOR RE-ASSURANCE. THE OPERATION WOULD REQUIRE ADVANCE PUBLICITY AND EMPHASIS ON THE FACT THAT THE TEAMS HAD COME TO TREAT EVERYBODY REGARDLESS OF WHOSE SIDE THEY ARE ON AND THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE COME IN UNDER NATIONAL COLOURS IS BECAUSE ANY OTHER WAY OF OPERATING WOULD IMPOSE INTOLERABLE DELAY.

I HAVE DRAFT SITREP PREPARED BY MY D.A. WHO REACHED EMBASSY THIS MORNING ALSO MY U.S. COLLEAGUE HAS JUST ARRIVED THE SIEGE HAVING BEEN LIFTED ON HIS EMBASSY THIS MORNING.

I WILL NOT NOW SEND A SITREP BEYOND SAYING THAT ALTHOUGH THE ARMY IS IN ACTION IN ONE OR TWO PARTS OF AMMAN AGAINST ISOLATED RESISTANCE IN GENERAL IT IS QUIETER THE ARMY ARE IN CONTROL OF MOST AREAS AND ABOVE ALL OF THE NORTHERN APPROACH TO THE AIRPORT AND OF THE AIRPORT ITSELF.

DOUGLAS-HOME

F I L E S:

EMERGENCY STAFF

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549

CYPHER/CAT A

SECRET

F L A S H FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NO. 1262

TO UKMIS NEW YORK  
24 SEPT 1973.

(KA 549)

SECRET 241300Z

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING IS AN ABBREVIATED SITREP.

MILITARY SITUATION. AMMAN REMAINS FAIRLY QUIET AND A NUMBER OF AIRCRAFT HAVE BEEN ABLE TO FLY IN AND OUT. THE ARMY ARE STILL SHELLING ISOLATED POCKETS OF RESISTANCE.

2. AFTER TAKING HEAVY PUNISHMENT FROM THE JORDANIANS, SOME SYRIAN UNITS ARE BEING WITHDRAWN. THE ISRAELIS ASSERT THAT THE SYRIANS' WITHDRAWAL WAS DUE TO ARAB AND SOVIET PRESSURE AND TO THE FEAR OF ISRAELI AND U.S. INTERVENTION. IRAQI FORCES REMAIN IN JORDAN WITHOUT TAKING ANY ACTION.

3. AMMAN AIRPORT. REPORTS THAT AMMAN AIRPORT IS AT TIMES LIMITED. 4,000 FEET HAVE PROVED UNFOUNDED. LATEST REPORTS CONFIRM THAT THE FULL LENGTH OF RUNWAY IS AVAILABLE.

4. CARAVELLE. ACCORDING TO REUTERS THE MEA CARAVELLE HAS NOW LEFT AMMAN AIRPORT.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES  
EMERGENCY STAFF

SECRET

TO UKNIS NEW YORK  
25 SEPTEMBER 1970

349(A)

(TELEPOLICY UNIT)

SECRET. 251244Z.

NEJ 174

ADDRESSED TO UKNIS NEW YORK TELNO 1235 OF 25/9 RFI TO WASHINGTON,  
BERNE, BONN AND TEL AVIV.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING ARE MAIN POINTS OF TELEPRINTER CONFERENCE WITH AMMAN  
AT 06.30Z ON 25 SEPTEMBER.

## 2. SITUATION IN AMMAN.

A FAIRLY QUIET NIGHT FOLLOWED BY FURTHER NOISY ATTEMPTS TO  
ELIMINATE SNIPERS IN AMMAN.

## 3. ASSESSMENT OF KING HUSSEIN'S FUTURE.

LONDON.

IT SEEMS TO US THAT HOWEVER SUCCESSFULLY THE KING MAY DESTROY  
THE MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE FEDAYEEN, HE WILL STILL ONLY  
HAVE AGGRAVATED THE PROBLEM OF LIVING WITH THE PALESTINIANS.  
IN THE FUTURE, THE FOCUS OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN SYRIA, IRAQ  
LEBANON, SUPPORT FROM THE UAR AND THE PERIPHERALS (ALGERIA,  
KUWAIT ETC) AND THE EXISTENCE OF A PALESTINIAN MAJORITY IN JORDAN  
WILL ALL HELP TO ENSURE THAT THE CIVIL WAR GOES ON, ALBEIT  
SPASMODICALLY. IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW THE KING, CUT OFF,  
PRESUMABLY, FROM HIS SUBSIDIES OR PART OF THEM, POLITICALLY  
DISCREDITED IN THE ARAB WORLD AND MORE THAN EVER THE TARGET  
OF A SNIPERS BULLET CAN LONG SURVIVE. THEN, PRESUMABLY WE MUST  
LOOK FORWARD TO AN EVENTUAL PALESTINIAN REGIME, PROBABLY UNDER  
SYRIAN INFLUENCE, POSSIBLY PRECEDED BY A SHORT PHASE UNDER  
KERENSKY/HADITHA OR ONE OF HIS ILK.  
INCIDENTLY WE DONT BELIEVE THE SYRIAN REGIME WILL FALL.

AMMAN.

SECRET

8A J 2611



AMMAN.

REGARDING YOUR ASSESSMENT OF KING HUSSEIN'S FUTURE THIS LOOKS PRETTY SOUND TO ME IN THE COLD LIGHT OF MORNING. IT IS THE TIME SCALE WHICH I FIND SO HARD TO ESTIMATE. HAVING JUST BROKEN THE FEDAYENI MILITARY ORGANISATION, PUSHED BACK THE SYRIANS OVER THEIR OWN BORDER AND AS THEY BELIEVE SCARED OFF THE IRAQIS THE HASHEMITES ARE RIDING HIGH AND WILL BE IN NO HURRY TO RELAX THE GRIP OF THE BRIGADIERS GOVT. GIVEN ABSENCE OF INTERVENTION FROM OUTSIDE AND THE CONTINUANCE OF SOME OF THE SUBSIDIES THEY ARE RECEIVING (E.G. FROM THE SAUDIS) THEY MIGHT EVEN BE ABLE TO KEEP GOING FOR A YEAR OR SO. THE ISRAELIS WOULD I SUPPOSE WHETHER ACTIVELY OR PASSIVELY MAKE WHAT CONTRIBUTION THEY CAN TO SUCH A STATE OF AFFAIRS BUT INEVITABLY THE STRESSES AND STRAINS OF A SYSTEM IN WHICH A TOUGH MILITARY MINORITY TRIES TO HOLD DOWN A MAJORITY WHO HAVE THE SYMPATHY AND SUPPORT OF MOST ARABS AS WELL AS OF THE COMMUNIST POWERS MUST LEAD TO ITS BREAKING DOWN. WE SHOULD THEN I THINK HAVE YOUR KERENSKY/HADITHA PHASE WITH THE KING EITHER OUT OR STILL PRECARIOUSLY HOLDING ON AS HEAD OF STATE. THE TRANSITION FROM THIS TO SOMETHING MORE RADICAL WILL DEPEND ON SO MANY OTHER EXTERNAL FACTORS NOT LEAST THE ISRAELIS THAT I SHOULD HESITATE TO STICK MY NECK OUT ANY FURTHER. I HAVE DONE SO ALREADY IN GIVING THE KING UPTO ANOTHER YEAR (PROVIDED HE AVOIDS A SHIPERS BULLET).

#### 4. EMBASSY'S TASKS.

IF THE SITUATION PERMITS OUR TENTATIVE PRIORITIES FOR TODAY WILL BE

A. CONTINUING THE ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT AND IF POSSIBLE ARRANGE THE EVACUATION OF MORE BRITISH SUBJECTS SUCH AS THOSE STILL CUT OFF IN AMMAN AND AQABA.

/B.

SECRET

ECO TELNO. 1285 TO U.I.NIS NEW YORK

-3-

B. COORDINATING BRITISH MEDICAL RELIEF BETWEEN THE JORDANIAN  
AUTHORITIES AND HQBFNE AND

C. SORTING OUT OUR OWN INTERNAL ADMINISTRATION INCLUDING MESSING  
ARRANGEMENTS ESTIMATING OUR OWN FOOD AND WATER POSITION ARRANGING  
RECEIPT OF PERSONEL AND BAGS AND GENERALLY TRYING TO CLEAR UP  
SOME OF THE MESS INTO WHICH THE EMBASSY HAS INEVITABLY GOT  
DURING 8 DAYS OF VIRTUAL SIEGE CONDITIONS.

DOUGLAS-HOME

FILES

EMERGENCY UNIT

SECRET



S E C R E T

CYPHER CAT 'A'

FLASH TEL AVIV

MOD UK

TELNO 271000Z

27 SEPTEMBER 1970

S E C R E T U K EYES ONLY

*Handwritten signature*

ADDRESSED MOD UK DI 4 R F I TO DA AMMAN , JIS NE,  
WASHINGTON.

FOH 271000Z SEP.

REF MY FOH 251115Z SEP.

FROM BRITHILAT TEL AVIVI

*Handwritten signature*  
NEJ1/4

JORDAN SITREP AS AT 270600Z.

ONE. THE IDF DID NOT RELEASE ANY INFORMATION TO ME ON 26TH SEP. THEY SAID IT WAS THEIR SABATH AND THEY WERE "STANDING DOWN". I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO CHECK WHETHER ANY INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO U.S. BUT TELEPHONE CALLS TO IDF HQ CONFIRMED THEY HAD REDUCED TO SKELETON STAFFS.

TWO. THE IDF REPORT SITUATION IN AMMAN IS LARGELY UNDER CONTROL TO ARMY. THERE IS SOME SHIPER FIRE AND THE AREA NEAR THE HOSPITAL IN JEBEL ASHUFIR REMAINS UNDER FEDAYEEN CONTROL. IN IRBID THE ARMY IS STILL OUTSIDE THE TOWN. THE IDF SAY THE ARMY WISH TO ENTER BUT IS BEING HELD BACK BY POLITICAL PRESSURE THE HOPE BEING THE FEDAYEEN WILL AGREE TO EVACUATE TOWN. RAHITA AND ZERKA ARE IN ARMY HANDS. JERASH AND AJLUN ARE NOMINALLY UNDER ARMY CONTROL BUT THERE IS A FORCE OF "SEVERAL HUNDREDS OF FEDAYEEN" IN THE HILLS WHICH CAN COVER THE APPROACHES. THE ARMY CANNOT MOVE AS FREELY IN AND OUT OF THESE TWO TOWNS AS THEY WOULD WISH. THE SOUTH IS REPORTED AS FREE OF FEDAYEEN BUT THOSE WHO EVACUATED KERAK AND WERE SAID TO BE EN ROUTE FOR AMMAN DID NOT REACH THERE. THEY ARE SAID TO HAVE "TAKEN TO THE HILLS". THE ARMY ARE REPORTED TO BE "ROUNDING UP THOUSANDS" AND MOVING THEM TO CONCENTRATION CAMPS MAINLY IN THE SOUTH.

S E C R E T

/THREE

S E C R E T

- 2 -

THREE. THE IDF VIEW THE NEW GOVERNMENT WITH SOME SCEPTICISM. THEY SAY THERE IS NO ONE OF ANY STATURE AND THAT ITS PURPOSE IS TO ACT AS A COVER TO THE POLICY LAID DOWN BY THE KING AND HIS ARMY. THE KING IS REPORTED AS STILL STICKING TO THE CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT HE MADE ON 23 SEP WITH ARAFAT'S THEN DEPUTY WHO WAS CAPTURED BY THE JORDAN ARMY, "TURNED ROUND" BY THEM AND WHO IS NOW IN CAIRO. THE KING'S VISIT TO CAIRO IS VIEWED WITH SOME APPREHENSION THE COMMENT BEING "HE IS A BRAVE MAN".

THE IDF ASSESSMENT IS THAT TIME IS NOT ON THE KING'S SIDE DUE TO THE INCREASING INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL PRESSURE HE WILL BE SUBJECTED TO. FURTHERMORE HE IS CONFRONTED WITH THE PROSPECT OF CONTINUING GUERILLA WARFARE.

FOUR. THE SITUATION REGARDING HOSTAGES IS THAT THE IDF BELIEVE THE REMAINING SIX HOSTAGES ARE GOING TO BE RELEASED. THE EARLIER BATCH OF THIRTY TWO WERE RELEASED TO THE JORDAN ARMY AND NOT BY THEM. THE PART THE EGYPTIAN EMBASSY PLAYED IN THE RELEASE, IF ANY, IS STILL OBSCURE.

F.C.O. PLEASE PASS FLASH WASHINGTON, DEFCCMCEN.  
DEFCCMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH MOD UK DI 4 JIS ME.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FCO/WH DISTRIBUTION  
N.E.D.

S E C R E T

FFFFF



(351)

CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

TELEGRAM NO FOH 250935Z 25 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

*[Handwritten signature]*  
NET 1/4

ADDRESS TO MODUK TELNO. FOH 250935Z OF 25 SEPTEMBER  
REPEATED FOR INFORMATION IMMEDIATE TO FCO, DEFATS AMMAN,  
BEIRUT, CAIRO, TEL AVIV, JEDDA, TEHERAN AND DEFENCE  
ADVISER RAWALPINDI.

IRAQI TROOPS IN JORDAN .

BAGHDAD TELEGRAM NO. 654 NOTAL REPORTED TO FCO THAT  
14 INF BDE AND ARTILLERY FROM THE IRBID AREA HAD  
BEEN WITHDRAWN BEFORE THE FIGHTING STARTED THERE.  
THE SAME SOURCE BELIEVED THAT AT LEAST PART OF THE IRAQI  
ARMoured BRIGADE PREVIOUSLY DEPLOYED IN THE DERS'A/RANTHA  
AREA WAS STILL THERE AT THE TIME OF THE SYRIAN INVASION.  
A WELL INFORMED SOURCE NOW CONFIRMS THE FORMER ADDING THAT  
14 BDE IS NOW THOUGHT TO BE BACK ALONG THE L OF C PROBABLY  
WITHIN THE IRAQI BORDER . HE WAS EQUALLY CERTAIN THAT THE  
COMPLETE ARMoured BRIGADE WAS OUT OF THE DERA'A AREA CITING  
HARD EVIDENCE THAT THE BRIGADE COMMANDER AND ONE OF HIS  
REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS WERE IN BAGHDAD, FOUR DAYS AGO.  
CONVICT. WHILE NOT CONCLUSIVE EVIDENCE THIS LAST DEDUCTION  
SEEMS REASONABLE

2. ON 23 SEPT PAKMA VISITED MOD TO ASK IRAQ HELP IN  
CHECKING ON CONDITION OF MEMBERS OF PAK MISSION  
IN JORDAN AND HEARD A TELEPHONE CONVERSATION CONFIRMING  
THAT HQ SALAH AS-DIN FORCE WAS STILL IN NAFRAQ. QUESTIONED  
PAKMA SAID THAT HE WAS SURE THAT MAJORITY OF THE TROOPS HAD  
LEFT NAFRAQ FOR THE DESERT FURTHER EAST.

/3. PAKMA

CONFIDENTIAL

3. PAKNA LOST CONSIDERABLE TENSION IN FOD AND PUT IT DOWN TO FOLLOWING .

ALPHA . FEAR THAT THEIR TROOPS WHO HAD LIVED IN BUG-OUTS FOR MONTHS WOULD BE CAUGHT IN THE OPEN (PROBABLY BY THE ISRAELI AIR FORCE).

BRAVO. CONCERN AT SYRIAN ACTIONS AND THE GENERAL UNCERTAINTY OF THE SITUATION AND PARTICULARLY THE DANGERS OF OUTSIDE INTERVENTION.

CHARLIE. QUALMS OF CONSCIENCE AT HAVING INCITED THE FEDAYEEN TO ACTION WITH PROMISES OF SUPPORT AND THEN DOING NOTHING .

DELTA . POSSIBLE DOUBTS ON THE LOYALTIES IN SALAH AS-DIN FORCE .

COMMENT. DA WITNESSED THE TENSION AND CONSIDERS PAKNA ASSESSMENT REASONABLE. .

4. SAME SOURCE CLAIMED THAT THE IRAQIS HAD SELECTED A NUMBER OF SOLDIERS OF BAGHDAD GARRISON WITH SUSPECT LOYALTIES , DRESSED THEM UP AS FEDAYEEN AND SENT THEM TO THE FRONT .

5. A VERY SENIOR BUT DISGRUNTLED IRAQI OFFICER CONFIRMED THAT THERE WERE NO IRAQI TROOPS IN THE LEBID/RANITHA AREA AT THE TIME OF THE SYRIAN INTRUSIONS AND SAID THAT AT LEAST SOME OF THEM HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN TO, OR WITHIN, THE IRAQI BORDER. THE SYRIAN IIA SAYS THIS WAS THE CASE AT THE TIME OF THE 'PLA ATTACK', ADDING THAT HE SURELY DID NOT BELIEVE THAT REGULAR SYRIAN TROOPS COULD HAVE BEEN HELD BY THE JORDANIANS.

6. THE SAME IRAQI OFFICER SAID THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF FEDAYEEN HAD BEEN DESPATCHED FROM IRAQ AND CERTAINLY NOTHING APPROACHING THE THOUSANDS QUOTED BY THE NEWSPAPERS . THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE INCREASE IN AIR MOVEMENT TO JORDAN AND MUCH OF THE ROAD TRAFFIC HELD MEDICAL SUPPLIES . THESE WERE LARGELY DESTINED FOR RUTBA WHERE AN EMERGENCY FIELD ORGANISATION WAS BEING SET UP BY THE ARMY. IT WAS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE AIM WAS TO ASSIST FEDAYEEN OR AS A PRECAUTION AGAINST HEAVY IRAQI CASUALTIES .



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BAGHDAD TELNO. FOH 250935Z TO M.O.D.

-3-

7. HAVE REPORTED IRAQI CONCERN THAT SALAH AL-DIN FORCE MIGHT BE CUT OFF IN THE EVENT OF MAJOR MILITARY INTERVENTION FROM WITHOUT. THE MOVES REPORTED ABOVE MAY REFLECT SUCH A FEAR. ALTERNATIVELY THEY MAY REFLECT A GENUINE DESIRE NOT TO BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE INTER - ARAB FIGHTING.

8. IF THE LATTER THE REASONS WOULD BE :  
ALPHA. THE ADVANTAGES OF SITTING ON THE FENCE UNTIL THE ISSUE WAS CLEARER .  
BAYO. AVOIDING RISKS OF MILITARY DEFEAT OR OF POLITICAL EMBARRASSMENT IF THE FORCES DECLINED TO CARRY OUT THEIR ORDERS( A POSSIBILITY WIDELY MOOTED BUT PERHAPS WISHFUL THINKING BY OPPONENTS OF THE REGIME).  
CHARLIE . THE LONG TERM PROSPECT OF PRESENTING THEMSELVES AS A GOVERNMENT WHICH HAD SHOWN RESTRAINT AT A TIME OF CRISIS WHILST PRESERVING A STRONG MILITARY FORCE TO COUNTER ANY INTERVENTION BY THE ZIONIST/IMPERIALIST ENEMY, (A PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEMBER IN CAIRO IS REPORTED TO HAVE SAID THAT THIS LAST WAS THE ROLE ALLOTTED TO THE IRAQI ARMY).

9. IRANIAN FRONT. DESPITE RADIO PROPAGANDA LINKING THE IRANIANS AND THE EGYPTIANS WITH IMPERIALIST PLOTS, THE 6TH ARMoured DIVISION , RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MAIN BAGHDAD-TEHERAN AXIS, SPENDS MUCH OF ITS TIME AND ENERGY ON " PEOPLES WORK " DRIVES IN THE IRRIGATION AND AGRICULTURAL FIELDS AND LITTLE ON TRAINING . HOWEVER, THE WEST GERMAN MILITARY ATTACHE FROM AMMAN WHO PASSED THROUGH RECENTLY RATED IRAQI MILITARY DISPOSITIONS IN THE BORDER AREA AS FAR MORE PROFESSIONAL THAN THE IRANIAN .

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/20.5.53

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-4-

10. PAKISTAN . THE INDIAN MA SAYS THAT HE HAS CERTAIN INFORMATION THAT A PAKISTANI AIR FORCE SQUADRON, PROBABLY MIG, LEFT PAKISTAN ON 17/18 SEPT. HE BELIEVES THAT MAY POSSIBLY BE IN JORDAN , BUT MORE PROBABLY IN SAUDI ARABIA OR IRAN. COMMENT, THE PAKMA WHEN EXPRESSING CONCERN FOR MEMBERS OF THEIR MISSION IN JORDAN SAID HE WAS NOT WORRIED ABOUT " THE OTHERS " WHO COULD LOOK AFTER THEMSELVES . I ASSUMED THAT HE REFERRED TO THE LAA REGIMENT . GRATEFUL FOR COMMENTS OF THE INDIAN STORY .

FCO PSE PASSIMMEDIATE TO MODUK , TEHRAN AND DEFENCE ADVISER RAWALPINDI .

MR. HAWLEY

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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IPHER CAT A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 651

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
25 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

251010Z

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 651  
DATED 25 SEPTEMBER 1970.

SITREP AT 251010ZM

1. DA SAW DMI THIS MORNING. DMI STATED THAT SITUATION IN NORTH JORDAN WAS NOW UNDER CONTROL ALTHOUGH FEDAYEEN AND ARMY CLASH WAS CONTINUING IN IRBID.
2. IRAQIS, HE SAID, HAVE MOVED FROM THEIR POSITIONS AROUND IRBID TOWARDS MAFRAQ. SOME IRAQI SOLDIERS ARE THOUGHT TO BE IN PLAIN CLOTHES IN THE JERASH ZERQA AREAS, BUT ARE NOT GIVING ANY TROUBLE.
3. DMI PRAISED RJAF ROLE IN ATTACKING SYRIAN ARMOUR.

FCO PLEASE PASS AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS

/COPIES SENT TO NO. 10 DOWNING STREET AND CABINET OFFICE/

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NNNN

CYPHER CAT A

S E C R E T

FLASH TEL AVIV TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DI4  
TELEGRAM NO WFFOH251115Z 25 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET  
UK EYES ONLY

ADDRESSED TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE DI 4 TELEGRAM NO FOH 241115Z  
SEPT REPEATED FOR INFORMATION FLASH TO DA AMMAN JIS NE BAGHDAD  
WASHINGTON AND UKMIS NEW YORK.

FOH 251115Z SEPT FROM BRITMILAT.

REF MY FOH 250815Z SEPT. (NOTAL).  
JORDAN SITREP ~~23~~ AT 241030Z SEPT.

ONE. IDF SAY THAT DESPITE REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY IRBID HAS NOT YET BEEN SECURED BY THE JORDAN ARMY. THE ATTACK ON THE TOWN OF YESTERDAY WAS HALTED IT IS BELIEVED BY A QUOTE POLITICAL BRAKE UNQUOTE EXERCISED BY HUSSEIN IN RESPONSE TO CEASE-FIRE APPEALS FROM CAIRO. THE CURRENT POSITION IS THAT THE TOWN IS SURROUNDED BY THE ARMY WHICH CONTROLS ALL THE EXITS. TANKS ARE IN THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE TOWN AND IT IS EXPECTED THAT IT WILL BE TAKEN TODAY.

TWO. THE IDF SAY THAT AT 1030Z HOURS AMMAN RADIO REPORTED THE ARMY HAD RELEASED 15 HOSTAGES OF WHICH 2 ARE GERMAN, 8 BRITISH AND 5 SWISS. NO OTHER NEWS OF HOSTAGES WAS AVAILABLE. THERE ARE TWO MAIN AREAS IN AMMAN WHERE FIGHTING CONTINUES, JEBEL ASHUFIR AND JEBEL NUWEIDA. THE BULK OF THE CITY IS CLEAR AND QUIET BUT IT IS NOT YET COMPLETELY CLEAR. THE ARMY CAPTURED 6000 + FEDAYEEN MILITIA WHO HAVE NOW BEEN MOVED TO QUOTE CONCENTRATION CAMPS UNQUOTE SPACE IN WHICH HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR 10000 INMATES. THESE FIGURES ARE MUCH HIGHER THAN THE IDF EXPECTED. THEIR ESTIMATE WAS OF 10000 FEDAYEEN IN JORDAN AS A MAXIMUM.

SECRET

/THREE. IN



THREE. IN THE REST OF THE COUNTRY THE ARMY ARE IN CONTROL. THE FEDAYEEN RESPONDED TO AN ULTIMATUM WITH WHICH THE SAUDI FORCES ASSOCIATED THEMSELVES TO LEAVE KERAK AND TAFILA. IN JERASH AND AJLUN THERE HAVE BEEN QUOTE FIRE-FIGHTS WITH PLA UNITS UNQUOTE.

FOUR. THE IDF CONSIDER THAT ON THE 18 OR 19 SEPT IRAQ AND SYRIA BOTH AGreed TO GIVE ASSISTANCE TO THE FEDAYEEN. THE TERM ASSISTANCE WAS NOT DEFINED AND WAS INTERPRETED BY THE IRAQIS AS MEANING LOGISTIC SUPPORT AND BY THE SYRIANS AS ACTIVE MILITARY SUPPORT. SPHERES OF INTEREST WERE AGREED WITH THE AREA EAST OF THE RANTA-JARASH AXIS BEING THE IRAQI SPHERE. THE IDF SAY THE IRAQIS WERE QUOTE SHOCKED UNQUOTE BY THE INVASION OF SYRIAN ARMOUR AND ON 22 SEPT PUT PRESSURE ON THE SYRIANS TO WITHDRAW. THE FOREGOING TOGETHER WITH THE FACT THAT THE IRAQIS HAD A SUPPLY BASE IN HAWARA FOR THEIR 14 BRIGADE WHICH HAD EARLIER MOVED FROM IRBID TO MAFRAQ IS GIVEN AS THE EXPLANATION FOR THE PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IRAQI MOVES BACK AND FORTH ALONG THE ROADS MAFRAQ-IRBID AND MAFRAQ-JARASH. SINCE THE SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE JORDAN ARMY AND THE IRAQI FORCES IN MAFRAQ AREA HAVE BEEN QUOTE ENTIRELY CORRECT UNQUOTE.

FIVE. THE IDF COMMENT ON THE PLANNED MEETING BETWEEN THE ARAB STATE DELEGATION LED BY THE SUDANESE PRESIDENT NUMEIRI AND ARAFAT THAT ANY AGREEMENT REACHED WILL BE DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT BECAUSE LEADING MEMBERS OF ARAFAT'S PLO ARE ALL SCATTERED IN VARIOUS CAPITALS. FURTHERMORE THEIR AGREEMENT TO WHATEVER ARAFAT PROPOSES CANNOT BE TAKEN FOR GRANTED.

SIX. THE IDF NOTE THE CHANGING TONE OF EGYPTIAN PROPAGANDA. THEY SAY THAT MUSSEIN IS BEING BLAMED FOR THE CARNAGE BUT THAT THE EXTREMISTS OF THE PLO MUST ALSO SHARE THE BLAME FOR THEIR IRRESPONSIBLE ACTS. THE FEAR OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION PARTICULARLY BY THE US AND/OR THE ISRAELIS IS ALSO THEY SAY REPEATEDLY MENTIONED BY CAIRO.

SECRET

TEL AVIV TELNO. 251115Z TO H.O.D.

-4-

SEVEN. PLEASE NOTE CLASSIFICATION OF THIS AND FUTURE REPORTS.  
I HAVE DRAWN ATTENTION TO THIRD PARTY RULE AND DO NOT WISH  
THE SOURCE OF INFORMATION TO BE DISCLOSED WHEN IT IS PASSED  
BILATERALLY ISRAEL-UK.

FCO PLEASE PASS FLASH TO DEFCOMCEN WASHINGTON AND UKNIS NEW YORK.

DEFCOMCEN PLEASE PASS FLASH TO MODUK DI4 AND JISNE.

MR. BARNES

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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ENCLAIR

IMMEDIATE CAIRO TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 1446 26 OCTOBER 1977

UNCLASSIFIED

000017Z

NET 1/94

ADDEND TO FCO TELNO. 1446 DATED 24/10/77 REPEATED FOR-INFO  
(IMMEDIATE) TO WASHINGTON, UKMIS NEW YORK, TEL AVIV,  
AMMAN (PRIORITY) TO BEIRUT, PARIS, MOSCOW, BAGHDAD, JEDDA,  
KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, KHARTOUM, TUNIS, AND ALGIERS.

AMMAN TODAY PUBLISHES FOLLOWING TEXT OF A MESSAGE SENT EARLY  
THIS MORNING BY PRESIDENT NASSER TO KING HUSSEIN.

" IN THE NAME OF THE HEADS OF ARAB STATES MEETING IN CAIRO  
I REGRET TO HAVE TO INFORM YOU OF OUR DEEP CONCERN AS A  
RESULT OF THE REPORT WHICH WE HAVE HEARD FROM OUR BROTHER  
PRESIDENT NINEIRI AND THE OTHER MEMBERS OF THE DELEGATION  
REPRESENTING US WHO HAVE RETURNED TONIGHT FROM AMMAN. THE  
REPORT WHICH WE HAVE HEARD CONFIRMS WITHOUT ANY DOUBT THE  
FOLLOWING FACTS:

(I) THE JORDANIAN AUTHORITIES ARE STILL PERSISTING IN  
SHOOTING IN SPITE OF ALL THE EFFORTS WHICH HAVE BEEN MADE.

(II) ALL THE PROMISES MADE TO US HAVE BEEN TOTALLY BROKEN  
AND RENDERED VALUELESS.

(III) THERE IS A PLAN TO LIQUIDATE THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION  
IN SPITE OF CLAIMS TO THE CONTRARY.

(IV) A TERRIFYING SLAUGHTER IS GOING ON IN JORDAN CONTRARY  
TO ALL ARAB AND HUMANITARIAN VALUES.

(V) THE DELEGATION WHICH RETURNED FROM AMMAN FEELS THAT IT  
WAS EXPOSED TO UNNECESSARY EVASION.

2. IN THE FACE OF ALL THIS WE HAVE NOW AGREED THAT OUR BROTHER PRESIDENT NINEIRI SHOULD HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE IN WHICH HE CAN ANNOUNCE IN HIS OWN NAME AND IN THE NAME OF THE WHOLE DELEGATION THE DETAILS OF HIS REPORT TO US. WE FEEL DEEP SORROW THAT MATTERS HAVE COME TO THIS PASS BETWEEN US ..... BUT WHAT IS HAPPENING NOW LEAVES US NO ALTERNATIVE. RIGHT MUST PREVAIL AND OUR NATION WILL ALWAYS REMAIN GREATER THAN ANY EVIL AND STRONGER THAN ANY INTRIGUE''.

3. NINEIRI'S PRESS CONFERENCE IS BEING HELD AT 10.30 THIS MORNING.

FCO PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO WASHINGTON AND UKNIS NEW YORK AND PRIORITY TO PARIS.

SIR R. BEAULIEU

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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355

OTHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 663

TO F.C.O.  
26 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

260900Z.

SITREP AS AT 260800Z

*Handwritten:* A line with an arrow pointing to the right, and the text "NET 1/4" below it.

1.. NIGHT 25/26 SEPT WAS VERY QUIET. ISOLATED OUTBREAKS OF FIRING OCCURRED BUT CERTAINLY SOME WERE INITIATED BY FEDAYEEN AND ARMY RESPONSE WAS LIMITED.

2.. THIS MORNING, AFTER A FEW BURSTS IN SEVERAL AREAS AT FIRST LIGHT, THE CEASE FIRE SEEMS TO BE GENERALLY EFFECTIVE ALTHOUGH OCCASIONAL BURSTS ARE HEARD. SOME STILL HEAR FROM THE MAHDAT CAMP AREA AND HEAR FIRST CIRCLE. CHILDREN ARE APPEARING ON THE STREETS AND ASKING FOR FOOD.

RED CROSS HAVE NOT YET GOT INSIDE MAHDAT CAMP WHERE AN ESTIMATED 700 CASUALTIES ARE LYING.

3.. AMMAN CANNOT BE SAID TO BE UNDER FULL ARMY CONTROL. IT IS POSSIBLE TO MOVE ON THE NORTH AND WEST OUTSKIRTS IN A WHITE BEFLAGGED CAR. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CITY CENTRE AND JIBEL AMMAN EAST OF FIRST CIRCLE IS STILL OCCUPIED BY FEDAYEEN. JIBEL MUSHIM AND JIBEL LITHIM (NONE OF THEM HAS BEEN RECENT HEAVY FIGHTING NEAR THE U.S. EMBASSY) ARE QUIET.

4.. THE NORTHERN RING ROAD TO THE AIRPORT IS OPEN MOST OF THE TIME. A LARGE POW CAMP FOR FEDAYEEN HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED ON THIS ROAD

FCO PASS AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS

MR. PHILLIPS AT 10.15 AM  
HEAR EASTERN DEPT

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N.E.D. to enter.

(35C)

COPY NO. 2.....

CYPHER/CAT-A-

SECRET

PRIORITY UKMISSION NEW YORK

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 2895

26 SEPTEMBER 1973

SECRET

DTG 261530Z

*mmmm*

NEJ 1/4

FOLLOWING FROM SECRETARY OF STATE.

I SHOULD LIKE TO SEND A PERSONAL MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN BUT AM WELL AWARE OF THE RISKS, BOTH TO HIM AND TO US, SHOULD THE FACT, AND STILL MORE THE TEXT, BECOME PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE. IF, HOWEVER, THE DEPARTMENT SEE NO OBJECTION I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF INSTRUCTIONS COULD BE SENT TO H.M. AMBASSADOR, AMMAN, TO DELIVER THE MESSAGE IN P.I.F.T. HE SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THIS IS A PURELY PERSONAL AND PRIVATE MESSAGE AND NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN ANY WAY.

2. ALTERNATIVELY, IT MIGHT BE BETTER FOR H.M. AMBASSADOR TO GIVE THE MESSAGE ORALLY.

SIR C. CROWE

FMISAC

SECRET



NED to enter.

357

SECRET

COPY NO..3.....

CYBER/CAT-A-

PRIORITY UKMISSION NEW YORK  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 2696

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
26 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET

DTG 261530Z

H.I.P.T.

FOLLOWING IS TEXT.

BEGINS.

I WOULD LIKE TO TELL TO YOUR MAJESTY HOW RELIEVED AND HAPPY I AM THAT YOU HAVE COME SO SUCCESSFULLY THROUGH THE TRIAL AND ORDEAL TO WHICH JORDAN HAS BEEN SUBJECTED. I SHARE THE DISTRESS AND SORROW THAT YOU MUST BE FEELING AT THE DESTRUCTION AND SUFFERING THAT THIS HAS INVOLVED.

I WOULD LIKE TOO TO ADD MY PERSONAL THANKS TO THOSE OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND OUR GOVERNMENT FOR THE PROTECTION AND RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE WHO WERE HELD AS PRISONERS.

ENDS

SIR C. CROWE

PRISSEC

SECRET

P. M. M. M.

NET 1/4

CONFIDENTIAL

CYPHER CAT/A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 681

TO F.C.O. LONDON  
27 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

270700Z.

LITREP AS AT 270600Z.

*[Handwritten signature]*

*[Handwritten mark]*  
NET 1/4

FROM BRITHILAT.

SITUATION IN AMMAN AND AIRPORT AREA.

THE LAST TWO DAYS AND NIGHTS HAVE BEEN MUCH QUIETER IN THAT THERE ARE NOW LONG PERIODS DURING WHICH NO SOUNDS ARE HEARD OF EXPLOSIONS SEEN. THIS QUIET IS DECEPTIVE. THE JORDANIAN ARMY ARE USING TROOPS OF SALADIN SARACEN M113 AND 106 MM RCL VEHICLE CREWS TO COMMAND ROAD JUNCTIONS IN THE TUNNERS AND TO MAKE SALLIES AWAY FROM THEIR POSITION TO BLAST OUT SNIPERS OR MAKE CURSORY SEARCHES OF BUILDINGS. INFANTRY SECTIONS OPERATING ON FOOT ARE CASUALLY SEEN. IN THE OUTLYING SOUTHERLY SECTORS OF AMMAN CLEARING OPERATIONS USING TANKS CONTINUE AS REPORTED YESTERDAY. THE ARMY DOES NOT CONTROL THE CITY CENTRE OR THE DOMINATING JEBEL ASHRAFIYEH/TAJ FEATURE. THREE MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY ASSISTING THE RED CROSS YESTERDAY IN AN ABORTIVE EFFORT TO CONTACT HOSTAGES WERE TAKEN TO A ROOM WITHIN 500 YARDS OF THE ASHRAFIYA CENTRAL HOSPITAL TO VIEW BODIES. FEDAYEEN WERE EVERYWHERE. ROADS WERE BLOCKED NO BODIES LITTERED THE STREETS AND THE DEFEATISM OF THE FEDAYEEN AND THEIR HATE FOR THE ARMY WAS EVIDENT. THEY REPORTED ABOUT 600 CASUALTIES AT ASHRAFIYEH HOSPITAL AND LITTLE MEDICAL HELP. HOLDING UP THE FAIR HAired SCALP OF HIS DAUGHTER ONE DISTRAUGHT FEDAYEEN SAID 'TAKE THIS BACK AND SHOW THEM' THE AREA VISITED WAS FATEH CONTROLLED. WE BELIEVE THAT THE ARMY CONTROL THE SPINE OF JEBEL AMMAN TO FIRST CIRCLE, JEBEL LUWEIBDIYEH POSSIBLY AS FAR AS THE U.S. EMBASSY, JEBEL MUSSEIN, THE AIRPORT TO AMMAN ROAD AS FAR AS THE RAILWAY STATION, AND ONLY AS FAR AS THE WAHDAT CAMP IN SOUTHERN AREA OF JEBEL ASHRAFIYA.

/2. THE

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CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

2.. THE NORTHERN RING ROAD TO THE AIRPORT VIA MARKA IS OPEN BUT SNIPING TAKES PLACE AND THE AIRPORT IS WITHIN MORTAR RANGE 17 POINTS STILL HELD BY FEDAYEEN. TO SUM UP NO AREAS OF AMMAN CAN REALLY BE SAID TO BE FREE OF SNIPERS FOR INFILTRATION BY NIGHT IS EASY AND HOUSES HAVE NOT BEEN PROPERLY CLEARED.

3.. TO CLEAR AMMAN WILL REQUIRE, IN DA'S OPINION A MAJOR OPERATION BY MANY MORE TROOPS, PARTICULARLY INFANTRY, THAN ARE AVAILABLE AT PRESENT. IF THE EFFORT WAS MADE IT WOULD CLEARLY BE A MOST COSTLY AND LENGTHY BUSINESS. WE DOUBT IF THE ARMY WILL HAVE SUFFICIENT AMMUNITION TO DO THIS FOR THE WASTAGE WE HAVE WITNESSED IS VERY EXCESSIVE. IT MIGHT BE ASWELL IF THE FACT THAT EMBASSY STAFF WERE INVOLVED WITH REDCROSS AS STATED ABOVE IS NOT MADE PUBLIC AS THE INVOLVEMENT WAS FORTUITOUS.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE FULL DISTRIBUTION AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS

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359

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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE TEL AVIV  
TELEGRAM NO 912

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
27 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELNO 912 OF 27 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO AMMAN.

NE-51/4

NEW JORDAN GOVERNMENT.

PERES TOLD ME IN CONFIDENCE ON THURSDAY THAT THREE  
OR FOUR DAYS EARLIER THE ISRAELIS HAD HAD AN APPROACH  
FROM AHMED TOUKAN'S BROTHER, WHO LIVES IN HABLUS, ASKING  
IF THEY WOULD GIVE TOUKAN 'ASYLUM' IN THE WEST BANK.

MR. BARNES

DEPARTMENTAL DISTRIBUTION

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N. AFRI. DEPT.  
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M.O.D. (INTERNAL)

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FFFFF

*[Handwritten signature]*  
22



360

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CYPHER CAT A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 696

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
28 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.  
280600Z

SITREP AS AT 280600Z

CONTINUOUS SHELLING OF JEBEL ASHRAFIYEH TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY. MOST ROUNDS SEEMED TO LAND AROUND HIGHEST POINT AND INCLUDED PHOSPHOROUS SMOKE. THROUGHOUT THE DAY THERE WERE OCCASIONAL OUTBURSTS OF FIRING AND AT NIGHT FALL THESE BECAME HEAVY UNTIL ABOUT 1900Z. THE NIGHT HAS BEEN QUIET. WE HAVE NOTED THAT THE INITIAL JUBILATION OF TROOPS IS BEGINNING TO WEAR OFF. YESTERDAY BOTH IN THE QIADA AND LOCAL HQ VISITED BY DA AND COLONEL FERRIE IT WAS NOTICED THAT NEWS BROADCASTS WERE BEING LISTENED TO CONTINUOUSLY. IT WAS CLEAR THAT THE ARMY OFFICERS SEEN DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THE ARMY HAS WON DECISIVELY ENOUGH. A FACT THAT HAS BEEN EVIDENT FOR SOME DAYS.

FCO PLEASE PASS AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS

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FFFFF

*Amir*  
*21/6*



Emergency Unit  
c. NES  
JTD  
10 Downing Street  
Whitehall  
E25/9 September 24, 1970

Dear Ian,

The Prime Minister has seen the suggestion coming from an Israeli source that the P.L.O. people held by the Jordanian Government should be used as bargaining counters to recover the hijacked hostages. The Prime Minister hopes that careful consideration is being given to whether anything can be made of this idea though clearly it presents difficulties from the point of view of King Hussein.

Yours sincerely

Richard Nixon

NES 1/4

Mr. Tarn

overturn  
by work

I. McCluney, Esq.,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

(Sul  
27/9

Mr. Haines  
12/9

11/11/11

25/11

- Yes. P.D.  
28/9.



24 September, 1970

Phillips

You will wish to know straight away that at the 1830 telex conference with Amman our Ambassador, Mr. Phillips, passed on a personal message from King Hussein to the Prime Minister.

The text is as follows:

"Sir,

May I express to you my profound gratitude for the sympathy, understanding, friendship and assistance which you showed during the difficult and crucial week through which Jordan passed. At a time of grave danger, we felt we were not alone. We appreciate all you have done for us. We know we can count on your help in our determination to rebuild a new strong and dynamic Jordan. With my repeated thanks, please accept my respect, regards and best wishes."

P. J. S. Moon, Esq.,  
10 Downing Street.


Private Secretary

c.c. Mr. Battiscombe  
Mr. Daunt  
Sir P. Adams  
Mr. Tripp  
Emergency Unit

At the 1830 telex conference with Amman Mr. Phillips said he had just received a personal message from King Hussein to the Prime Minister in the following terms:

Sir,

May I express to you my profound gratitude for the sympathy, understanding, friendship and assistance which you showed during the difficult and crucial week through which Jordan passed. At a time of grave danger, we felt we were not alone. We appreciate all you have done for us. We know we can count on your help in our determination to rebuild a new strong and dynamic Jordan. With my repeated thanks, please accept my respect, regards and best wishes.



(P.R.M. Hinchcliffe)

24 September, 1970





SYNOPSIS CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
PROGRAM NO 697

CC.

TO F.C.

28 SEPTEMBER 1970

RECEIVED

CONFIDENTIAL.

280730Z.

RECEIVED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 697 DATED 23 SEPTEMBER 1970  
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV AND MOD DIA.

NET 1/4  
REPEATED

JORDAN INTERNAL 280730Z.

I DOUBT IF IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO COMMENT ON THE NEW JORDAN GOVERNMENT WHICH MUST SURELY BE TRANSITORY CONSISTING AS IT DOES OF ARMY OFFICERS HEADED BY CIVILIAN AHMAD TOUQAN, A NOTIONAL PALESTINIAN ONLY AND A PLEASANT LITTLE LIGHTWEIGHT.

2.. WE HAVE IT AT SECOND HAND THAT A PARTY OF JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE JUST VISITED THE FEDAYEEN HELD QUARTERS OF AMMAN WERE ASTONISHED TO FIND AN EFFECTIVE FEDAYEEN ADMINISTRATION WORKING. IN CONTRAST TO ARMY HELD AREAS, PEOPLE WERE MOVING ABOUT FREELY, SHOPS WERE OPEN AND DISTRIBUTION OF WATER AND FOOD PROCEEDING IN AN ORDERLY MANNER. THERE APPEARED TO HAVE BEEN NO LOOTING.

3.. ONE OF OUR DRIVERS HAS JUST RETURNED FROM ZERQA (JORDAN'S SECOND LARGEST CITY POPULATION ABOUT 140,000) WHICH HE REPORTS TO BE IN ARMY HANDS. HE DESCRIBES DAMAGE THERE AS SIMILAR TO AMMAN.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DIA

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

MR PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.F.C.]

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21/11/71  
21/11



TYPIER/CAT A

SECRET

NEJ14

(365)

TELEGRAM NUMBER 1284

25 SEPTEMBER 1970

SECRET 251212Z.

FOLLOWING FOR SECRETARY OF STATE.

FOLLOWING IS AN ABBREVIATED SITREP.

1. MILITARY SITUATION.

AMMAN HAS REMAINED FAIRLY QUIET, THOUGH ELIMINATION OF SNIPERS CONTINUES. IRBID HAS BEEN RETAKEN BY JORDANIAN ARMY, THOUGH STREET FIGHTING CONTINUES. THE SYRIAN ARMY IS REPORTED TO HAVE TAKEN UP POSITION BEHIND THE SYRIAN FRONTIER.

2. POLITICAL SITUATION.

BRIGADIER DAWOOD (THE JORDANIAN P.M.) IS REPORTED TO HAVE RESIGNED WHILE IN CAIRO. A SECOND ARAB PEACE MISSION UNDER THE SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER HAS FLOWN TO AMMAN FOR TALKS WITH ARAFAT.

3. EVACUATION.

47 BRITISH EVACUEES ARRIVED AT GATWICK LAST NIGHT AND WERE MET BY MR. ROYLE AND AN F.C.O. CONTINGENT. FOLLOWING IS THE BREAKDOWN OF BRITISH SUBJECTS WHO REMAIN:

(A) 24 EMBASSY STAFF INCLUDING DEPENDANTS:

(B) 21 WHO HAVE REFUSED EVACUATION:

(C) 26 WHO ARE OUTSIDE AMMAN AND CANNOT BE REACHED (SOME ARE KNOWN TO BE SAFE, E.G. IN AQABA):

(D) 11 WHO CANNOT BE REACHED IN AMMAN.

4. RELIEF SITUATION.

KING HUSSEIN HAS ISSUED AN URGENT APPEAL TO THE BRITISH, FRENCH AND U.S. GOVERNMENTS FOR FOOD SUPPLIES, TENTS AND BLANKETS. WE ARE OFFERING FOODSTUFF AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES DIRECT TO JORDANIAN RED CRESCENT AND ALSO CONSIDERING SETTING UP A MILITARY FIELD HOSPITAL WITH 450 BEDS AT DEKHALIA IN CYPRUS TO WHICH CASUALTIES COULD BE EVACUATED FROM JORDAN.

/5. BERNE

SECRET

*20 JIM*  
*299*

SECRET

- 2 -

5. BERNE GROUP.

THE GROUP HAS AGREED ON THE TEXT OF A LETTER TO M. BOISSIER WHICH INSTRUCTS HIM TO ASK THE P.F.L.P. TO GATHER THE HOSTAGES IN A SECURE PLACE AND ALLOW ACCESS TO THEM: AND AUTHORISES HIM TO NEGOTIATE AN EXCHANGE ON THE TERMS ALREADY AGREED.

6. HOSTAGES.

JORDAN ARMY H.Q. HAS CONFIRMED TO THE EMBASSY THAT THEY HAVE RECOVERED 15 HOSTAGES: 2 BRITISH, 5 SWISS AND 2 GERMANS. THE EMBASSY HAVE NOT AT TIME OF DESPATCH YET SEEN OR TAKEN DELIVERY OF OUR PEOPLE.

DOUGLAS-HOME

REMARKS:

EMERGENCY STAFF

SECRET

DDDDDD



366

NET 1/4

S E C R E T

CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
TELEGRAM NUMBER 412

TO AMMAN  
27 SEPTEMBER 1970.

SECRET 271135Z

I SHOULD BE GRATEFUL IF YOU WOULD DELIVER THE FOLLOWING  
PERSONAL MESSAGE FROM ME TO KING HUSSEIN.

BEGINS. I WOULD LIKE TO TELL YOUR MAJESTY HOW RELIEVED  
AND HAPPY I AM THAT YOU HAVE COME SO SUCCESSFULLY THROUGH  
THE TRIAL AND ORDEAL TO WHICH JORDAN HAS BEEN SUBJECTED. I  
SHARE THE DISTRESS AND SORROW THAT YOU MUST BE FEELING AT THE  
DESTRUCTION AND SUFFERING THAT THIS HAS INVOLVED.

I WOULD LIKE ALSO TO ADD MY PERSONAL THANKS TO THOSE  
OF THE PRIME MINISTER AND HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FOR  
THE PROTECTION AND RELEASE OF OUR PEOPLE WHO WERE HELD AS  
PRISONERS. ENDS.

2. I LEAVE IT TO YOUR DISCRETION AS TO WHETHER YOU DELIVER  
THIS ORALLY OR AS A WRITTEN MESSAGE. BUT YOU SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR  
THAT THIS IS A PURELY PERSONAL AND PRIVATE MESSAGE AND NOT  
FOR PUBLICATION IN ANY WAY.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

F I L E S

EMERGENCY STAFF  
N.E.D.  
PRIVATE SECRETARY  
SIR P. ADAMS  
MR. ARTHUR

S E C R E T

FFFFF

2.11.70  
21/9

CYPHER CAT/A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 672 (SIC)

CONFIDENTIAL

TO F.C.O.  
28 SEPTEMBER 1970

REC'D  
REGIS

CONFIDENTIAL.  
231400Z  
SITREP AS AT 231400Z.

*pm*  
*sh*

367  
NET 1/4

1. MANY CIVILIANS PARTICULARLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN APPEARED ON STREETS IN THE SUBURBS OF AMMAN EARLY TODAY. THEY CLUSTERED AROUND WATER AND FOOD DISTRIBUTION LORRIES. AND CONTINUE TO WAIT AT KNOWN DISTRIBUTION POINTS.

2. BETWEEN 0900 AND 1000 HOURS LOCAL SEVERAL LARGE EXPLOSIONS INCLUDING PHOSPHOROUS SMOKE WERE SEEN ON JEBEL ASHRAFIYEH AND WE HAVE RELIABLE REPORT OF FIRING IN THE SOUK AREA, AND HAVE HEARD SOME SHOTS NEAR JEBEL AMMAN.

3. THE ARMY HAS MADE A CONCENTRATED EFFORT TODAY TO REMOVE DISABLED AND BURNT OUT VEHICLES. WE HAVE SEEN SEVERAL M113S BEING TOWED AWAY WHICH HAD LARGE HOLES IN THEM.

4. ARMoured CARS AND APC'S ARE STILL STATIONED AT IMPORTANT ROAD JUNCTIONS. THE AIRPORT AND THE NORTHERN ROAD TO IT ARE OPEN AND BRITISH RELIEF SUPPLIES HAVE ARRIVED AND HAVE BEEN HANDED OVER TO THE RED CROSS.

5. NO FEDAYEEN HAVE BEEN SEEN. THE ABSENCE OF THEM AND THEIR TRANSPORT IS REMARKABLE BUT MANY ARE CONCENTRATED IN THE JEBEL ASHRAFIYEH AND TAJ AREA.

6. SOME SENIOR OFFICERS ARE NOW CONTACTABLE IN THE QUIADA AND WE HOPE TO HAVE A CLEARER PICTURE OF THE OVERALL SITUATION TOMORROW.

7. A 50 BEDDED FRENCH FIELD HOSPITAL IS ESTABLISHED IN THE KING HUSSEIN SPORTS STADIUM IN NORTH WEST AMMAN.

CCO PLEASE PASS AS NECESSARY

MR. PHILLIPS

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION.  
NEAR EASTERN DEPT

*pm*  
*21/6*

CONFIDENTIAL



RECEIVED IN  
REGISTRY NO. 10

*Blair*  
289. *wevi/9*

*Prun*  
2/10

Private Secretary

NET 1/4

Jordan Internal

On page 1 of the Teleprinter Conference with Amman at 0630 hours on 25 September, H.M. Ambassador referred to our assessment of King Hussein's future. This reference was to a question which was put to the Ambassador on the evening of 24 September with a request for his views. I attach a copy of the question as it was put and of his off-the-cuff answer, which should be read as supplemented by comment in the Teleprinter Conference this morning.

*C. J. Makins*

(C. J. Makins)  
25 September, 1970

Copy to:

Mr. Renwick  
Mr. Daunt  
Sir P. Adams  
Mr. Tripp  
Mr. Royle  
Mr. Battiscombe  
Mr. Tesh  
Mr. Bottomley  
Mr. Hanbury-Tenison  
Private Secretary, No. 10  
Emergency Unit

TO BE READ) WITH PAGE 1 OF TELECONF AT 0630Z

CONFIDENTIAL

QUESTION PUT TO AMMAN AT 1700Z on 24/ix

Low Dan

IT SEEMS TO US THAT HOWEVER SUCCESSFULLY THE KING MAY DESTROY THE MILITARY ORGANISATION OF THE FEDAYEEN, HE WILL STILL ONLY HAVE AGGRAVATED THE PROBLEM OF LIVING WITH THE PALESTINIANS. IN THE FUTURE, THE FOCUS OF FEDAYEEN ACTIVITY IN SYRIA, IRAQ, LEBANON, SUPPORT FROM THE UAR AND THE PERIPHERALS (ALGERIA, KUWAIT ETC) AND THE EXISTENCE OF A PALESTINIAN MAJORITY IN JORDAN WILL ALL HELP TO ENSURE THAT THE CIVIL WAR GOES ON, ALBEIT SPASMODICALLY. IT IS HARD TO SEE HOW THE KING, CUT OFF, PRESUMABLY, FROM HIS SUBSIDIES OR PART OF OF THEM, POLITICALLY DISCREDITED IN THE ARAB WORLD AND MORE THAN EVER THE TARGET OF A SNIPERS BULLET CAN LONG SURVIVE. THEN, PRESUMABLY WE MUST LOOK FORWARD TO AN EVENTUAL PALESTINIAN REGIME, PROBABLY UNDER SYRIAN INFLUENCE, POSSIBLY PRECEDED BY A SHORT PHASE UNDER KERENSKY/HADITHA OR ONE OF HIS ILK. INCIDENTLY WE DONT BELIEVE THE SYRIAN REGIME WILL FALL

AMMAN

THINK THE FIRST PART OF YOUR ASSESSMENT IS VERY GOOD (HOPE THIS DOESN'T SOUND PATRONISING) BUT I SUSPECT THAT YOU MAY BE UNDERESTIMATING THE ~~TRANSJORDANIAN~~ EXTRAORDINARY TOUGHNESS AND RESILIENCE OF THE TRANSJORDANIANS IN GENERAL AND THE KING IN PARTICULAR. IF THE POSITIONS WERE REVERSED WITH THE PALESTINIANS IN CHARGE THE TRANSJORDANIAN ~~MINORITY~~

MINORITY WOULD BE MOST INDEGESTIBLE AND COULD CONTINUE TO MAKE LIFE JUST AS DIFFICULT FOR THE PALESTINIANS AS THE LATTER NO DOUBT WILL DURING THE NEXT PERIOD FOR THE TRANSJORDANIANS. THIS OFF THE CUFF I SHOULD LIKE TO CONSULT MY STAFF AND PERHAPS LET YOU HAVE A MORE CONSIDERED ANSWER TOMORROW.



24/9/70

NE?

(369)

ME/3490/A/11

Other Amman Broadcasts on the Jordanian Situation(a) Amman home service in Arabic 09.00-19.50 GMT 22.9.70

Text of reports, unless otherwise indicated:

NET 1/4

09.00 GMT Brother compatriots, honest honourable fida'iyyin, when the rancorous conspiratorial plan began to collapse and when the ugly faces of the conspirators began to show proof of their ugliness, atheism and treason, the true picture of the criminal plot against this steadfast country to destroy it and enslave its people became clearer.

The manner in which the aircraft were hijacked and the timing of the hijacking were not accidental. The hijacking of an aircraft to Cairo in order to blow it up at Cairo Airport was not accidental. The blowing up of the three aircraft in Jordan was not accidental. The participation of the American Jew Patrick Anguello in the attempt to hijack the Israeli aircraft was not accidental. George Habash's absence abroad is not accidental. Brother citizens: Think and be alert.

The defamatory attacks on the armed forces of the fraternal UAR, the steadfast, struggling and sacrificing UAR, were not accidental. The attack by Hawatimah on HE Col. Mu'ammarr al-Qadhafi in his paper 'Ash-Shararah' was not accidental. Hawatimah's instigation of his elements to arouse dissension and rancour and shed blood was not accidental. Brother citizens: think and be alert.

The disclosure of the places and movements of the Jordanian military units in Hawatimah's paper 'Ash-Shararah' was not accidental. The unanimous decision to dismiss the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) by the Central Committee was not accidental. The Central Committee's decision to reinstate the PFLP upon Hawatimah's insistence was not accidental. Brother citizens: think and be alert. Hawatimah's shelling of houses of officers, NCOs and men at the Zarqa and Talal camps and at the Shumaysani and Abdali quarters were not accidental. Brother citizens, think and be alert.

Be our witnesses before God, your women and children and for the sake of their lives and yours that here we are giving a warning and a sincere brotherly notice to all the elements in the Habash and Hawatimah organisations that they have been misled and deceived by distorted facts and by lies and fabrications. These lies and fabrications have aroused these elements' true national feelings and prompted them to act unwittingly according to the dictates of these distortions, lies, fabrications and misleading facts.

The criminals Habash and Hawatimah are the heads of a treacherous rancorous plot directed against the Arab nation to destroy it and establish an atheist totalitarian regime in our homeland. We call on them to think carefully and be cautious and alert to verify all that is said about Habash and Hawatimah and all that they know about their attitudes and ideologies and to arrest them when they become convinced that they are nothing but two criminals, so that they may receive their just punishment for shedding the blood of the innocent and drawing the people into blind dissension, destruction and fighting among brothers.

09.45 GMT (Excerpts) Woe unto you, Syrian rulers, you disciples of Cohen. Woe unto you, George Habash and woe unto you, Nayif al-Hawatimah. What service have you rendered to the Arab nation and its sacred cause. You only hijacked aircraft occupied hotels and spread rancour, hatred, regionalism and discord throughout the beloved homeland... The Syrian Army is now fighting the Jordanian Armed Forces as a result of your black designs, the designs of treason and agency, the designs of Cohen's disciples... The people will never forget you, disciples of Cohen. The people will never forget you, Nayif al-Hawatimah, and you, George Habash. The entire Arab nation will not forget you. Be sure that your end is imminent and very near, God willing. We will find you wherever you go. The honorable, honest fida'iyyin will find you. The Arab nation will find you now that you have betrayed its cause and right to peaceful honourable life...



**10.35 GMT** Honourable Syrian people: The Damascus rulers' radio has accused us of fighting against the revolution to justify their abominable crime and attack on Jordan. We have finally reacted against those who played havoc with the revolution's destiny, against those who dressed themselves in revolutionary attire and looted cars in the name of the revolution while we kept silent. They attacked the sanctity of homes and stole money and property. Yet we kept silent. They violated order and disregarded law. Yet we kept silent. They closed Amman and frequently obstructed life in it, but we kept silent. They set up road blocks and assumed the duties of the security police. They arrested whomever they wanted and attacked and abused people. Yet we kept silent. They attacked the officers and men. They kidnapped and looted, and stole the officers' and men's property. Yet we kept silent. They committed all sorts of offences. But we kept silent because we preferred that some individuals should go on suffering rather than expose everybody to danger. The citizens who were detained by those commands for scores of days in their camps and who were prevented from going to their home daily as they were used to, which left only their wives to run their homes - these citizens became fed up. But we kept silent in the face of all this so as not to expose our citizens, the honourable revolution and the armed forces to what they are undergoing today.

Amman was flooded with bases set up in all quarters, streets and hotels. Amman was flooded with rockets, guns and arms of all sizes. But we kept silent because we knew that all these were prepared to strike the enemy. The authorities accepted all the conditions of the Central Committee, including those of 15th September 1970, which gave the fida'iyin more than they needed. But still we were patient. Do you know why, Damascus rulers? We kept silent not out of cowardice or weakness but for the sake of Palestine and the Palestinians. At dawn on 17th September we were surprised by rockets and artillery fire against the Army camps and the houses of Army personnel in Amman and Zarqa. Do you see now, rulers of Damascus, where tolerance and goodwill have led us? We have been patient, as have all the honourable men, both fida'iyin and citizens. Then we had no more room for patience. But what have you shown patience about, rulers of Damascus? Have you been harmed as we have been?

We declare to you that ours is a rebellion against all wrongs and against all deviation, so that in the end clean revolution will remain to attend to its honourable national task side by side with the Jordanian armed forces there at the front line of blood and sacrifice, the front line of bravery and martyrdom. As for you, Cohen's disciples, you who imposed yourselves on the fraternal Syrian people and sucked their wealth and goodness, we advise you for the sake of God and history to withhold your evil from Jordan and leave us to devote ourselves to dealing with our enemy, in collaboration with our honourable brother fida'iyin. Or is this contrary to the orders issued to you by your masters? If so, then we are ready. We will sacrifice our lives and blood for the sake of our soil.

**11.50 GMT** (Statement by Majali) A reward of 5,000 Jordanian dinars will be paid to anyone who either arrests the criminals Nayif al-Hawatimah and George Habash or informs the Jordanian authorities about their whereabouts and leads to their arrest.

**12.00 GMT** The Beirut 'An-Nahar' today confirms that the forces which entered Jordan from Syria last Sunday [20th September] were actually regular forces belonging to the 28th Syrian Brigade.

**16.00 GMT** (Statement by Majali) Irbid: The invading Syrian forces are still in the eastern and northern parts of Irbid. Our forces have been able to stop their advance and force many of their units to retreat from the positions they occupied yesterday. Clashes continue. Amman: The Jordanian armed forces are in control of most parts of the capital. Mopping up of remaining small pockets continues. Zarqa: The Jordanian armed forces are in control of all parts of the town and are carrying out mopping-up operations in the Jamaah quarter. As-Salt: The town is quite calm since our forces chased out the remnants of the misled ones who opened fire on some of our advanced positions. Calm prevails and life is normal in the other provinces.



I.D.F. SPOKESMAN  
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24 SEPTEMBER 1970  
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(NOT TO BE ATTRIBUTED).

THE SITUATION IN JORDAN - 24.9.1970  
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THE MILITARY SITUATION IN THE NORTH  
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THE RETREAT OF THE SYRIAN ARMoured FORCES FROM NORTHERN JORDAN IS AN ACCOMPLISHED FACT, AND THIS CONCLUDES AN IMPORTANT PHASE IN RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THAT COUNTRY.

IN HIS ANNOUNCEMENTS YESTERDAY AFTERNOON, THE COMMANDER OF THE JORDANIAN 2ND DIVISION SPEAKS WITH A VICTOR'S VOICE. AND INDEED, THERE APPEARS TO BE SOME JUSTIFICATION FOR THIS: DESPITE THEIR DEFINITELY INFERIOR FORCES, THE JORDANIANS CAUSED THE INVADING SYRIANS HEAVY LOSSES OF EQUIPMENT, AND THIS, WITHOUT ANY OUTSIDE MILITARY HELP.

ON THE OTHER HAND, SEVERAL ADDITIONAL FACTORS MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE SYRIAN DECISION TO RETREAT, INCLUDING FEAR OF A MILITARY INTERVENTION BY I.D.F. OR U.S. FORCES, THE UNKNOWN QUANTITY OF THE IRAQI EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IN JORDAN, AND INTERNATIONAL AS WELL AS INTER-ARAB POLITICAL PRESSURES.

THE PRIMARY FACTORS WERE THEREFORE MOST PROBABLY, THE ACTUAL ARREST OF THE SYRIAN ADVANCE, I.E. ITS FAILURE AND ITS LOSSES IN ACTION - AS WELL AS THE APPREHENSION OF FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION WHICH GREW IN PROPORTION TO THE SYRIAN SOUTHWARD ADVANCE - ESPECIALLY AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF INCREASING RUMOURS OF MILITARY DISPOSITIONS ON THE PART OF THE ISRAEL DEFENCE FORCES.

ANOTHER, PURELY MILITARY FACTOR WAS CONTRIBUTED BY THE SYRIANS THEMSELVES: THEIR DESCRIPTION OF THE INVADING ARMY AS 'PALESTINIANS' MADE IT DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO SEND IN THEIR AIR FORCE TO ESTABLISH MILITARY SUPERIORITY.

AS THE SYRIAN FORCES WITHDREW YESTERDAY (WEDNESDAY), THE JORDANIAN ARMY ENTERED IRBID BUT LATER EVACUATED AND ENCIRCLED THE TOWN. THROUGHOUT WEDNESDAY AND THE NIGHT FROM WEDNESDAY TO THURSDAY, THERE WERE EXCHANGES OF FIRE WITH TERRORISTS WHO FIRED ON JORDANIAN ARMY UNITS, AND THE ARMY RETURNED FIRE DESPITE ITS DEFINITE ORDERS NOT TO INITIATE FIRING ON ITS PART.

CONT'D...

IN ANY CASE, FIGHTING, WHICH CONTINUES IN THE IRBID SECTOR IS NOW OF A VERY DIFFERENT TYPE, AS THOSE ARE NOT TANK BATTLES AGAINST A FOREIGN REGULAR ARMY, BUT EXCHANGES OF FIRE WITH TERRORIST GROUPS THAT REMAINED IN THE SECTOR.

#### THE MILITARY SITUATION IN OTHER SECTORS

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IN AMMAN AND IN SMALLER TOWNS NORTH OF THE CAPITAL, LOCALIZED EXCHANGES OF FIRE WITH TERRORISTS OPERATING FROM SMALL POCKETS OF RESISTANCE, CONTINUED THROUGHOUT YESTERDAY (WEDNESDAY), AND IN GENERAL, THE JORDANIAN ARMY IS IN CONTROL OF THE SITUATION.

THIS MORNING (THURSDAY), CURFEW WAS LIFTED IN AMMAN TO PERMIT THE CIVILIAN POPULATION TO ATTEND TO VITAL MATTERS WHICH HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED BY THE FIGHTING .

YESTERDAY (WEDNESDAY) THE ARMY APPEARED TO BE CONSOLIDATING ITS SUCCESS IN MOPPING-UP OPERATIONS, BUT UNLIKE THE FINE STAND MADE BY THE JORDANIAN ARMOUR ON THE BATTLEFIELD, ITS LACK OF EXPERIENCE IN FIGHTING IN BUILT-UP AREAS WAS EVIDENT.

IN THE MOPPING-UP OPERATIONS, THE INFANTRY ADVANCED BEHIND THE TANKS, AND WHEN ENCOUNTERING FIRE, TOOK COVER AND RETURNED FIRE - MOSTLY IN THE AIR. THE ARMOUR MAKES NO SERIOUS ATTEMPTS TO CLEAN UP HOUSES BY FORCE, BUT BLOCKADES THEM UNTIL THE AMMUNITION SHALL GIVE OUT. THIS SYSTEM SHOWS, ON ONE HAND, A POSITION OF POWER AND, ON THE OTHER HAND, A RELUCTANCE TO SHED MORE BLOOD.

#### CONTACTS

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THE DELEGATION HEADED BY THE SUDANESE PRIME MINISTER ON TUESDAY (22.9.) MET HUSSEIN AND FOUR LEADERS OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS WHO WERE BEING HELD BY THE JORDANIANS.

YESTERDAY (WEDNESDAY), HUSSEIN BROADCAST TO HIS NATION A PROPOSAL OF A SETTLEMENT WITH THE TERRORISTS UNDER HIS CONDITIONS, WHICH DEMONSTRATED AN ASSURANCE OF HIS POWER FOLLOWING THE SUCCESS AGAINST THE SYRIANS IN THE NORTH.

CONT'D...



- 3 -

RADIO AMMAN LATER BROADCAST AN ADDRESS BY ABU AYAD, THE DEPUTY OF YASSER ARAFAT, HELD BY THE JORDANIANS, WHO PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE CONDITIONS FOR A SETTLEMENT, WHICH DID NOT DIFFER GREATLY FROM THOSE PUT BY HUSSEIN.

IN THIS WAY, A CEASE-FIRE AGREEMENT WAS REACHED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT WAS NOT ACTUALLY PUT INTO ACTION IN THE FIELD. NIMEIRI RETURNED TO CAIRO, ACCOMPANIED BY THE FOUR TERRORIST LEADERS WHO HAD BEEN IMPRISONED IN JORDAN.

IN THE MEANTIME, BROADCASTS OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS SHOW THAT THEY ARE REJECTING THE AGREEMENT, CLAIMING THAT ABU AYAD AND THE OTHER LEADERS WHO WERE DETAINED IN JORDAN DID NOT REPRESENT THE PALESTINIAN REVOLUTION AND CANNOT SPEAK IN ITS NAME.

THIS UNCOVERS SIGNS OF DIFFERENCES OF OPINION AMONG THE TERRORIST LEADERSHIP REGARDING CONTINUED RELATIONS WITH JORDAN.

HUSSEIN'S POSITION IS NO DOUBT STRONGER NOW THAN IT WAS BEFORE THE RECENT FIGHTING - BUT HE NEEDS TO COME TO AN AGREEMENT WITH THE TERRORISTS. THE CHANCES FOR A BINDING AND WORKABLE AGREEMENT ARE NOT PREDICTABLE, SINCE THE TERRORISTS, DESPITE THEIR LOSSES AND DESPITE THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE SYRIAN FORCES FROM JORDAN, HAVE REPEATEDLY IN THE PAST SHOWN A STUBBORN AND FANATICAL ATTITUDE.

IN THE LIGHT OF THE PAST DAYS' EVENTS, THE ATMOSPHERE HAS CERTAINLY NOT BECOME MORE CONDUCTIVE TO MUTUAL TRUST. A LASTING ARRANGEMENT IS THEREFORE NOT SEEN PROBABLE AT PRESENT. AS TO TEMPORARY COMPROMISE-AGREEMENTS - EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT THEY DO NOT TEND TO BE OBSERVED - ESPECIALLY BY THE TERRORISTS WHO ARE NOT A HOMOGENOUS BODY.

HG/EL

19.30 HOURS

(Not to be attributed)

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN JORDAN ON 23.9.70.

Military Situation

1. According to this afternoon's (23.9.) announcement by the General Military Governor of Jordan, the Syrian armoured forces are in retreat towards Ramtha, pursued by the Jordanian armour.
2. It appears that the Syrian force which had crossed into Jordan and reached Irbid sector on Sunday 20 September, may have retreated from there during the day on its way back to Syria.
3. There is no confirmation of reports that engagements between the Syrian and the Jordanian army took place also today (Wednesday). Possibly, only artillery fire was exchanged.
4. The Jordanian army is in control of Amman but is still engaged in mopping up pockets of resistance.
5. The situation is similar in the towns of Sarka and Salt, where mopping up operations are also continuing.
6. In the rest of the country, Jordanian forces are in control, except for the region of Mafrak where Iraqi units are concentrated.

Other Developments

1. The Conference of Arab leaders in Cairo was postponed this morning for the fourth time - without a new date having been set. In the meantime, a delegation was formed in Cairo to call on King Hussein during the night of 22-23 September, headed by Sudanese Premier el-Nimeiry. This morning, Hussein broadcast details of an agreement with the terrorists, under which those would evacuate towns and villages and move to the border region with Israel.
2. Only a few hours later the Central Committee of terrorists organizations replied, that rivers of blood were separating them from Hussein, and the revolution would continue until the present rule in Jordan was overthrown. The same terrorist broadcast put the number of casualties in the fighting at 30,000 killed and wounded.
3. The announcer of Radio Amman last night termed the Syrian army "The Disciples of Eli Cohen who shamed their army, betrayed their people and handed over the Golan Heights".
4. The Commander of the second Jordanian division announced in Amman today that the Syrians invaded Northern Jordan with 285 tanks of the T54 and T55 type, organised in three armoured brigades and one mechanized brigade. He described the Syrian forces as belonging to the fifth division and to brigades 67 and 88 of the Syrian army. Syrian losses, the colonel said, totalled 103 tanks hit or destroyed, and 170 vehicles during the three days fighting. Although those figures appear slightly exaggerated, the Syrians clearly sustained heavy losses of equipment.

(Attached: geographical description of The Irbid Plateau)

HG/EL



THE IRBID PLATEAU

The Irbid Plateau is the northeast extension of the Gilad mountains in Eastern Trans-Jordan. The Plateau is bordered to the West by the Jordan River, approximately 200 metres under sea-level, rising eastwards for a distance of some 25 kilometers up to an elevation of 600 meters, above sea-level. (in the vicinity of the town of Irbid). East of Irbid- the Irbid Plain.

To the north, the Plateau borders on the Yarmukh Gorge and to the North-East by the beds of Wasi- Shalalah. Southwards, the Plateau fuses with the Ajlun Mountains (max. elev. near the town of Ajlun- 1200 meters above sea-level, approx. 25 kilometers south of Irbid.)

The Plateau's watershed bisects the area near Irbid, following westwards into the Jordan, and Eastwards into Wadi Shalalah, a tributary of the Yarmukh River.

The Western parts of the Irbid Plateau is bisected by many streams, running parallel to each other towards the Jordan. In between the streams are numerous plains, cultivated areas and villages.

Irbid constitutes the gateway into a wide-open plain, leading (southwards) into the centre of Jordan, eastwards in the direction of Iraq, and northwards towards Syria. Irbid straddles an important road junction leading in all these directions (the centre of Jordan, Syria, and Damascus).

All roads leading northwards out of Irbid are blocked by the Yarmukh Gorge apart from one which crosses the river in the vicinity of Al-Hana.

Because of the Yarmukh obstacle, road-links between Irbid and Syria lead from Darr'ah (Syria) via Paltah (Jordan)- an important road junction- southwards to Amman and Eastwards to Mafraq.

Only few roads connect Irbid with the Jordan river fords and bridges in the West. Even so, these roads are still more numerous than parallel roads further to the south.

The Irbid Plateau is the most densely populated area in the Jordanian Kingdom. One reason for this is the relatively high quantity of rainfalls (annual average-600 mm. of precipitation). Irbid is the second largest town in Jordan. Its population is estimated at over 100 thousand residents, mainly Moslems with a Christian minority.

Irbid serves as a regional centre, incorporating various administrative authorities and commercial centres. Agriculture and industry are its main sources of income.

( NOT TO BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE I.D.F. SPOKESMAN. )

THE SITUATION IN JORDAN ON 22 SEPTEMBER 1970

THE SYRIAN INVASION

1. THE SYRIAN FORCE STARTED CROSSING INTO JORDAN DURING THE NIGHT OF 19-20 SEPTEMBER 1970. THIS FORCE CROSSED THE BORDER NEAR RAMTHA, WHICH WAS TAKEN WITHOUT A FIGHT, AND ADVANCED WESTWARDS AND TO THE SOUTH.

2. JORDANIAN UNITS ESTABLISHED CONTACT WITH THIS FORCE ON SUNDAY MORNING 20 SEPTEMBER, AND SUCCEEDED TO ARREST ITS ADVANCE BEFORE IT COULD PROCEED MUCH BEYOND RAMTHA.

ON THE SAME DAY, DURING THE MORNING HOURS, THE SYRIAN FORCE - WHICH HAD IN THE MEANTIME RECEIVED REINFORCEMENTS - ATTEMPTED TO RENEW ITS ADVANCE, WAS AGAIN REFUSED BY THE JORDANIANS, AND TOOK UP POSITION IN THE RAMTHA-IRBID SECTOR.

3. THE INVADING SYRIAN FORCE IS ESTIMATED TO INCLUDE OVER 200 TANKS - THE EQUIVALENT OF AN ARMoured DIVISION. IN THEIR TWO ENGAGEMENTS WITH THE JORDANIANS, THE SYRIAN TANKS SUSTAINED HEAVY LOSSES.

4. ON 20 SEPTEMBER, AT NOON, THE SYRIAN FORCE BEGAN TO FORTIFY ITS POSITIONS WITHOUT CONTINUING ITS ADVANCE ON THAT DAY.

5. BOTH SIDES CONTINUED FORMING-UP THROUGHOUT THE MORNING HOURS OF MONDAY 21 SEPTEMBER, AND ONLY IN THE AFTERNOON, THE SYRIAN FORCE ATTEMPTED TO RENEW A TWO-PRONGED ADVANCE TO THE SOUTH AND NORTH OF IRBID.

THE MOVE OF THE SYRIAN ARMOUR WAS IMMEDIATELY ANSWERED BY JORDANIAN FIRE. JORDANIAN TANK FORCES, ARTILLERY AND AIR SUPPORT AGAIN SUCCEEDED TO ARREST THE ADVANCE OF THE SYRIANS, CAUSING THEM HEAVY LOSSES.

6. ON THE MORNING OF TUESDAY 22 SEPTEMBER, THE SYRIANS AGAIN TRIED TO ADVANCE SOUTH FROM THE OUTSKIRTS OF IRBID. REINFORCED JORDANIAN UNITS REFUSED THIS NEW ATTEMPT, AIDED BY AIR AND ARTILLERY SUPPORT. AT NOON, THE FORCES WERE AGAIN DUG IN.

CONT'D...



## THE SITUATION IN AMMAN

-----

THE JORDANIAN ARMY IS IN CONTROL OF THE CITY, BUT THE TERRORISTS WHO STILL REMAINED AT AMMAN APPEAR TO BE EXPLOITING THE SITUATION CREATED BY THE MOVE NORTH OF ARMED FORCES, AND SEEM TO OPEN SPORADIC FIRE AT UNDEFINED TARGETS. THIS SEEMS TO ACCOUNT FOR THE CURFEW WHICH WAS AGAIN IMPOSED TODAY, AFTER IT HAD BEEN LIFTED ONLY A SHORT TIME AGO.

### SUMMARY

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1. SYRIA HAS NOT ADMITTED UNTIL NOW THAT HER FORCES INVADED JORDAN. THIS MAY ALSO BE THE REASON WHY THE SYRIANS HAVE NOT SO FAR SENT IN THEIR AIR FORCE, WHICH THEY CANNOT VERY WELL DESCRIBE AS "PALESTINIANS".
  2. THERE IS NO DOUBT WHATSOEVER THAT THE FORCE WHICH CROSSED INTO JORDAN IS A REGULAR SYRIAN ARMY FORCE, WHICH HAS ADOPTED FOR ITSELF THE INSIGNIA OF WHAT IS TERMED "PALESTINE LIBERATION FORCES". THIS "ARMY" HAS NEITHER TANKS NOR OTHER ARMOUR. IT NUMBERS A FEW INFANTRY UNITS ALL TOLD, AND TO DESCRIBE IT AS AN ARMoured FORCE IS NOTHING BUT A SYRIAN RUSE.
  3. IT SHOULD BE NOTED THAT IN HIS PRESS BRIEFING TODAY (TUESDAY) HASSNAN HEYKAL MADE NO MENTION AT ALL OF THE SYRIAN ARMY'S INVASION. HE ONLY MENTIONS THE MATTER IN PASSING, NOTING THAT THE DISCUSSIONS STARTING IN CAIRO TONIGHT WILL, AMONG OTHER TOPICS, INCLUDE "LIQUIDATION OF THE COMPLICATIONS CREATED BY THE CRISIS". THIS APPEARS TO PERPETUATE EGYPT'S POSITION WHICH CLEARLY CEASED TO SUPPORT THE JORDANIAN REGIME IN ITS STRUGGLE AGAINST THE TERRORISTS AND, ESPECIALLY, ITS FIGHT AGAINST THE SYRIAN FORCES WHICH HAVE INVADED NORTHERN JORDAN.
  4. THE SITUATION, AS IT APPEARS ON THE EVE OF THE CAIRO TALKS IS THAT THE JORDANIANS HAVE PRACTICALLY LOST CONTROL OVER THE NORTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY WHICH IS DIVIDED BETWEEN THE SYRIANS IN THE NORTH-WEST, AND THE IRAQIS IN THE NORTH-EASTERN REGION.
  5. ALSO NOTEWORTHY IS THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE SUPREME MILITARY GOVERNOR OF JORDAN REGARDING A PRIZE OF 5000 DINAR PROMISED TO "ANYONE ARRESTING THE CRIMINALS NAIF KHUATAMA AND GEORGE HABASH, OR ANYONE GUIDING THE JORDANIAN ARMED FORCES TO THEIR PLACE OF RESIDENCE IN A MANNER LEADING TO THEIR ARREST".
- NAIF KHUATAMA IS KNOWN TO HEAD THE TERRORIST ORGANISATION CALLED THE DEMOCRATIC POPULAR FRONT, WHILE GEORGE HABASH IS THE HEAD OF THE TERRORIST "POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE."

HG/EL

13.40 HOURS

CYPHER CAT/A

CONFIDENTIAL

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE (U.K.)

TELEGRAM NO 291130Z

SEPTEMBER 1970

371

CONFIDENTIAL.

291130Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELNO 291130Z SEPT 70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
IMMEDIATE TO FCO DA BEIRUT DA TEL AVIV DA BAGHDAD DA CAIRO JIS(NE)  
AND JIS GULF.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN JORDAN.

1.. DA SAW ACOS (OPS) BRIG H.H. SHERIF ZAID BIN SHAKER ON 292830Z  
SEPT IN THE QIADA. SHERIF ZAID GAVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION:-

2.. SITUATION IN NORTH JORDAN.

IRBID WAS STILL CONTROLLED BY FEDAYEEN BUT THE ARMY SURROUNDED  
IT. KING HUSSEIN HAD GIVEN ORDERS THAT THE ARMY WAS NOT TO ATTACK  
IRBID. HE DID NOT WISH IRBID TO SUFFER SUCH LARGE SCALE DESTRUCTION  
AS HAD AMMAN. NO IRAQIS REMAINED IN THE IRBID AREA. THE SITUATION  
IN NORTH JORDAN WAS THEREFORE CONSIDERED TO BE UNDER CONTROL, AND  
WITH THE EXCEPTION IF IRBID QUOTE 'THE POSITION WAS RESTORED'.

3.. SITUATION IN SOUTH JORDAN.

ALL WAS REPORTED TO BE QUIET, EXCEPT FOR A POCKET OF RESIST-  
ANCE IN THE WADI MUJIB SOUTH OF MADABA. THE CIVILIAN POPULATION HAD  
TAKEN MATTERS INTO THEIR OWN HANDS IN SOUTH JORDAN AND DEALT WITH  
THE FEDAYEEN. SAUDI ARABIAN FORCES HAD NOT MOVED.

4.. SITUATION IN AMMAN.

SHERIF ZAID SAID THAT THE ARMY CONTROLLED JEBEL HUSSEIN AREA,  
JEBEL AMMAN TO FIRST CIRCLE, JEBEL LUMEIDEN ONLY TO TERRA SANCTA  
COLLEGE, THE STATION AREA, AND OF JEBEL ACHRAFIYEH ONLY THE SOUTHERN  
OUTSKIRTS WERE HELD-UP TO THE WANDAT CAMP. HE ADMITTED THAT THE  
ARMY INTELLIGENCE HAD GROSSLY UNDERESTIMATED THE STRENGTH, DETERMIN-  
ATION, AND DEFENCES OF THE FEDAYEEN. A PARTICULAR FEATURE WAS /THE

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THE EXTENT THAT MINES AND POOBY TRAPS HAD BEEN USED. HOUSES, PODIES, VEHICLES, AND ROADS WERE FREQUENTLY MINED. WHEN AREAS WERE OVER-RUN BY THE ARMY THE FEDAYEEN HAD GONE TO GROUND, OR PUT ON CIVILIAN CLOTHES. LATER THEY EMERGED TO CONTINUE FIGHTING. THERE HAD BEEN A SHORTAGE OF INFANTRY AND THUS NO AREAS WERE PROPERLY CLEARED. AMMUNITION EXPENDITURE HAD BEEN EXCESSIVE AND FIRE DISCIPLINE DEARLY NEEDED IMPROVEMENT. HE SAID THAT, IF ORDERED HE THOUGHT THE ARMY COULD CLEAR JEBELS TAJ AND ASHRAFIYEH IN TWO TO THREE DAYS.

## 5.. SYRIAN INCURSION.

---

SHERIF ZAID CALLED THIS A STAB IN THE BACK. HE SAID THAT FIVE DAYS BEFORE THE ATTACK A SERJEANT ON LEAVE HAD SEEN SYRIAN ARMoured VEHICLES CARRYING PALESTINIAN MARKINGS SOUTH OF DAMASCUS. THE ATTACK WAS EXECUTED BY TWO ARMoured AND ONE MECHANISED INFANTRY BRIGADE. INITIALLY, BY LYING WELL BACK, 40 JORDANIAN ARMoured BRIGADE HAD BEEN ABLE TO INFLICT HEAVY CASUALTIES THOUGH THEY ALSO SUFFERED LOSSES. THEN THE JORDANIANS HAD MANNED THE HIGH GROUND SOUTH AND EAST OF Irbid IN THE HUSH AREA. THE AIRFORCE HAD BEEN MOST EFFECTIVE AND GREATLY CONTRIBUTED TO THE GOOD MORALE OF TROOPS IN THE AREA. THE SYRIANS MOVED BY NIGHT - THEY WERE EQUIPPED WITH INFRA RED DEVICES. THE SYRIANS WERE NO MATCH MILITARILY FOR THE JORDANIANS AND COULD HAVE BEEN QUOTE "CHASED BACK TO DAMASCUS".

## 6.. IRAQIS.

---

WHILST THE IRAQIS HAD NOT INTERFERED BY USING THEIR MILITARY UNITS THEY HAD SUPPLIED FEDAYEEN AND HAD SOLDIERS IN PLAIN CLOTHES OPERATING WITH FEDAYEEN IN THE AJLUN AND JERASH AREAS. ALL THE IRAQIS HAD WITHDRAWN FROM THE Irbid AREA TOWARDS MAFRAQ. HE THOUGHT THAT THE IRAQIS WERE TRYING TO LESSEN THEIR MILITARY COMMITMENT IN JORDAN AND SAID "IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF THEY WOULD GO". HE SAID THAT BOTH IRAQ AND SYRIA WILL HAVE TO BE WATCHED.

## MORALE OF THE ARMY.

---

SHERIF ZAID SAID THAT HE EXPECTED THAT THERE MIGHT STILL BE CLASHES BETWEEN THE ARMY AND FEDAYEEN IN THE REMOTER AREAS - THOUGH THE ARMY WAS UNDER STRICT ORDERS NOT TO FIRE. HE SAID HE WANTED /TO

AMMAN TELNO 291130Z TO MOD

- 3 -

TO HAVE LOSSES REPLACED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE ARMY'S  
 "OVERENTHUSIASM" IN MOVING TO ATTACK FEDAYEEN SHOULD NOT BE  
 CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE OF LACK OF CONTROL WITHIN THE ARMY, RATHER  
 A DEMONSTRATION OF TROOPS LOYALTY TO KING HUSSEIN.

#### 7.. FUTURE FEDAYEEN ACTIVITIES.

---

IT WAS THOUGHT THAT FEDAYEEN WILL BE ALLOWED TO OPERATE, AS  
 IN THE PAST, AGAINST THE OCCUPIED WEST BANK. SHERIF ZAID SAID  
 THAT HE THOUGHT THE FEDAYEEN HAD NOT YET REALISED THE EXTENT OF  
 THEIR LOSSES. QUOTE "THEIR SPINE IS BROKEN" UNQUOTE.  
 HE IMPLIED THAT THE ARMY COULD DO WITH THE FEDAYEEN IF THE CEASE  
 FIRE WAS BROKEN.

#### 8.. EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS.

---

THE LONG LIST OF REQUIREMENTS FOR AMMUNITION AND SOFT AND  
 HARD SKINNED VEHICLES WAS URGENTLY REQUIRED. HE ASKED FOR AN INDIC-  
 CATION AS TO OUR OFFICIAL REACTION TO THE REQUEST AS SOON AS POSSIBLE  
 AMMUNITION SHOULD BE FLOWN IN. 70MM AND 105MM AMMUNITION WAS  
 CRITICALLY SHORT, SO WERE LANDROVERS MANY OF WHICH HAD BEEN STOLEN  
 BY FEDAYEEN. THE TANK FLOTTIE INCLUDED 16 ALREADY ON ORDER,  
 (NEW DELIVERY THIS WK). HE HOPED THAT THE AMERICANS WOULD  
 GIVE CREDIT FACILITIES. THE ARMY NEEDED REINFORCEMENTS FOR THE  
 FRONT AND SYRIANS WERE STILL A THREAT.

#### CASUALTIES.

---

THERE WERE FAR LESS THAN HAD BEEN REPORTED.

#### 9.. COMMENTS.

---

IN BRIEF IT SEEMS THAT THE SITUATION IN JORDAN OTHER THAN IN  
 AMMAN CAN BE SAID TO BE GENERALLY UNDER CONTROL BY GOVERNMENT FORCES  
 BUT THAT, IF THE FEDAYEEN SO WISHED THEY COULD HAVE MOVEMENT  
 FREIGHT FOR THEY APPEAR TO HOLD SEVERAL COMMUNICATION CENTRES.  
 IT APPEARS THEY HAVE A STRONGHOLD IN THE JEBEL AUBRAHYEH AREA /FROM



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- 4 -

FROM WHICH THEY ARE UNLIKELY TO BE FORCED OUT WITHOUT THE EMPLOYMENT OF FAR MORE TROOPS, PARTICULARLY INFANTRY, THAN THE JORDANIANS HAVE COMMITTED TO DATE. WE WONDER IF THE INFANTRY WHO INCLUDES A HIGHER PROPORTION OF PALESTINIANS ARE RELIABLE ENOUGH. A SITUATION THEREFORE EXISTS IN AMMAN. THE FAYATEEN HAVE UNDOUBTEDLY PROVED THEIR CAPABILITY TO PARALYSE AMMAN AT WILL. WE THINK THE ARMY CONTINUE TO UNDERESTIMATE FAYATEEN CAPABILITIES. THE JORDANIAN ARMY WAS COMMITTED TO AMMAN WITHOUT PROPER TRAINING AND WITHOUT THE INFANTRY ESSENTIAL FOR HOUSE CLEARING OPERATIONS IN A TOWN BUILT, GENERALLY, OF STONE BUILDINGS ON STEEP SLOPED JEBELS. THE ARMY WILL NOW REQUIRE A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD TO RECOVER FROM ITS EQUIPMENT LOSSES WHICH WERE, WE THINK, FAR MORE NUMEROUS IN THE IRBID AREA AS A RESULT OF THE SYRIAN INCURSION THAN IN AMMAN. THE ARMY CANNOT SUSTAIN FURTHER OPERATING WITHOUT A VERY LARGE AMMUNITION RESUPPLY PROGRAMME (PARTICULARLY FOR TANKS AND ARMoured CARS) AND REPLACEMENT OF SOFT SKINNED VEHICLES. PARTICULARLY LAND-ROVERS. WE DOUBT IF 60 CENTURIONS WERE LOST IN THE IRBID BATTLE. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN WHAT WILL BE THE EFFECTS OF THE DEVASTATION IN AMMAN ON PALESTINIAN ELEMENTS IN THE ARMY. THE IMMEDIATE REACTION OF ALL ARMY ELEMENTS IS ONE OF REGRET THAT SUCH DAMAGE HAD TO BE CAUSED. WE DO NOT BELIEVE MORALE CAN BE HIGH, EXCEPT, POSSIBLY IN THE NORTH, FOR THERE WAS NO ARMY VICTORY IN AMMAN.

10.. THE CURRENT ACTING CHIEF OF STAFF JORDANIAN ARMY IS THE DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF MAJ GEN MOHAMED ABDEL RAHMAN.

11.. DETAILED DEPLOYMENT OF JORDANIANS IS NOT AVAILABLE AT PRESENT.

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS


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British Embassy,

Tel Aviv.

(1/5)

25 September, 1970.

Enter

Noted. PA.

35/9

Dear Pike, NETJ/k

As you know the IDF have been most helpful in providing information to us during the recent crisis in Jordan. But, I got information from the British Embassy, issued "a memorandum" to the press by Mr. J. J. ... only people who were kept well-briefed.

Yours sincerely,  
Hen'W Mandel.

(H. J. Mandel)

Mr. Michael Pike,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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372

TOP COPY

CYPHER CAT A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 717  
CONFIDENTIAL.  
300600Z

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TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
30 SEPTEMBER 1970

REC'D  
REG. 17/11/70  
NEJ 1/4

SITREP AT 300600Z

1. AMMAN IS QUIET. WHEN CURFEW WAS RAISED THIS MORNING CIVIL POPULATION APPEARED QUICKLY ON THE STREETS TO GATHER AT WATER DISTRIBUTION POINTS. WE HAVE HAD A FEW SPOTS OF RAIN.
2. ARMY REMAINS DEPLOYED AT ROAD JUNCTIONS ON JEBELS AMMAN AND HUSSEIN. RECOVERY OF DAMAGED VEHICLES CONTINUES.
3. BRITISH MEDICAL UNIT HAS STARTED TO ARRIVE AT AMMAN AIRPORT AND IS DEPLOYING TO KING HUSSEIN MILITARY HOSPITAL.
4. DA SPOKE TO COMMANDER RJAF AT AIRPORT THIS MORNING. BRIG. KURDI SAID THAT IF THE FEDAYEEN DO NOT WITHDRAW THEN THEY WOULD HAVE TO ANSWER TO OTHER ARAB NATIONS. ANOTHER OFFICER SAID THAT THAT THE ARMY HELD 4,000 FEDAYEEN AS HOSTAGES.

FCO PLEASE PASS AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS

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373

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CYBER CAT/A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 729

TO F.C.O. LONDON  
33 SEPTEMBER 1978

CONFIDENTIAL.

301330Z

SITREP AS AT 301330Z.

for am  
24/9

- 1.. THROUGHOUT THE MORNING WE HAVE NOTICED APC'S AND OTHER CARS AND ADMINISTRATIVE VEHICLES MOVING WEST FROM JEBEL HUSSEIN AND JEBEL AMMAN AREAS.
- 2.. WITHIN 800 YARDS OF THE KING HUSSEIN MILITARY HOSPITAL WHERE BOTH U.K. AND U.S. FIELD HOSPITALS ARE GETTING ESTABLISHED NEAR 0400 SIX TWO SQUADS OF CE-FUNCTION TANKS AND MECHANICAL INFANTRY HAVE HARBOURED. OUR FORCES ARE WELL PROTECTED.
- 3.. IT IS CLEAR THAT LIFE IN AMMAN IS SLOWLY IMPROVING THOUGH FOOD DISTRIBUTION APPEARS TO BE UNEVEN, SOME LOCAL STAFF HAVE REPORTED FOR DUTY TODAY.
- 4.. THE ROAD FROM AMMAN TO ZENKA VIA RUSSEIFA IS NOT CLEAR YET FOR TRAFFIC, BUT THE NORTHERN ROAD AMMAN-SUMELIN-ZENKA IS OPEN, SUMELIN APPEARS CLEAR AND THERE IS THUS AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE FROM OUR HOSPITAL SITE TO AMMAN.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE FULL DISTRIBUTION FOR SITREPS.

MR. PHILLIPS

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YPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 722

TO F.C.O.  
30 SEPTEMBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

301115Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 722 DATED 27 SEPTEMBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO MOD D14 BEIRUT TEL AVIV DACHDAAD CAIRO  
JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

THE MILITARY SITUATION IN JORDAN.

---

OUR TEL 291130Z TO MOD D14 REFERS.

WE HAVE TRIED TO SYNTHESISE THE ACCOUNTS OF THE PRESENT  
SITUATION GIVEN US BY THE BRIG. ZEID BIN SHAKER (A/COPS)  
(OUR 291130Z), THE KING, AND RED CROSS DOCTOR HORNIBLOW (OUR  
TELEX CONFERENCE OF 291700Z.).

2.. IT SEEMS PRETTY CLEAR FROM THESE ACCOUNTS THAT THE RECENT  
FIGHTING HAS CHANGED THE OVERALL PICTURE REMARKABLY LITTLE EXCEPT  
OF COURSE THAT BOTH SIDES MUST OBVIOUSLY HAVE MUCH LESS AMMUNITION  
THAN WHEN THEY STARTED.

THE ARMY ARE IN GENERAL CONTROL OF THE AREAS THEY HAVE ALWAYS  
OCCUPIED AND MUCH THE SAME CAN BE SAID OF THE FEDAYEEN.

3.. FOR ANY CHANGE THEREFORE, WE SHALL HAVE TO EXAMINE MUCH MORE  
INTANGIBLE FACTORS SUCH AS MORALE AND THE BALANCE OF POLITICAL  
FORCES (IN THE WIDEST SENSE) ON EACH SIDE. FOR THE PRESENT THESE  
MUST CLEARLY BE A MATTER OF PURE CONJECTURE.

4.. THE FIGHTING HAS CLEARLY DEMONSTRATED THAT, WHILE THE ARMY  
HAVE INSUFFICIENT RELIABLE INFANTRY TO OVERWHELM THE FEDAYEEN  
IN AMMAN, THE FEDAYEEN HAVE NOT THE NECESSARY HEAVY EQUIPMENT TO  
OUST THE ARMY FROM ITS ESTABLISHED POSITIONS OR TAKE IT ON IN THE  
OPEN, SO LONG AS NO ASSISTANCE CAN BE RELIED ON FROM IRAQ OR SYRIA.

5.. IT FOLLOWS FROM THIS THAT THE CAIRO AGREEMENT WHICH PRESCRIBES A WITHDRAWAL OF BOTH SIDES FROM POPULATED AREAS IS MORE FAVOURABLE TO THE REGIME THAN TO THE FEDAYEEN. IT SEEMS THEREFORE EXTREMELY UNLIKELY TO US THAT THE FEDAYEEN WILL BE PREPARED TO INTERPRET THIS WITHDRAWAL AS APPLYING TO THEIR SO CALLED MILITIA, AS OPPOSED TO QUOTE "REGULAR FORCES" UNQUOTE, INDEED ARAFAT HAS NOW SAID PRECISELY THIS. BUT UNLESS THE MILITIA ARE DISBANDED, WE SHALL HAVE IN AMMAN THE EXACT STATUS QUO ANTE BELLUM.

-----

6.. WE FIND IT VERY DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW THIS FUNDAMENTAL DILEMMA, WHICH HAS BEEN WITH US FOR THE PAST TWO YEARS, CAN BE RESOLVED SHORT OF SOME DE FACTO PARTITION OF THE COUNTRY WHICH WOULD GUARANTEE FEDAYEEN IMMUNITY FROM ARMY ATTACK. BUT THIS OF COURSE COULD WELL CREATE MORE PROBLEMS THAN IT SOLVED.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

MR PHILLIPS

FCO/WHITEHALL

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

N.E.D.



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376

All Members of the Emergency Staff

NET 1/4

6/11

Jordan Crisis: Briefing for Secretary of State  
while in the United States

I have agreed with Mr. Graham that during the Secretary of State's absence from London the Emergency Unit will send him briefing material as follows:-

- (i) An edited version of the morning SITREP, to reach New York not later than 9 a.m. New York time, i.e. to be despatched from London Flash by 1.30 p.m. Unlike the rather fuller morning SITREP we put out for Whitehall each day, the SITREP to be sent across the Atlantic should concentrate on events of the twelve hours immediately preceding its despatch;
- (ii) Summary accounts of the most important information obtained from Amman in the daily teleprinter conversations. The necessary ~~condensation~~ can be done by redictation or possibly even by a clever sub-editing job.

2. I also agreed with Mr. Graham that we would put the Secretary of State's party on the distribution list of all telegrams covering the various aspects of the Jordan crisis. Such telegrams should be addressed to UKMIS New York or Washington as appropriate "for Secretary of State". I understand that the Secretary of State's present intention is to leave London Airport for New York at 3 p.m. on Sunday, 20 September.

(S. L. *[Signature]*)  
18 September, 1970

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RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 16 -1 OCT 1970 NEJ 1/4
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CYPHER/CAT A

IMMEDIATE FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NO. 300

TO MADRID

29 SEPTEMBER 1970  
(EMERGENCY STAFF)

CONFIDENTIAL

291300Z

JORDAN.

THE FOLLOWING HAS BEEN RECEIVED IN A TELEX CONFERENCE THIS MORNING FROM H.M. AMBASSADOR AMMAN.  
BEGINS.

THE SPANISH AMBASSADOR WHOSE EMBASSY HAD BEEN IN THE THICK OF THE FIGHTING HAS JUST ARRIVED HERE AND WOULD BE GRATEFUL IF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE COULD BE PASSED TO THE UNDERSECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (MADRID).

BEGINS.

I WAS ABLE TO GO OUT WITH THE EMBASSY CAR FOR THE FIRST TIME TODAY. I VISITED THE PRIME MINISTER, AHMED TUKAN. HE TOLD ME HE WAS VERY HOPEFUL FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF THE SITUATION AND THE HEALING OF THE WOUNDS THE CIVIL WAR HAS PRODUCED. HE SAID THE NUMBER OF VICTIMS HAS BEEN GROSSLY EXAGGERATED. ACCORDING TO HIS RECKONING THERE HAVE BEEN ABOUT 600 DEAD AND TWELVE HUNDRED WOUNDED. HE SAID HE HAS GREAT HOPES IN THE SUCCESS OF THE MISSION OF THE TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER, WHO WILL STAY IN AMMAN FOR A WHILE. THE PRIME MINISTER ADDED, HOWEVER THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME DIFFICULT PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING THE CAIRO AGREEMENT. HE POINTED OUT THAT ACCORDING TO SAID AGREEMENT, THE MILITIA WOULD HAVE TO SURRENDER THEIR WEAPONS.

I ASKED HIM ABOUT THE FOOD SHORTAGE. HE IS MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN THE RED CROSS REGARDING THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO STORE AND DISTRIBUTE FOOD. RICE WOULD BE ESPECIALLY WELCOMED, AS WELL AS FLOUR.

/THROUGH

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- 2 -

THROUGH THE PRIME MINISTER I GOT IN TOUCH WITH THE ROYAL PALACE.  
I WAS PROMISED A CAR TO TAKE ME TO SEE H.M.

I ALSO WENT ABOUT TOWN TO INQUIRE ABOUT THE SITUATION OF  
ALL SPANISH RESIDENTS IN AMMAN, EMBASSY DEPENDENTS AND THEIR  
FAMILIES. NOBODY HAS BEEN HURT. I WAS ABLE TO NOTICE ROADBLOCKS  
IN SOME AREAS, MANNED BY FEDAYEEN PATROLS.

DURAN-LORIGA

AMBASSADOR OF SPAIN.

ENDS.

PLEASE ACT ACCORDINGLY.

DOUGLAS-HOME.

F I L E S

EMERGENCY STAFF

S.E.D.

N.E.D.

MR. BENDALL

MR. ARTHUR

CONFIDENTIAL

(378)

EN CLAIR

PRIORITY FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELEGRAM NUMBER 446

TO TEL AVIV

30 SEPTEMBER 1970

NET 1/4

(NED)

UNCLASSIFIED 300930Z

ADDRESSED TO TEL AVIV TELEGRAM NUMBER 446 OF 30 SEPTEMBER REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO AMMAN, CON. GEN. GENEVA, BERNE, BEIRUT, CAIRO,  
WASHINGTON, JERUSALEM.

YOUR TELEGRAM NO. 929 JORDAN

pa  
am  
6/6

WE FIND THESE REPORTS USEFUL SO PLEASE CONTINUE FOR THE TIME BEING

DOUGLAS-HONE

F I L E S

N.E.D.  
ARAB. DEPT.  
DEF. DEPT.  
NEWS DEPT.  
P.U.S.D.  
EMERGENCY STAFF  
SIR W. LUCE

COPY TO:

WING COMMANDER NETLEY  
D.O.C., M.O.D.

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CYPHER CAT/A

AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 730

TO F.C.O. LONDON  
1 OCTOBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL. 011115Z

JORDAN INTERNAL. SITREP AS AT 011000Z OCT.

1.. WE HAVE SEEN NO ARMY UNITS IN AMMAN TODAY OTHER THAN  
NORMAL GUARDS ON GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS, ARMoured CARS AT  
IMPORTANT ROAD JUNCTIONS HAVE BEEN REMOVED. NO REPORTS YET  
OF FIGHTING IN IRBID FROM OFFICIAL SOURCES.

2.. CIVILIANS ARE MOVING FREELY IN SEARCH OF WATER AND FOOD  
IN WEST AMMAN.

3.. AIRLIFT TO JORDAN OF BRITISH MEDICAL UNITS, FOOD AND  
SUPPLIES CONTINUES SMOOTHLY AND BRITISH FIELD HOSPITAL OPENED  
TO RECEIVE CASUALTIES AT 010700Z OCT.  
REAR LINK TO CYPRUS IS ESTABLISHED AND WORKING.

4.. REDCROSS COORDINATING MEETING WITH UNWRA, FRENCH, U.K. AND  
U.S. HOSPITAL REPRESENTATIVES WAS HELD THIS MORNING AND WILL BE  
HELD DAILY IN FUTURE.

5.. REDCROSS HOPE TO HAVE ASHRAFIYEH HOSPITAL WORKING SOON.  
THIS IS HOSPITAL IN FEDAYEEN HELD AREA. IT IS HOPED THAT AN  
ALGERIAN MEDICAL TEAM WILL WORK THERE.

6.. MAYOR OF AMMAN HAS STATED THAT HALF OF THE CITY IS WITHOUT  
WATER AND FOOD SUPPLIES (THE FEDAYEEN HELD HALF), AND THAT HE  
FEARS A DANGEROUS PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM MAY SOON ERUPT.

7.. WE HAVE JUST RECEIVED A REPORT FROM A REDCROSS DOCTOR (BRITISH)  
HE SAYS THERE ARE NO SIGNS OF THE FEDAYEEN WITHDRAWAL FROM JEDUL  
ASHRAFIYEH. THEY APPEAR HE SAID TO BE TAKING UP THEIR OLD  
FIGHTING POSITIONS AND THINKS THAT EGYPTIANS MAY BE THE ONLY  
FOREIGNERS ACCEPTABLE IN THIS AREA WHERE HE REPORTS AN INCREASING  
FEELING OF TENSION.

FCO PSE PASS AS FOR FULL SITREP DISTRIBUTION

MR. PHILLIPS

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Cabinet Office (Mr. Thomson)  
PUS  
Sir P. Adams  
Mr. Killick/Defence Dept.  
NAD  
Planning Staff  
NED to enter

Private Office  
2 October, 1970



## CONFIDENTIAL

RECORD OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE FOREIGN  
AND COMMONWEALTH SECRETARY AND HIS MAJESTY  
KING HUSSEIN I. CAIRO AT 8.30 A.M. ON  
THURSDAY, 1 OCTOBER, 1970

PRESENT:

The Rt. Hon. Sir  
Alec Douglas-Home, M.P.

RECEIVED IN  
Rt Hon Mr 10  
King Hussein

His Excellency Sir  
Richard Beaumont

r. J. H. Graham

NEJ 1/4

King Hussein agreed with Sir

Alec Douglas-Home's opening comment that  
the operations in Jordan had been a sad  
necessity. Fortunately the casualties  
were much lower than the press reports -  
he put the figure at 581 killed. He said  
that the Jordanian Army no longer controlled  
much of Amman, though there were some  
pockets of resistance; but the Fedayeen  
were still in control of some areas in the  
North. Under the agreement both the  
Fedayeen and the Jordanian Army were to  
leave the towns, but the Fedayeen were  
to go to the cease-fire line while the  
Army would be withdrawn just outside the  
towns. King Hussein added that they had  
found 350 Fedayeen bases with stocks of  
ammunition just outside Amman.

2. Speaking of the Syrian attack,  
King Hussein said that when the Syrians  
had first come in ~~there was~~ <sup>he had</sup> only <sup>had</sup> one  
battalion facing them. He had used ~~this~~ <sup>his</sup>  
~~rear force~~ <sup>air</sup> to attack ~~and~~ and delay them  
/while

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

Mr. Douglas-  
(see my minute  
on the  
photocopy  
below)  
(i) Mr. Mackins.  
8/10

ADVANCE COPY

(ii) Mr Bradley,  
NED.  
(we spoke: you  
agreed to  
see that this  
issue is  
prioritized in the  
proper way)  
8/10

Mr. Bradley.  
You told me Private  
Office here  
confirmed that  
this record  
will not be  
published.

Pt. enter

x p a

am

3/60

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while he deployed his <sup>armour</sup> ~~army~~ to drive them back. Sir Alec Douglas-Home commented that the operations ~~seemed~~ to have been very successful.

3. Speaking of the Iraqi forces in Jordan, the King said that they had been a problem. They had not ~~actively~~ <sup>direct</sup> played a part but there was a suspicion that some of them had <sup>put on</sup> ~~worn~~ Fedayeen uniform. His troops were now <sup>containing</sup> ~~deployed against~~ them and he hoped to get the situation under control. /

There would be  
no representatives  
of the Fedayeen  
in the Government.

4. The next task, King Hussein said, was reconstruction. Sir Alec Douglas-Home commented that a British military hospital was now operating in Jordan and he assumed that the Jordanians had almost more hospitals than they needed.

5. Sir Alec Douglas-Home asked about the prospects for a settlement, which he thought was urgently needed by Jordan. King Hussein <sup>added</sup> ~~said~~ that President Nasser's death would complicate the search for a settlement enormously. Sir Alec Douglas-Home asked whether there was any possibility of working out <sup>some</sup> form of autonomous Palestinian state on the West Bank. King Hussein said that he was going to give this serious thought. He thought it would be necessary to work something out, like that, but the problem was that the extremists among the Palestinians sought a territory much

/larger

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN



NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

larger than the ~~at~~ West Bank.

6. Sir Alec Douglas-Home mentioned King Hussein's request for ammunition and arms. He said that we were looking at these urgently and would do what we could, but the heavier items would of course take a long time. King Hussein said that the ammunition was an urgent need, particularly the 105 mm. They had gotten into their war reserves and he needed to replace them.

7. Sir Alec Douglas-Home said that he would keep in touch with King Hussein through the Ambassador in Amman. He was ~~most~~ grateful for the King's help throughout the time that our hostages had been in Fedayeen hands. King Hussein said that he was glad they were safe, ~~and~~ in turn he thanked Sir Alec for his message.

10.

NOTHING TO BE WRITTEN IN THIS MARGIN

larger than the ~~old~~ West Bank.

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10.



(381)

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CYPHER CAT A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 734

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
2 OCTOBER 1970

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021125Z

per  
lan  
6/6

NET 1/4

1. SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 001900Z DA WAS ABLE TO CARRY OUT LIMITED RECCO OF AMMAN THIS MORNING. FOLLOWING ITEMS WERE NOTICED.

A. STREETS EVERYWHERE WERE QUITE FULL OF PEOPLE CLEARLY LOOKING FOR FOOD. A FEW SHOPS WERE OPEN. GROUPS WERE ASSEMBLED WHERE WATER WAS AVAILABLE. GARBAGE DISPOSAL VEHICLES WERE OPERATING IN SEVERAL AREAS. NO TAXIS ARE ALLOWED TO MOVE.

B. ON THE SPINES OF JEBELS HUSSEIN AND AMMAN AS FAR AS THE FIRST CIRCLE SOME AREAS HAVE SUFFERED HEAVY DAMAGE TO BUILDINGS. THERE IS CLEAR EVIDENCE THAT ROADS HAVE BEEN MINED. NO BURNT OUT ARMY VEHICLES WERE SEEN BUT MANY DESTROYED CARS. ONLY THREE ARMED FEDAYEEN WERE SEEN.

C. THE CENTRE OF AMMAN IN THE COUK AREA AROUND THE MAIN MOSQUE, THE SHOPPING AREA BETWEEN THE POST OFFICE AND THE MOSQUE, AND FROM THE MOSQUE PAST THE PHILADELPHIA HOTEL TOWARDS THE STATION, IS NOT BADLY DAMAGED. AROUND THE STATION BUILDINGS ARE DAMAGED AND BURNT.

D. THE ROAD TO THE AIRPORT VIA THE TOWN CENTRE IS OPEN AS IS THE NORTHERN RING ROAD.

E. MORE LOCAL STAFF HAVE REPORTED FOR DUTY. ON THE WHOLE PEOPLE DO NOT APPEAR TO BE TOO SHORT OF FOOD IN NORTH AND WEST AMMAN. JEBEL ASHRAFIYYA COULD NOT BE VISITED AND CONDITIONS ARE PROBABLY VERY DIFFERENT THERE.

/2.

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- 2 -

2. DA SAW D.HI AT 1030 HOURS LOCAL. COL MOHAMED BASHIR SEEMED TIRED AND DISPIRITED. BOTH HIS OWN AND HIS CSO2'S HOUSES HAVE BEEN DAMAGED IN THE FIGHTING. HE SAID THAT, 5 DAYS AGO, AN IRAQI TANK REGIMENT MOVED INTO THE JENASH AREA. COMMUNICATIONS WITH THE NORTH WERE DIFFICULT. MANY SYRIAN AND IRAQI SOLDIERS OPERATED THERE AS FEDAYEEN. THE JORDANIAN FLAG, HE SAID, HAD BEEN REHOISTED AT RANHA. SPEAKING OF THE IRAQIS HE SAID, 'IT IS TIME THOSE BURGERS LEFT HERE.' THE CSO2 STATED THAT FEDAYEEN WERE LEAVING JEBEL ASHRIFIYEH AREA.

3. WE HAVE HEARD FROM TWO SOURCES TODAY THAT THE JORDANIAN ARMY CASUALTIES IN THE RECENT FIGHTING ARE IN THE ORDER OF 400 KILLED AND 2,000 WOUNDED. IF THIS IS SO THEN WE THINK THE FEDAYEEN CASUALTIES MUST HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLY MORE.

4. COL ISSA SAYEGH, COMMANDER AIR DEFENCE BRIGADE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SHOT DEAD BY A PALESTINIAN OFFICER FROM 17 (TIGERCAT) REGIMENT. THIS OFFICER WAS WELL LIKED BY MEMBERS OF THIS EMBASSY. HE HAD BEEN TRAINED AT THE STAFF COLLEGE, CAMBERLEY.

FCO PLEASE PASS AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS

FCO/WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

N.E.D.

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FFFFF



CYPHER CAT/A  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 742

CONFIDENTIAL

TO

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
3 OCTOBER 1970

382

CONFIDENTIAL. 031100Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 742 DATED 3 OCTOBER 1970.  
AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO USAL FULL SITREP DISTRIBUTION.

SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 030900Z

NET 1/4

6/11

1.. WITH CIVILIAN TRAFFIC ALLOWED ON THE STREETS AND BUS SERVICES  
RESTARTING AMMAN IS ALMOST AS BUSY AS USUAL.  
IN THE MAIN SOME WHICH HAD SUFFERED LITTLE APPARENT DAMAGE SHOPS  
ARE OPEN AND SOME FOOD IS BEING SOLD.

2.. DA AND COL FERRIE TOURED JEBEL ASHRAFIYEH AREA THIS MORNING.  
ALL ROAD BLOCKS HAVE BEEN REMOVED.  
SEVERAL NINE CRATERS WERE SEEN AND NUMEROUS BULLET HIT CIVILIAN  
VEHICLES. JORDANIAN ARMY ELEMENTS ARE IN THE ASHRAFIYEH HOSPITAL  
AREA, AND INDIVIDUAL SOLDIERS CAN BE SEEN WALKING ARMED IN  
SIDE STREETS. A FEW ARMED AND UNIFORMED FEDAYEEN WERE SEEN AND  
SEVERAL FEDAYEEN VEHICLES BEING DRIVEN BY YOUNG CIVILIANS.  
AT ONE PLACE ARMY PERSONNEL AND ARMED FEDAYEEN WERE ARGUING.

3.. SOME WATER CARRYING LORRIES WERE SEEN. THERE APPEARED TO BE  
SEVERAL PLACES WHERE WATER WAS AVAILABLE, BUT AT OTHER PLACES  
PEOPLE WAITED WITH RECEPTICLES. THEY DID NOT BEG FOR FOOD AS  
THEY SAW A RED CROSS VEHICLE.

4.. MAHDAT CAMP AND THE AREA AROUND IT IS VERY HEAVILY DAMAGED  
AND PARTS MAY BE UNINHABITABLE, BUT FAMILIES ARE BUSY CLEANING  
UP EVERYWHERE. PILES OF GARBAGE ARE BURNING BUT MANY REMAIN TO  
BE CLEARED IN THIS AREA.

5.. A NOTICEABLE EFFECT OF THE RECENT FIGHTING HAS BEEN THE  
DESTRUCTION AND BREAKING OF TELEPHONE AND ELECTRICITY POLES AND  
WIRES. THESE LITTER THE STREETS AND WILL OBVIOUSLY TAKE TIME TO  
REPAIR.

/S. L. L.

CONFIDENTIAL





NET 1/4

353

PHR CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 745

3 OCTOBER 1976

CONFIDENTIAL. 031215Z

ADDRESSED TO FCC TELEGRAM NO 745 DATED 3 OCTOBER 1976 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION TO MOD DIA BEIRUT TEL AVIV BAGHDAD CAIRO WASHINGTON  
JIS(NE) JIS GULF.

pr  
am  
6/10

MY TEL NO 722      MILITARY SITUATION IN JORDAN.

I HAD HOPED TODAY TO BRING YOU UP TO DATE WITH THE GENERAL  
PICTURE (AS APART FROM THE AMMAN ONE WHICH WE ARE REPORTING IN  
DAILY SITREPS) AND WITH THE KINGS' INTENTIONS IN THE IMMEDIATE  
FUTURE.

UNFORTUNATELY HE AND HIS CLOSEST CRONIES INCLUDING ZAID RIFAI  
HAVE GONE OFF TO AQABA FOR A PERIOD OF "REST AND REFLECTION"  
AND ARE UNLIKELY TO RETURN BEFORE 4 OCTOBER P.M.

2.. MY U.S. COLLEAGUE IS IN GENERAL AGREEMENT WITH THE VIEWS  
EXPRESSED IN MY TEL NO 722. ACCORDING TO WASFI TEL, WHO DESPITE  
HOLDING NO OFFICIAL MINISTERIAL POSITION IS CLEARLY IN ONE OF  
EXECUTIVE AS WELL AS OF ADVISORY POWER, AND WHO YESTERDAY SAID  
THAT HE HAD "ORDERED THREE BRIGADES TO WATCH THE IRAQIS AT JERASH"  
(WHERE THEY HAVE AN ARMoured REGIMENT AS REPORTED IN MY TELNO 734),  
THE PROCESS OF TRANSPORTING ARMED FEDAYEEN OUT OF AMMAN AND OF  
REMOVING ARMS FROM MILITIA AS WELL AS FROM DUMPS IN THE CITY CONT-  
INUES, WITH THE CONSENT AND MORAL COOPERATION OF THE ARAB SUPERV-  
ISORY COMMITTEE. IT IS PROPOSED THAT EARLY NEXT WEEK "POLICE"  
(MY U.S. COLLEAGUE SUSPECTS THESE MAY BE BEDOUIN SOLDIERS IN POLICE  
UNIFORM) WILL CONDUCT HOUSE TO HOUSE SEARCHES TO ENSURE THAT ARMS  
HAVE IN FACT BEEN HANDED OVER OR TAKEN OUT OF THE CITY. THE FEDAYEEN  
ARE TO BE ALLOWED TO RETAIN FIFTEEN "HEADQUARTERS" IN AMMAN FOR  
ADMINISTRATION PURPOSES, BUT (IN THEORY) NO WEAPONS. THIS PROCESS  
MAY WELL SUCCEED IN SOME AREAS BUT THERE IS IN MY VIEW LIKELY  
TO BE SOME LIVELY RESISTANCE IN OTHERS (E.G. JEBEL ASHRAFIYEH).

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/S. IN GENERAL,

3.. IN GENERAL, I THINK THE BEST HOPE FOR AT LEAST A TEMPORARY CONTINUATION OF THE PREVAILING "ARMED PEACE" IS THAT THE MASS OF THE INHABITANTS OF AMMAN ARE THOROUGHLY FED UP WITH VIOLENCE, DISCOMFORT AND SHORTAGES WHILE THE ACTIVISTS ON BOTH SIDES ARE SHORT OF AMMUNITION.

4.. I SHALL ENDEAVOUR TO SEE THE KING AS SOON AS HE RETURNS FROM AQABA. UNFORTUNATELY HE CHANGES HIS MIND ABOUT HIS INTENTIONS EVERY FEW HOURS. HAVING TOLD ME RECENTLY THAT HE PROPOSED A PERIOD OF FIRM MILITARY RULE FOR JORDAN HE HAS SINCE (ACCORDING TO MY U.S. COLLEAGUE VIA ZAID RIFAI) SAID THAT HE HOPES TO APPOINT A NEW GOVERNMENT OF CONCILIATION NEXT WEEK WHICH WILL INCLUDE BOTH CIVILIANS AND SOLDIERS.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO HQ DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO WASHINGTON AND DEFCONCEN

MR PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]  
[REPEATED AS REPEATED]

FCO/AM. DISTRIBUTION  
H.E.D.

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CYPHER/CAT.A.

PRIORITY AMMAN TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

PRIORITY AMMAN TELEGRAM NO.040919Z TO M.O.D. D14 4 OCTOBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL - 040910Z.

(384)

*Pun*  
6/6

ADDRESSED TO MOD D14 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, JISNE  
AND JISGULF.

SITUATION IN ZERKA 3RD OCTOBER.

NEJ 1/4

1. FOLLOWING INFO HAS BEEN RECEIVED FROM BRITISH OFFICER WHO  
VISITED ZERKA YESTERDAY.
2. FIGHTING IN ZERKA SEEMS TO HAVE STARTED BEFORE THAT IN AMMAN  
WITH FEDAYEEN FIRING ROCKETS INTO MILITARY CAMPS ON 15TH SEPT.  
MANY HOUSES ON EITHER SIDE OF THE MAIN ROAD THROUGHOUT THE TOWN  
HAVE BEEN DAMAGED BUT WITHIN THE MILITARY CAMPS AREAS DAMAGE IS  
SLIGHT. 5 KATYUSHAS ARE REPORTED TO HAVE LANDED IN 17 (TIGERCAT)  
REGIMENT CAMP.
3. THE SUWEILEH-ZERKA ROAD WHICH IS OPEN IS PIQUETTED BY THE  
JORDANIAN ARMY PARTICULARLY AT ITS CLOSEST POINT NEAR RUSBIFA  
ON THE AMMAN-ZERKA ROAD. WHERE THE ROAD FROM SUWEILEH JOINS  
THE AMMAN-ZERKA ROAD TWO SALADINS ARE IN POSITION AT A CHECK  
POINT.
4. IN ZERKA TOWN PEOPLE AND CARS MOVE FREELY BUT CHECK POINTS  
AT THE ENTRANCES OF THE TOWN ARE OPERATED STRICTLY.
5. WITHIN THE MILITARY CAMPS AREA A TROOP OF FOUR 105 MM SP  
CUNS ARE DEPLOYED COVERING THE TOWN. NO TANKS WERE NOTED EXCEPT  
NEAR THE WORKSHOP.
6. SOME ELEMENTS OF THE TIGERCAT REGIMENT HAVE BEEN EQUIPPED  
WITH M113'S AND ARE ACTING AS INFANTRY. THESE HAVE BEEN DEPLOYED  
NORTH OF ZERKA IN THE SUKPA BR 2358 AREA AND EAST OF ZERKA PROBABLY  
IN AN OBSERVATION ROLE TO COVER THE IRAQIS. NO IRAQI SOLDIERS  
WERE SEEN IN ZERKA.

/7. ZERKA MILITARY

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7. ZERKA MILITARY HOSPITAL IS REPORTED AS BEING VERY FULL AND ADDITIONAL ACCOMMODATION TAKEN OVER. IRAQI DOCTORS HAVE BEEN ASSISTING.

8. SOME OFFICERS MORALE IS NOT HIGH. THEY TALK OF LEAVING JORDAN. COLONEL ISSA SAYEEN, COMMANDER AIR DEFENCE BRIGADE WHO HAD BEEN REPORTED SHOT BY A PALESTINIAN OFFICER WAS, IN FACT KILLED IN ACTION BY FEDAYEEN. APPARENTLY HE RECEIVED A SLIGHT KNEE WOUND WHICH DID NOT INCAPACITATE HIM ON 17TH SEPT. ON 19TH SEPT HE WAS IN AN M113 CALLING UPON THE FEDAYEEN TO SURRENDER WHEN HE WAS SHOT TWICE IN THE THROAT.

9. WE HAVE ALSO HEARD ANOTHER CONFUSING STORY THAT A FATEH OFFICER WHO WAS APPARENTLY AT ZERKA GARRISON NO RECOGNISED A PALESTINIAN OFFICER IN THE TIGRAT REGIMENT. HE REPORTED TO THE GARRISON COMMANDER (THE CPA) THAT THIS OFFICER HAD BEEN RESPONSIBLE FOR DIRECTING KATYUJA FIRE ON TO MILITARY CAMPS. AS A RESULT THE OFFICER HAS NOW BEEN ARRESTED. ANOTHER PALESTINIAN OFFICER IN THIS REGIMENT IS REPORTED TO HAVE DEFECTED TO THE FEDAYEEN.

10. INFORMATION WE HAVE TO DATE IS THAT ZERKA IS FIRMLY UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTROL.

11. THE AA WHEN RETURNING BY AIR FROM CYPRUS ON 3RD OCTOBER REPORTED THAT THE IRANI (3 MICH BHE) POSITIONS BETWEEN ZERKA AND KHAM SEEMED TO BE VERY EMPTY.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO MOD DIA, JISNE AND JISGULF.

MR. PHILLIPS.

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

FCO/WH/DISTRIBUTION:

N.E.D.



CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO MOD DIA

TELEGRAM NO 851835Z

SECRET

051635Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DIA AND TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE.  
AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, JISNE  
AND JISGULF.

YOUR 021610Z REFERS (NOTAL)

1. FEDAYEEN MILITIA IS NOT IDENTIFIABLE OR DISTINGUISHABLE.  
WE KNOW THAT MANY PREVIOUSLY UNIFORMED FEDAYEEN HAVE REVERTED TO  
PLAIN CLOTHES. ALTHOUGH WE KNOW THAT MANY FEDAYEEN HAVE LEFT  
AMMAN IN THE LAST 24 HOURS WE ALSO KNOW THAT PLAIN CLOTHES MEMBERS  
STILL REMAIN. THESE MAY, OF COURSE, BE MILITIA.

2. EMBASSY STAFF HAVE SEEN WHAT LOOKED LIKE FEDAYEEN BEING  
TRANSPORTED IN QUOTE "FRUIT LOBBIES" UNQUOTE OUT OF AMMAN LAST  
NIGHT. THIS CONFIRMS PREVIOUS REPORTS.

3. MEMBER OF EMBASSY STAFF RETURNING FROM DAMASCUS YESTERDAY  
REPORTED FEDAYEEN IN CONTROL IN BANTHA. CROSS ROADS SOUTH OF  
BANTHA IS CONTROLLED BY THE JORDANIAN ARMY. BUT VEHICLES ARE  
DIVERTED TO MILITARY CAMP EAST OF IBBIL (YEMAM) TO GET  
CLEAR FROM MILITARY COVERED ZONES BEFORE ALLOWED TO TRAVEL FURTHER  
SOUTH. HE REPORTS FEDAYEEN IN CONTROL IN IBBIL AND IN JERAM  
YESTERDAY 4TH OCTOBER.

4. YOU WILL HAVE SEEN REPORTS THAT FEDAYEEN  
ARE BEING TAKEN TO WOODED AREAS AROUND AJLUN BY THE ARMY AND  
ESTABLISHED IN CAMP THERE. WE CANNOT AT PRESENT GET TO THIS AREA.

THIS IS A COPY  
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN  
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RELATIONS SECTION  
21 1953

SECRET

-7-

E. WE HAVE NO INDICATIONS THAT FIDAYEEN HAVE ARMOUR, BUT THINK REGULAR SYRIAN TROOPS ALIA SAIRA MANNED TANKS IN RECENT INCURSION.

C. ALTHOUGH IT SEEMS THAT THE AGREEMENT IS BEING IMPLEMENTED WE DOUBT, AT PRESENT, WHETHER IT IS YET COMPLETELY EFFECTIVE IN AMMAN.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO HQD DIA, JISNE AND JISGULF

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

AK/WHITCHAM. DISTRIBUTION

NEAR EASTERN DEPT

SECRET

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THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED  
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER SECTION  
3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958



TOP COPY 385

SECRET

CYPHER CAT A

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO MOD DIA

TELEGRAM NO 051035Z

SECRET

051035Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DIA AND TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, JISNE  
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AMMAN IN THE LAST 24 HOURS WE ALSO KNOW THAT PLAIN CLOTHES MEMBERS  
STILL REMAIN. THESE MAY, OF COURSE, BE MILITIA.

2. EMBASSY STAFF HAVE SEEN WHAT LOOKED LIKE FEDAYEEN BEING  
TRANSPORTED IN QUOTE "MILITARY LOGISTICS" UNQUOTE OUT OF AMMAN LAST  
NIGHT. THIS CONFIRMS PREVIOUS REPORTS.

3. MEMBER OF EMBASSY STAFF RETURNING FROM JERAMOUS YESTERDAY  
REPORTED FEDAYEEN IN CONTROL IN RANHA. CROSS ROADS SOUTH OF  
RANHA IS CONTROLLED BY THE JORDANIAN ARMY. BUT VEHICLES ARE  
DIVERTED TO MILITARY CAMP EAST OF IBBID (YERGES) TO OBTAIN  
PASS FROM MILITARY GOVERNOR BEFORE BEING ALLOWED TO TRAVEL FURTHER  
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THIS IS A COPY  
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED  
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3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

CYPHER CAT A  
PRIORITY MESSAGE  
TELEGRAM NO 756

CONFIDENTIAL  
DEFENCE AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
5 OCTOBER 1970

386

CONFIDENTIAL  
051100Z

NET 1/4

AMMAN SITREP AT 1100Z ON 5TH OCTOBER 1970.

1. DA SAW MAJOR GENERAL NAAN ABU NAWAR, WHO HOLDS A POST EQUIVALENT TO THAT OF OUR DIRECTOR PUBLIC RELATIONS (ARMY), THIS MORNING 5TH OCTOBER. MAJOR GENERAL NAAN GAVE THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION.

2. SITUATION IN NORTH JORDAN.

THE FEDAYEEN OCCUPIED THE TOWNS OF IRRID, JERASH, AJLUN AND RANTHA, BUT OUTSIDE THESE TOWNS IN ALMOST EVERY VILLAGE THE FEDAYEEN WERE NOT IN CONTROL. BEFORE THE RECENT FIGHTING TRUSTED ARMY OFFICERS HAD FORMED ARMED MILITIA IN VILLAGES. THE FEDAYEEN HAD BEEN DENIED ACCESS, ESPECIALLY WATER AND FOOD. THE SITUATION IN NORTH JORDAN WAS NOT THEREFORE AS BAD AS SOME REPORTS INDICATED.

3. SITUATION IN AMMAN.

HE CONFIRMED THAT MANY FEDAYEEN HAD WITHDRAWN BUT WAS AWARE THAT SOME REMAINED. THESE, HE SAID, WOULD BE PICKED UP IN DUE COURSE.

4. SYRIAN INVASION.

HE CONFIRMED THAT T55 TANKS HAD BEEN MANNED BY REGULAR SYRIAN TROOPS. HE SAID THAT INITIALLY PLA MANNED UNITS OF THE BATTAL (?) BRIGADE MOVED FORWARD IN THE EL TURRA AREA YESTERDAY. THEY USED HEAVY MORTARS. THEN 68 SYRIAN ARMoured BRIGADE PLUS SOME MECHANISED INFANTRY ATTACKED. IT HAD BEEN ON AN EXERCISE TO THE EAST OF DEPAU. THE GENERAL SAID HE HAD TALKED TO A SERGEANT FROM THIS BRIGADE WHO SAID THAT HIS UNIT HAD BEEN ORDERED TO MOVE FROM THE EXERCISE AREA TO ATTACK THE JORDANIANS. MANY SYRIAN TROOPS HAD NOT WANTED TO DO THIS. THE SERGEANT SAID FOUR T55S HAD BEEN KNOCKED OUT BY A SINGLE CENTURION IN ONE INCIDENT. THE SYRIAN CREWS "FREEZE" ON SEEING CENTURIONS AND REFUSED TO OBEY THEIR OFFICERS. A LATER ATTACK WAS PUT IN BY TROOPS FROM 5 SYRIAN DIVISION. ONE TANK GOT AS FAR AS THE CENTRE OF IRRID. AS A RESULT OF SUBSEQUENT JORDANIAN ARMY AND MOST EFFECTIVE AIR FORCE ATTACKS THE SYRIANS RETREATED HAVING DELAYED LONG ENOUGH TO RECOVER SOME OF THEIR EQUIPMENT.



CONFIDENTIAL

-2-

5. IRAQIS.

GENERAL HAYAT SAID THAT SOME 7,000 IRAQIS HAD BEEN OPERATING IN FLAIN CLOTHES AS FEDAYEEN. DA ASSUMED HE MEANT IN THE AREA WEST OF JERASH.

6. CASUALTIES.

HE SAID THAT NOT MORE THAN 700 CIVILIANS HAD BEEN KILLED IN AMMAN AND ABOUT 1600 WOUNDED. HE AGREED THAT THE ARMY CASUALTIES FOR ALL JORDAN WERE BETWEEN 350-400 KILLED AND 8,000 WOUNDED. HE WISHED THE BBC WOULD BROADCAST THE TRUE CASUALTY FIGURES TO CORRECT PREVIOUS SENSATIONAL PRESS REPORTS.

FCO PLEASE PASS AS NECESSARY.

MR. PHILLIPS

FCO/IN/REGISTRATION:

N.A.D.

CONFIDENTIAL

8/9/70

Mr. Markins  
 Mr. Evans R.E. 12/10  
 then for Mr. 8/10

NE-114

Record of a meeting at the State Department  
on Monday, 28 September, 1970

Present

The Right Honourable  
 Joseph Godber, M.P.

Mr. Millard

Mr. Cape

Mr. Rodger Davies

Mr. Seelye

Mr. Blake

Mr. Burns

Jordan

Mr. Godber enquired how the Americans saw the situation in the aftermath of the fighting and the Arab summit in Cairo.

2. Mr. Davies said that one aspect which concerned the Americans was the status of Hussein. All Arabs were now in varying degrees hostile to him. His problem was to maintain his credentials as an Arab leader. The American press had been unhelpful in describing the recent events in over-dramatised terms and had given credence to the Fedayeen accusations against Hussein of provoking a massacre. The Americans had sent a circular to all their posts in the Middle East instructing them to do what was possible to correct this distorted picture. The fact was that the confrontation with the Fedayeen did not just happen. It was mainly the fault of the extremists of the Habash faction who had sabotaged all the King's efforts to reach an accommodation with the guerillas. Areas of the country had been virtually under Fedayeen control and this was an impossible position for the King and his Government. U.S. representatives had been instructed to make these points as appropriate. The USIA representative in Beirut had gone to Amman and would be sending daily sitreps which the State Department could use to try to improve press reporting of the situation. These would stress the humanitarian help which the U.S. Government was giving to both sides. However, the one-sided reporting had already had its effect in the United States, and a number of Congressmen had expressed concern over the U.S. Government's announcement of military re-supply to Jordan. The fact was that it was in the Western interest to stabilise the situation in Jordan as soon as possible and the only way to do so was to support Hussein and his army.



3. Mr. Godber commented that Hussein had stayed passive too long and that Ararat himself had no control over many of the guerillas. But the King faced two basic difficulties: the universal sympathy for the Palestinians in the Arab world and the lack of enthusiasm for peace negotiations with Israel. There was clearly a danger of his assassination. It was difficult to see what kind of government might come after. Possibly it would be some kind of joint regime of the army and the Palestinians. Whether the King stayed or went, the situation was likely to be unstable and this had implications for Mr. Rogers' peace initiative.

4. Mr. Davies said that if the King went, he doubted if the Hashemite dynasty would survive, since Hussan had not got the personality and position to take over. On the other hand, if the army prevailed, the King's position would not necessarily be weaker than before. In this connection, it was of interest that there had been a reaction of enthusiasm from many Palestinians of the west bank to the Rogers initiative and the cease-fire. Hussein's position might be eased if negotiations could be set in train in a short time. The Americans were mildly optimistic that a formula might be found over the rectification over violations of the standstill. This feeling was based on the hint given by Ambassador El-Zayyat on television in New York and on similar hints received through Haikal. There had been nothing official. If something could be arranged over the standstill, it might still be possible to move on to discussions under Jarring.

5. As regards the standstill violations, the U.S. had offered to send a team to Cairo to discuss the evidence of the photographs. They had clear evidence that work on the sites was going on at an accelerated rate, although the U.A.R. had denied that they were constructing new sites.

6. Mr. Davies said that he had some sympathy with Mrs. Meir's point of view that there was no use in having negotiations if the Egyptians could not be trusted over the standstill. He did not think that the Israelis would unilaterally breach the cease-fire, but was sure that they would react very vigorously if there was a breach on the Egyptian side.

7. The Americans had assured the Israelis that during the cease-fire all their contractual obligations to Israel for aircraft, etc., would be carried out. This had been done. In addition the Israelis had been

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assured that if violations occurred, the Americans would take measures to adjust the situation. The Americans judged that violations had taken place, and to a limited extent they had adjusted the balance. They were refusing to comment on the action which they had taken, just as the Russians did not announce what military equipment they were sending to the U.A.R. The Americans did not want to abandon restraint; their intention was to give the Israelis enough to deter them from making a preventive strike. They had, however, told the Egyptians that in all honesty they could not give them a guarantee against such a pre-emptive move, as El-Zayyat had suggested.

8. Studies were in hand on a formula for rectification of the standstill violations and for getting talks started under Jarring. Once Mr. Sisco returned from the visit to Italy with the President, there was no reason why the Americans should not start discussing these points in Jerusalem, Amman and Cairo.

9. Mr. Godber enquired whether there was anything which the Four Powers could do to help.

10. Mr. Seelye said that the Americans were considering whether there was something dramatic which the Israelis might do. One tentative idea was that they might declare that they would be prepared to take back a given number of Palestinians, displaced by the events of 1967, to the west bank. The present situation in Jordan offered an ideal opportunity for such a gesture of goodwill.

11. Mr. Godber enquired about the role of the Syrians in the recent events. Mr. Seelye said that the Americans had received reports of a split in the Syrian leadership between those who were in favour of intervention and those who were against. They were inclined to think that the Syrian withdrawal was due to inter-Arab pressures, though the fear of intervention either by the Israelis or the Americans may have played its part. They did not rate highly the part played by the Russians in bringing about the withdrawal. The Russians seemed to have acted only after the Syrians had decided to pull out.

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#### Jordanian relief

13. Mr. Seelye said that the Americans had earmarked \$5 million for this purpose. The aid would be distributed on a non-political basis to both sides. The Americans were also trying to estimate the amount of economic assistance required now that Libya had withdrawn its subsidy and the Kuwaitis had suspended theirs. The timing was very awkward from the point of view of the U.S. aid programme, which was already under severe pressure in Congress. But Hussein was still the best alternative in Jordan and the Americans were anxious to do what they could to help him.

#### Libya

14. Mr. Godber said that the Libyans gave the impression of being inexperienced and naive and might become increasingly subject to communist influence.

15. Mr. Blake said that he did not think they were communists. It was a pure Arab nationalist militarist regime, with no Western ideological content. They were powerfully motivated by the desire to wipe out the humiliation of June 1967, when the Libyans had played an inglorious role. Qadafi wanted to blood the Libyan army. They must be expected to behave in an erratic way. An example was the break in diplomatic relations with Jordan, just at the moment when agreement seemed to have been reached at the Arab summit in Cairo. This showed that the Libyan regime did not always follow Nasser.

#### Libyan oil

16. Mr. Blake said that the solid front of the oil companies was being eroded. A number of independents had accepted Libyan terms. Esso had increased the posted price unilaterally, but their offer to the Libyan Government on taxes had been turned down. For the time being Mobil was still holding out, but their German associate seemed to be in favour of giving way.

An underestimation! R.E. 12/10.

NEJ. 1/4

(387)

Record of a meeting at the State Department  
on Monday, 28 September, 1970

Present

The Right Honourable  
Joseph Godber, M.P.

Mr. Millard

Mr. Cape

Mr. Rodger Davies

Mr. Seelye

Mr. Blake

Mr. Burns

Jordan

Mr. Godber enquired how the Americans saw the situation in the aftermath of the fighting and the Arab summit in Cairo.

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Copied to :-

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N.A.D.

F.P.A.D. (Jordan Aid Unit)

Oil Dept

American Dept

(Rp NR 1)

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EN CLAIR

ROUTINE BAGHDAD TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

TELNO 693 6 OCTOBER 1970

UNCLASSIFIED

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AMMAN TELNO 745 : AMMAN TELNO 734 MENTIONED HAS NOT BEEN RECEIVED HERE. MAY WE PLEASE HAVE A COPY.

MR. HAWLEY

381

Military Situation - Jordan

383



CYPHER CAT A

ROUTINE KLARTOWN

TELEGRAM NUMBER 561

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

6 OCTOBER 1970.

(387)

13/11

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060950Z ADDRESSED TO FCO TEL NO 561 OF 6 OCTOBER RFI  
TO CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT BAGHDAD TRIPOLI JEDDA TEL AVIV AND  
WASHINGTON MOSCOW  
EVENTS IN JORDAN. NEJ 1/4

IN A PRIVATE TALK WITH ANTHONY HUTTING YESTERDAY NINERI  
SAID THAT GEORGE HABBASH AND NAIF HAWATMEH WERE PLOTTING TO  
OVERTHROW HUSSEIN. THIS HAD BEEN THE MAIN CAUSE OF THE  
RECENT FIGHTING AND HE EXPECTED FIGHTING TO BREAK OUT AGAIN  
ALTHOUGH HABBASH HAD LOST SOME PALESTINIAN SUPPORT THROUGH  
BEING ABSENT DURING THE RECENT CRISIS AND BECAUSE OF THE HI-  
JACKINGS. HUSSEIN HAD TOLD NINERI THAT HE HAD NO COMPLAINT  
AGAINST EL FATAH AND INDEED WHEN HUSSEIN HAD BEEN CHALLENGED  
TO ABDICATE BY QADAFI AT THE CAIRO MEETING AND HAD OFFERED TO  
GO IF ARAB LEADERS WANTED HIM TO YASSIR ARAFAT HAD BEEN THE  
FIRST TO OPPOSE HUSSEIN'S ABDICATION. NINERI CONFIRMED  
THAT THE KING'S CEASEFIRE ORDERS HAD BEEN IGNORED BY ELEMENTS  
IN THE JORDANIAN ARMY WHO WERE BENT ON EXTERMINATING THE GUERILLAS.

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2. NIMERI HAD LITTLE USE FOR THE SYRIANS AND IRAQIS WHOSE BEHAVIOUR WAS BOTH IRRESPONSIBLE AND INCONSISTENT AND WHOM HE EXPECTED TO CONTINUE TO AID AND ABET PALESTINIAN EXTREMISTS IF THIS APPEARED TO SUIT THEIR PARTICULAR BATHIST INTERESTS

FCO PASS CAIRO AMMAN BEIRUT BAGHDAD TRIPOLI JEDDA TEL AVIV WASHINGTON AND MOSCOW.

MR. BETHERINGTON-SMITH

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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
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Rec. 10/10/70  
Interesting but a bit old  
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per 13/10

BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

16 September, 1970

Dear Christopher

I enclose a copy of our press summary for Sunday, 13 September, which contains a full translation of the Central Committee's statement of 12 September freezing the membership of the PFLP. You will see that the language is slightly different from that given in our tel. 551 of 12 September, which was based on a second-hand account of the statement when it was broadcast by fedayeen radio. You will see from our telegram No. 551 that the Popular Front spokesman at a press conference on 13 September said that the PFLP representative on the Central Committee had been absent when this decision was taken. We understand that the PFLP representative on the Central Committee is Ahmad al Yemani (Abu Maher), and have heard from a reliable source that he was absent from the meeting accidentally and had no foreknowledge of the decision that the Committee was to take. He is said to have expressed considerable surprise at the Committee's decision.

Yours ever,

C. P. Carter

(C. P. Carter)

C. W. Long, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Dept.,  
F.C.O.

c.c. Chanceries at:-

Beirut  
Cairo  
Baghdad

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Headlines:-

Ad-Dustour: The Central Committee decides to wash its hands of the airliners' question and to freeze the Popular Front's membership of the committee. (Repeated in Ad-Difaa and Fatch).

The Popular Front blew up the three detained airliners yesterday afternoon. (Repeated in Al-Urdun).

Britain is ready to return Miss Leila Khaled to an Arab country as part of a satiation story settlement of the problem of the detained passengers and crews of the three airliners. (Repeated in Ad-Difaa).

Ad-Difaa : The Prime Minister says that the Government regret and condemn the blowing up of the three airliners. (Repeated in Ad-Dustour and Al-Urdun).

Al-Urdun : Meetings of the Arab League Council in Cairo.

Fatch : The Jordanian national movement calls for struggle for the establishment of a national authority.

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Statement by Central Committee

In a statement yesterday, the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation said:

While the Central Committee was in continuous session to deal with the protection of the revolution from the military campaign launched by forces of agents and imperialism against the resistance movement, to continue the struggle for ensuring the security of the revolution by liquidating agents and to work for establishing a national authority....., an emergency situation arose as a result of the hijacking of airliners.. This question occupied the attention of the Central Committee, which was inspired by the revolution's humanitarian attitude and the need to safeguard the lives and security of civilian passengers who had nothing to do with the policy of their imperialist governments. The Central Committee desired to preserve the unity of all groups of the resistance movement at this crucial time in order to stand as one front against the barbarous reactionary attack.

For all the above reasons and in the presence of representatives of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine at all meetings of the Central Committee, the committee took a number of decisions to deal with the problem so that it could devote itself to its basic task.

In dealing with the problem, the Central Committee took all local and humanitarian considerations into account and reached resolutions unanimously. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine showed reservation but it affirmed its adherence to those resolutions.



Statement by Central Committee(Cont'd).

At 9 p.m. yesterday, a delegation from the Central Committee went to the site of the airliners after failure of the first attempt made by the Central Committee in this direction.

The Central Committee was surprised to observe that the Popular Front had violated the above resolution for the second time. Accordingly, the Central Committee met at 4 p.m. on 12 September and decided:

- 1- to announce that it washed its hands of this question;
- 2- to freeze membership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in the Central Committee because of the Front's violation of the statement of 6.5.70, according to which the Central Committee was formed, and of the resolutions issued by the Central Committee on 6.9.1970.
- 3- to condemn the actions of and to cease dealing with the leadership of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine because of its failure to adhere to agreements and decisions made by the Central Committee.
- 4- to stand firmly against any actions by the leadership of the Popular Front that could affect the safety and security of the revolution and distract its attention from its real fight against the Zionist enemy and world imperialism.

Statement by the Prime Minister

Amman: Prime Minister Abdul Munem al Rifai stated that the Government deplored and condemned the blowing up of the three airliners. He said: "The Jordanian Government condemn, in principle, the hijacking of airliners because it conflicts with humanitarian principles and international commitments." The Prime Minister deplored the fact that the Popular Front should have blown up the airliners and violated the decision taken by the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation. The Prime Minister felt satisfied because passengers of the airliners were safe.

Popular Front holds press conference

Amman: At a press conference yesterday evening, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine announced that it had released all but 40 of the passengers of the three airliners before the blowing up of the airliners. The Front will hold the 40 persons concerned as hostages until the release of the commandos detained in Britain, West Germany and Greece and one of an unspecified number of detainees in Israel. A spokesman for the Front said that the hostages belonged to Israeli, American, Swiss, West German and British nationalities. He told reporters that the Front was ready to make a package deal for the release of the hostages or to make a series of bilateral deals in which each of the countries involved would trade its commando captives for its nationals among the hostages. The spokesman said that there were five women among the Israeli hostages, whom the Front considered as prisoners of war working in the Israeli army. He affirmed that the hostages would be treated in the same way as were the commandos held in Israel and the other countries. He said: "We will be responsible for the safety of the hostages to the extent that the other parties are responsible for the safety of our commandos held by them..We will keep the hostages as long as our demands remain unfulfilled".

Popular Front held press conference (Cont'd.)

The spokesman announced that the Front had blown up the three airliners in fulfillment of its strategy of striking at imperialist interests.

On the reason for blowing up the airliners before the deadline, which the Front had previously set for 10 p.m. on Sunday, the spokesman said: "There was a plan to foil the operation of seizure of the airliners by imperialist circles. There was a plan to blow up the airliners because we expected this attempt in view of the growing pressure exerted on us."

The spokesman said that the team from the International Committee of the Red Cross holding negotiations with the Front had encountered difficulties created by the imperialist powers, which gave promises and later went back on them. He added: "The team's mission is now at a standstill because of its failure and resumption of this mission depends on how serious the imperialist powers are."

The spokesman disclosed that the Front had blown up the Swiss airliner before the other two after the false risk of Swiss neutrality had slipped under American and Zionist pressure to prove that Switzerland was merely a part of the imperialist camp. He said that the United States had brought pressure to bear on the Swiss Government after they had announced their agreement to release the three captives held in Swiss prisons.

The spokesman accused Britain and West Germany of adopting contradictory attitudes in the past few days and the United States of not caring for the safety of the passengers. He said: "The United States was pushing matters in a direct on that threatened the lives of the passengers."

The spokesman announced that the Front had categorically refused to receive envoys appointed by the Israelis in order to discuss the question of releasing the Israeli hostages in spite of Israel's threat to take vengeance upon the Front's detainees and their families in Israel if the Front continued to hold the Israeli hostages.

British Government ready to return  
Leila Khaled

London: Reuters: The British Government said last night that they were prepared to return Miss Leila Khaled, the Arab girl commando, to an Arab country as part of a settlement of the problem of the detained passengers and crews of the three hijacked airliners.

A British government statement issued here last night said: "To avoid any misunderstanding or possible loss of life, Her Majesty's Government wish to announce that they are prepared to return Miss Leila Khaled to an Arab country as part of a satisfactory settlement of the problem of the detained passengers and crews of the three hijacked airliners."



## Prime Minister receives Iraqi Ambassador

Lieut. General Hachour Halitha, Chief of Staff.

## Withdrawal of PLA contingent from Iraqi Army

Amman: Reuters: A spokesman for the Central Committee of the PLO said today that the PLO had decided to withdraw its contingent from the Iraqi army. The contingent, estimated at a battalion's strength, had been under the Iraqi army command since it was formed about five years ago. It was moved to Jordan with Iraqi troops during the June 1967 war....

## Arab League Council

Cairo: Reuters: The 54th session of the Arab League Council began in Cairo yesterday. The Council will discuss the situation in Jordan. Items on the agenda include developments of the situation in the Middle East after acceptance by Egypt and Jordan of the American peace proposals.

Inaugurating the session, Sayid Abdul Wahab Hassouna, Secretary General of the Arab League, regretted the armed clashes between brethren in Jordan and mentioned the league's efforts to resolve the conflict. Sayid Hassouna was referring to the reactivation of the four-man mediation committee. At its recent emergency session, the Council decided to send this committee to Jordan in order to resolve the dispute between the Jordanian authorities and the commando organizations. The committee consists of representatives of Egypt, Libya, Sudan and Algeria.

Sayid Hassouna said that the situation called for mobilization of all efforts against Israeli aggression and expansionist policy. He condemned the supply by the United States of additional arms to Israel.

• Saudi Foreign Minister Omar Saqqaf declared the events in Jordan.

Libyan Foreign Minister Muammar Gaddafi said the situation in Jordan was passing through a crucial stage. He urged the Arab League to play its part.

After approving the agenda, the Council split into five committees to study items on the agenda, including the league's budget, Arab nominations for the forthcoming session of the U.N. General Assembly, a report on the works of UARUA and reports on activities of Arab offices for the boycott of Israel.

Informed circles said that the Palestine Liberation Organisation had submitted to the Council a report on developments of the situation in Jordan.

## Match:

Amman: The Jordanian people will participate in a national day of mourning on 12 June to commemorate the bloody events in the country caused by some agents controlling the principal state machines, particularly the Jordanian armed forces, the public security department and general intelligence.. The committee called on all citizens and organizations to struggle for the establishment of a national authority, for

### Fateh (Cont'd.)

removal of corrupt elements in elements from the state machine, particularly in the army, the public and general intelligence and for punishing all those responsible for the crimes committed in the country. The committee supported contents of the statement issued by the Central Committee of the Palestine Liberation Organisation on 10.9.1970. Similar calls were made in a statement issued by the Grouping of the Unions of Medical practitioners, engineers, lawyers, pharmacists, dentists, agricultural engineers, journalists and workers..

### Editorials

AD-Dustur, Al-Difa and Al-Urdu carry no editorials today....

The Al-Difa front-page commentary (by Ibrahim) refers to General Allenby's statement and developments in Jordan and describes the events in Jordan as a domestic dispute in which no foreign state must interfere.. Jordan alone is responsible for her domestic affairs.. The Great Powers, particularly the United States and Britain, are close hypocrites because they pretend to be sorry for a deteriorating situation for which they are the first to blame. They are cowardly and biased because they see the just solution but fail to support it and because they place Israel's security above the security of the world...

The Fateh editorial today calls for the establishment of a national authority....

Fateh today carries a report, which says :  
"Abu Ammar received the vice-chairman of the international committee of the Red Cross at 11 a.m. yesterday... The vice-chairman informed Abu Ammar that he carried the consent of all the parties concerned to all the contents of the resolutions of the Central Committee. Present at this interview were Dr. Mahmoud Hijazi, President of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society, Sayid Ahmad al Yamani, representative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and a representative of the Vanguard of the Popular Liberation War. It was surprising that, after the departure of the Popular Front's representative to convey the consent in order to begin implementation of these measures, the Front should have blown up the hijacked airliners."

ENDS.

PRESS OFFICE,  
BRITISH EMBASSY,  
AMMAN - JORDAN.  
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CYPHER CAT A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 779

CONFIDENTIAL

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
9 OCTOBER 1973

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 779  
DATED 9TH OCTOBER 1973 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO,  
BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, JISHE, MOD DIA AND WASHINGTON.

#### JORDAN INTERNAL.

THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE, APPOINTED TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF THE SEPTEMBER 27TH CAIRO AGREEMENT AND HEADED BY BAHI LADGHAN,  
THE TUNISIAN PM, HAS BEEN PURSUING ITS WORK IN AMMAN FOR THE  
PAST 10 DAYS. IT CONCENTRATED FIRST ON IMMEDIATE MEASURES TO  
REDUCE TENSION, INCLUDING THE WITHDRAWAL (OR AT ANY RATE  
DISENGAGEMENT) OF THE FORCES OF THE TWO SIDES, THE RELEASE OF  
PRISONERS AND AN END TO THE HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES AND DETENTION  
OF SUSPECTS. IN THE FIRST TWO OF THESE IT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN  
REASONABLY SUCCESSFUL. ABOUT 20,000 PEOPLE HELD BY THE  
GOVERNMENT IN DETENTION CAMPS HAVE BEEN RELEASED SO FAR. THERE  
ARE, HOWEVER, CONTINUING REPORTS OF HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES AND  
OF DETENTION OF PEOPLE WITH SUSPECTED FEDAYEEN CONNECTIONS,  
AND THE PLO HAS COMPLAINED THAT POLICE IN AMMAN ARE STOPPING  
AND CONFISCATING CARS BELONGING TO FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS. THE  
HIGHER ARAB COMMITTEE HAS SET UP MACHINERY FOR THE INVESTIGATION  
AND SETTLEMENT OF COMPLAINTS OF THIS SORT.

2. THE COMMITTEE IS NOW REPORTED TO HAVE STARTED WORK ON DRAFTING  
AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, AS ENJOINED UPON IT BY  
ARTICLE 8 OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT. SEVERAL MAJOR PROBLEMS ARE  
LIKELY TO CONFRONT IT IN THIS TASK. FIRST, THE JORDANIAN  
GOVERNMENT HAVE DECLARED THAT THEY WILL DEAL ONLY WITH FATAH,  
WHILE IBRAHIM BAKR (THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S REPRESENTATIVE ON  
THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE) IS REPORTED AS REJECTING THIS AS  
AN ATTEMPT TO sow discord BETWEEN THE FEDAYEEN GROUPS. PRESUMABLY  
HE WOULD PREFER AN AGREEMENT TO BE CONCLUDED BETWEEN THE  
GOVERNMENT AND THE PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE.

/3. SECOND

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3. SECOND PROBLEM CONCERNS THE NATURE OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE COUNTRY. A STATEMENT ISSUED BY THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE ON 7TH OCTOBER SAID THAT BOTH SIDES HAD AGREED THAT THE INTERNAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY THROUGHOUT THE KINGDOM "UNDER THE CIVIL ADMINISTRATION". IN ADDITION, PARA 12 OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT PROVIDES FOR AN END TO ALL "EXCEPTIONAL SITUATIONS" AND TO MILITARY RULE. AT THE MOMENT, HOWEVER, MUCH OF THE CONTROL OF THE SECURITY SITUATION IS IN THE HANDS OF THE MILITARY AUTHORITIES, IN PARTICULAR THE MILITARY GOVERNOR, HABIS AL-HAJALI, AND THE REGIONAL MILITARY GOVERNORS. SOME PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE IN AMMAN TOWARDS REPLACING ARMY PATROLS WITH CIVILIAN POLICE, BUT THE GOVERNMENT WILL CERTAINLY BE SUBJECT TO STRONG PRESSURES TO RETURN MORE OF THE CONTROL OF THE ADMINISTRATION TO CIVILIANS. INDEED, IT IS DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW FURTHER PROGRESS CAN BE MADE UNLESS IT DOES SO.

4. NORTH JORDAN IS STILL A PATCHWORK OF GOVERNMENT AND FEDAYEEN HELD TERRITORY. LIFE THERE APPEARS TO HAVE RETURNED MORE OR LESS TO NORMAL, WITH TRAFFIC MOVING ALONG MANY ROADS THOUGH SUBJECT TO FREQUENT CHECK-POINTS SET UP BY ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER. THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS CANNOT GO ON INDEFINITELY, AND IT IS IN THIS AREA THAT THE GOOD (OR BAD) FAITH OF THE TWO SIDES IS LIKELY TO BE TESTED MOST SEVERELY.

5. NO JORDANIAN NEWSPAPER HAS YET RE-APPEARED (APART FROM THE ARMY WEEKLY AL-AQSA), AND NO FOREIGN NEWSPAPERS HAVE YET BEEN ALLOWED IN. AMMAN RADIO AND THE "VOICE OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE" HAVE THEREFORE BEEN THE TWO PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF INFORMATION. THE TONE OF THE FIRST HAS BEEN RESTRAINED, BUT THE LATTER HAS CONTINUED TO COMPLAIN OF THE "FEDAYEEN AND LACKEYS" AND HAS WARNED THE MASSES TO BE READY FOR ANOTHER INEVITABLE CLASH.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN AND TO WASHINGTON.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO JISNE AND MOD DI4.

MR. PHILLIPS

[REDACTED]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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## Main News And Trends, Cont'd

pr am  
13/11

The ceasefire collapsed shortly after it started --and the Numeiri commission blamed the Jordanian authorities for this.

JORDAN'S NEW CABINET. The Amman announcement on formation of the new Cabinet came Saturday afternoon --as promised by King Hussein. Although headed by a civilian --and a Palestinian at that-- the Cabinet included five officers of the outgoing military Cabinet. The officers, however, were listed as civilians without their military rank. At any rate, the cabinet did not change the situation much. It appeared merely as a constitutional move to replace the outgoing military Cabinet which had to resign after Brigadier Daoud had sent his resignation from Cairo. Above all, the Military Rule remained as the Governor General, Field Marshal Habes Majali, retained his post, as did the district military governors appointed by Majali when the former military Cabinet was formed last September 16th. And no sooner had the name of Ahmed Toukan been mentioned as the new Premier, than the Toukan family, which resides in the West Bank town of Naplus, issued a statement asking him to resign or be renounced by his family. He did not resign.

Ironically, Toukan is the first West Bank Premier since the 1957 short-lived Cabinet of former Premier Suleiman Nabulsi. But Toukan, aged 72, has been loyal to the King all along. Because he is a Palestine, he was appointed Vice Premier in several Cabinets before. When the civilian Cabinet of Premier Abdel Monem Rifai resigned on September 16th, Toukan was appointed the Chief of the Royal Cabinet, replacing Zaid Rifai who was named Jordanian Ambassador to the Court of St. James.

The commandos rejected the new Cabinet. The commando radio from Damascus said that the new cabinet did not change the situation in Jordan. Beirut's AL HADAF, which speaks for the PFLP, charged that the Cabinet marked "the beginning of the second stage" in the liquidation of the commando movement.

The Cabinet. The five officers from the old Cabinet, and who have been retained in the new Cabinet, were: Brigadier Mazen Ajlouni, who remains the Deputy Military Governor; Brigadier Saleh Shareh; Major Mufleh Awadallah; Major Adnan Abou Audeh; and Col. Yacoub Abou Ghosh.

Following is a list of the Cabinet members:

Ahmed Toukan, Premier and Foreign Minister.  
Yahya Khatib, Minister of Communications and Public Works.  
Sami Ayoub, Minister of Agriculture.  
Fawwaz Rouaissan, Justice, Finance, Waqfs, and Islamic Holy Places.  
(Brig.) Mazen Ajlouni, Minister of State for Premiership Affairs.  
(Brig.) Saleh Shareh, Minister of Interior.  
(Col.) Yacoub Abou Ghosh, Minister of Health.  
(Maj.) Mufleh Awadallah, Minister of Interior for Rural and Municipal Affairs.  
(Maj.) Adnan Abou Audeh, Minister of Guidance.  
Akkash Al Zain (a former Army Officer), Minister of Defense.  
Fuad Kakish, Minister of Transport and Labour and Social Affairs.  
Abdel Majid Sharidah, Minister of Education.  
Omar Nabulsi, Minister of National Economy.

Policy. In his letter of designation to Toukan, King Hussein said the mission of the new Cabinet was to deal with the repercussions of the "tragedy" and to bring life back to normal as soon as possible. He said that Jordan was one country in both of its banks, and its people formed one people (which is a reference to the Palestinian-Jordanian angle of the Jordanian crisis).

In his reply, Toukan said that the commando movement will receive all support and help from his Government.

(393)

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CYPHER CAT A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 792

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
12 OCTOBER 1970

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120925Z

NET 1/4

15/10

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 792  
DATED 12TH OCTOBER 1970 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO LONDON,  
CAIRO, BEIRUT, TUNIS, WASHINGTON, TEL AVIV, HQBFNE AND MODUK DIA.

SPEAKING OF THE SITUATION IN AMMAN AND NORTH JORDAN DURING MY  
CONVERSATION WITH HIM ON 11TH OCTOBER, THE PRIME MINISTER SAID  
THAT WHILE THE JORDANIAN ARMY HAD FULFILLED THEIR SIDE OF THE  
PACCAIN AND WITHDRAWN FROM AMMAN, LARGE NUMBERS OF FEDAYEEN HAD  
NOT. HE HAD ACCORDINGLY MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO SAHI LIDGAN AND  
THE LATTER WAS NOW WORKING OUT A FURTHER AGREEMENT WHEREBY THE  
FEDAYEEN AND THEIR ARMS WOULD DEPART BY 15TH OCTOBER. THE  
TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER WAS FULLY SEIZED OF THE NEED TO GET ARMED  
FEDAYEEN OUT OF AMMAN IF FURTHER CLASHES WERE TO BE AVOIDED.

2. HE SAID THAT IN THE NORTH THE SITUATION WAS PEACEFUL BUT  
UNEASY. THE FEDAYEEN WERE STILL MANNING SOME ROAD BLOCKS AND  
WERE BEING ENCOURAGED IN THEIR INTRANSIGENCE BY THE PRESENCE  
OF THE IRAQIS. THE JORDANIAN GOVERNMENT WERE TRYING DIPLOMATICALLY  
TO PERSUADE THE LATTER THAT WITH HOSTILITIES AGAINST ISRAEL  
'IN THE DEEP FREEZE' THERE WAS NO REASON FOR THEM TO REMAIN IN  
JORDAN. THE PRIME MINISTER SAID THAT THIS IRAQI PRESENCE WAS THE  
GOVERNMENT'S CHIEF PRESENT PREOCCUPATION.

3. IN CONTRAST TO THE PRIME MINISTER'S REMARKS REPORTED ABOVE  
MY ACTING CONSUL, MR. BRUCE SPRACHAN, VISITED IREID YESTERDAY  
WITHOUT ANY HINDRANCE OR DIFFICULTY AND SAW NO ROAD BLOCKS ALTHOUGH  
A NUMBER OF FEDAYEEN, SOME ARMED, WERE TO BE SEEN MOVING ABOUT  
IN THE JERASH AREA. CIVILIANS AND TRAFFIC APPEARED TO BE MOVING  
NORMALLY.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN AND TO TUNIS AND WASHINGTON.  
DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO HQBFNE AND MODUK DIA.

MR. PHILLIPS [SENT TO D.C.C.] [REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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TELEGRAM NO 120955Z

TO MOD DIA  
12 OCTOBER 1970

(374)

CONFIDENTIAL 120955Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DIA AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO  
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, BA'S BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, CAIRO  
AND JISNE AND JISGULF.

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SITUATION IN NORTH JORDAN.

1. A MEMBER OF THIS EMBASSY TRAVELLED BY ROAD FROM AMMAN TO IRBID ON 11TH OCTOBER.
2. HE REPORTS BRIDGE OVER ZERKA RIVER AT ABOUT YA7257 HAS BEEN DAMAGED IN SOME WAY BUT THAT REPAIRS HAVE BEEN EFFECTED AND ALLOW IT TO BE USED BY HEAVY TRAFFIC.
3. THE JORDANIAN ARMY CHECK POINTS BETWEEN SAMALIN AND IRBID - THIS IS NORMAL. THERE ARE NO FEDAYEEN CHECK POINTS EITHER.
4. ARAB AND UNIFORMED FEDAYEEN WERE VERY COMMON IN THE AREA. ONLY FEW OF THEM WERE SEEN IN IRBID BUT AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE IT WAS DECIDED THAT THERE WAS NO ARMY PRESENCE IN IRBID, IT WAS ASSUMED THAT FEDAYEEN IN PLAIN CLOTHES ARE IN THE TOWN. NO TRAPS WERE NOTICED.
5. NO DAMAGED MILITARY VEHICLES WERE SEEN IN THE IRBID AREA. IRBID TOWN APPEARS UNDAMAGED. SHOPS ARE OPEN AND BUSINESS IS AS NORMAL.
6. IRBID MILITARY HOSPITAL AT ABOUT YB6824 WAS NOT FULL. IT HAD BEEN HIT ONCE. THE BRITISH NURSING SISTER THERE REPORTED THAT, DURING THE SYRIAN INCURSION THE HOSPITAL WAS IN THE FRONT LINE AND JORDANIAN TANKS ON EITHER SIDE OF ENGAGED SYRIAN TANKS CLEARLY VISIBLE ON THE LOWER GROUND TO THE EAST.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN .  
DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO JISNE AND JISGULF.

MR. PHILLIPS [SENT TO D.C.C.].

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CIPHER CAT A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 131437Z

TO MOD (U.K.)  
13 OCTOBER 1973

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131437Z

RECEIVED IN REGISTRY No. 1
NET 114

ADDRESSED TO MOD DIA AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN  
AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, DA'S TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD AND BEIRUT,  
AND TO JISNE AND JISGULF.

SITUATION IN NORTH JORDAN.

1. DA AND COLONEL FERRIE ACCOMPANIED DA'S WIFE ON JOURNEY TO  
IRBID MILITARY HOSPITAL TODAY WITH LOAD OF CHILDRENS CLOTHES FOR  
WOUNDED. PARTY DID NOT ENTER IRBID.
2. INFORMATION REPORTED YESTERDAY IS CONFIRMED. JORDANIAN ARMY  
HAS CHECK POINT AT SUMEILEH AS USUAL BUT STRENGTH HAS BEEN  
REDUCED TODAY.
3. ARMED FEDAYEEN WERE SEEN ON ROAD ALONGSIDE BAOAA CAMP AND  
FEDAYEEN VEHICLES WERE PARKED IN THE CAMP.
4. ZERQA RIVER BRIDGE IS GUARDED BY FEDAYEEN WHO LOOK LIKE PLA.  
BRIDGE HAS BEEN BLOWN AT EITHER END BY HEAVY LORRIES CROSS.  
CERTAIN BULLDOZERS HAVING LAID DOWN CONCRETE PIPES ARE BULLDOZING  
ANOTHER CROSSING JUST TO THE WEST.
5. JERASH IS FULL OF FEDAYEEN. PARTY SAW IRAQI LORRY MOVING  
WEST OF THE TOWN. AND AN IRAQI VEHICLE FULL OF ARMED FEDAYEEN  
IN THE TOWN. IRAQI MILITARY POLICE WERE IN EVIDENCE. EVIDENCE OF OLD  
ROAD BLOCKS WERE SEEN AT THE ENTRY AND EXIT OF THE TOWN.
6. NORTH OF JERASH THE ROAD IS PICKETTED BY FEDAYEEN UNTIL THE  
TOP OF THE HILL AT ABOUT YA7482. A FEDAYEEN WATER TRUCK WAS  
SEEN ON ITS ROUTE AND AT THE HIGHEST POINT A HMG WAS SEEN  
MOUNTED ON A TRIPOD. NO ATTEMPT WAS MADE TO STOP OUR PARTIES  
CAR.
7. NORTH

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- 2 -

7. NORTH OF JERASH NO SIGNS OF JORDANIAN ARMY WAS SEEN UNTIL ABOUT 2 MILES SOUTH OF JUNCTION YA7793 WHEN SCUFFS ON THE ROAD INDICATED TRACKED VEHICLES HAVE RECENTLY CROSSED IT.

8. NO IRAQIS WERE SEEN IN THEIR OLD POSTION AT ABOUT YB7664. THEIR EMPTY SCRAPES CAN BE SEEN FROM THE HOSPITAL. JORDANIAN ARMY POSITIONS SEEN WERE JUST TO THE WEST OF KUSH, POSSIBLY A HEADQUARTERS, 42 TANK TRANSPORTERS AT YA7405 AND AN ARMoured CAR LOOKING NORTH FROM YA7396. ARMoured VEHICLES WERE SEEN IN A COPSE AT ABOUT YA7593 AND MORE SUSPECTED AT YA7393 IN A VALLEY. NO EVIDENCE OF A BATTLE WAS SEEN ANYWHERE.

9. COMMENTS. JORDANIAN ARMY ADMIT THAT THEY ARE NOT USING THE AMMAN-IRBID MAIN ROAD. NO ARMY VEHICLE ON THE ROAD WAS SEEN BETWEEN SUMEILEH AND ROAD JUNCTION YA7793, BUT SEVERAL FEDAYEEN VEHICLES MOSTLY MOVING NORTH. FEDAYEEN AND IRAQIS APPEAR STRONGLY ESTABLISHED IN JERASH AND CAN BLOCK THE ROAD AT WILL.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO JISNE AND JISGULF

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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CYPHER CAT A  
IMMEDIATE ARABIAN  
TELEGRAM TO C.O.

OR LATER  
TO F.C.O.  
17 OCTOBER 1977

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VES 14

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RECEIVED BY TELETYPE AND C.O. 17 OCTOBER 1977  
DATED 14TH OCTOBER 1977 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT,  
CAIRO, TEL AVIV, MOD DIA, TUNIS AND JERSE.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

prum

23/6

THE TEXT OF THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT AND THE  
BEDAYEEN, SIGNED LAST NIGHT, IS AS WE ARE NOW TOLD, TO BE RELEASED.  
IBRAHIM BAKR (THE BEDAYEEN REPRESENTATIVE ON THE ARAB HIGHER  
COMMITTEE WHICH NEGOTIATED THE AGREEMENT) GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE  
LAST NIGHT. PRESS REPORTS ON THE AGREEMENT ARE BASED ENTIRELY UPON THIS  
BRIEFING. (THE REUTER'S REPORT, WHICH YOU WILL NO DOUBT HAVE SEEN  
IS PARTICULARLY COMPREHENSIVE).

2. WE SHALL OF COURSE DO OUR BEST TO GET HOLD OF THE FULL TEXT  
AND LET YOU HAVE OUR COMMENTS ON IT.

3. THE SIGNING CEREMONY TOOK PLACE AT THE TUNISIAN EMBASSY (IT  
WAS TELEVISED) AND APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN A SURPRISINGLY FRIENDLY  
OCCASION, PRESIDED OVER BY SAHI AL-ADGHANI, THE TUNISIAN PM.  
YASSIR ARAFAT AND KING HUSSEIN SHOOK HANDS WARMLY, AND THE LATTER  
IN A SHORT SPEECH SAID THAT HE WOULD ORDER THE RELEASE OF THE  
REMAINING DETAINEES. THIS MAY REFER TO A GROUP OF PARTICULARLY  
"HARD" CASES (REPORTEDLY MEMBERS OF PFLP AND PDPFLP) WHO HE  
UNDERSTAND ARE BEING HELD AT AL-JAFR, A POLITICAL PRISON IN  
THE DESERT SOME 50 KMS ENE OF MA-AN.

4. IT IS RELIABLY REPORTED THAT SAHI AL-ADGHANI COLLAPSED YESTERDAY  
AFTERNOON, ALLEGEDLY WITH A HEART ATTACK. HE WAS SEEN BEING  
CARRIED FROM THE INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL ON A STRETCHER.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMISSION AND TO TUNIS.  
DEFENCE COMMISSION PLEASE PASS TO MOD DIA AND JERSE.

MR. PHILLIPS : [REPEATED TO BE REPEATED]  
[SENT TO F.C.O.]

H.M.A.T. DEPT.


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EN CLAIR  
IMMEDIATE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 888

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
15 OCTOBER 1978

UNCLASSIFIED  
151135Z



ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 888  
DATED 15TH OCTOBER 1978 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO,  
BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, WASHINGTON, PARIS, MOSCOW, MOD D14  
AND JISNE.

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KING HUSSEIN TV AND RADIO BROADCAST.

KING HUSSEIN SPOKE ON JORDAN RADIO AND TELEVISION LAST NIGHT.  
HE SAID THAT FOLLOWING THE JUNE WAR, JORDAN HAD SET OUT TO REBUILD  
ITSELF, DESPITE THE ENEMY'S EXPANSIONIST AIMS AND HIS ATTACKS ON  
THE EAST BANK. IT WAS FROM THIS STRUGGLE THAT FEDAYEEN ACTION HAD  
BORN, AND JORDAN RECORDED FEDAYEEN ACTION AS A VERY PART OF  
ITSELF. BUT POLITICAL FORCES AND IDEOLOGICAL CURRENTS HAD  
INFILTRATED FEDAYEEN RANKS AND HAD THWARTED ALL 'HONOURABLE  
ATTEMPTS AND SINCERE EFFORTS'.

IN ADDITION THE REGIME HAD BEEN NEGLIGENT, WHICH LED  
TO LACK OF STABILITY AND OF THE RULE OF LAW. ANARCHY HAD SPREAD,  
AND THERE HAD BEEN A LOSS OF CONTROL IN FEDAYEEN RANKS, WHICH  
HAD ENABLED HOSTILE AND OPPORTUNIST QUARTERS TO CREATE SEDITION.

2. THE KING WENT ON TO SAY THAT A SINCERE AND SERIOUS SEARCH FOR  
A REMEDY HAD TO BE MADE. THE FIRST FRUITS OF THIS WERE TO BE  
SEEN IN THE AGREEMENT REACHED WITH YASSIR ARAFAT. THE KING  
EXPRESSED PARTICULAR GRATITUDE TO THE TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER,  
AL-BAHJ AL-ADJAH, FOR HIS WORK IN ENABLING THE AGREEMENT TO  
BE REACHED.

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3. FOR JORDAN, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM WAS NOT JUST A TRAGEDY THAT HAD BEFALLEN A BROTHERLY PEOPLE, IT WAS ONE WHICH HAD BEFALLEN JORDAN ITSELF. THE PALESTINIANS WERE THE VANGUARD OF THE STRUGGLE. BUT THE RIGHT OF THE PALESTINIANS TO THEIR USURPED LAND WAS ONE THING, AND THE DEFINITION OF THEIR ROLE IN ACHIEVING THAT RIGHT SOMETHING ELSE. IT WAS THE KING'S INTENTION THAT, WHEN LIBERATION WAS ACHIEVED, THE "PEOPLE OF THE WEST BANK AND THEIR BROTHERS WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE FOR THEMSELVES THE TYPE OF RULE AND REGIME THAT THEY WANT, AND TO DETERMINE ITS RELATIONSHIP WITH STATE OF JORDAN AND OTHER ARAB STATES". THE KING SAID THAT HE REFUSED TO CRITICISE THE FEDAYEEN, BUT LEFT IT TO THEM TO CRITICISE THEMSELVES, IN THE HOPE THAT THEY WOULD REVERT TO A MORE RESPONSIBLE POSITION. JORDAN WOULD ALLOW FEDAYEEN ACTION ONLY ON THE BATTLE FIELD, AND WOULD NOT ALLOW IT TO BE DIRECTED TO ANY OTHER OBJECT HAVING NOTHING TO DO WITH LIBERATION.

4. THE KING SAID THAT YESTERDAY WAS NOW PAST AND THAT THE COUNTRY SHOULD FORGET IT. WHAT WAS NOW NEEDED WAS STRONG GOVERNMENT, UNITY OF EFFORT AND CO-OPERATION BY ALL SECTIONS OF THE COMMUNITY.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN AND TO WASHINGTON AND PARIS.  
DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO MOD DI4 AND JISNE.

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED.]

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CYPHER CAT A

SECRET

PRIORITY AMMAN

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

REF NO 151315Z

15 OCTOBER 1973

(39)

SECRET.

151315Z

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pr am  
23/10

ADDRESSED TO MOD DIA AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, JISNE, JISGULF, DA BAGHDAD, DA BEIRUT.

YOUR TEL FOH 121325Z OCT (NOTAL) REFERS: JORDANIAN ARMY LOCATIONS.

1. NEITHER WE NOR THE AMERICANS HAVE YET BEEN ABLE TO SORT OUT JORDANIAN ARMY DISPOSITIONS.
2. THIS WEEK TWO VISITS HAVE BEEN PAID TO THE IRBID AREA BY EMBASSY STAFF USING THE MAIN ROAD NORTH FROM AMMAN WHICH THE JORDANIAN ARMY WAS NOT USING AT THAT TIME, BUT, PRESUMABLY, THEY MAY RESTART IF THE CURRENT AGREEMENT WITH THE FEDAYEEN IS EFFECTIVE.
3. 30 PATTON TANKS WERE SEEN ON 13TH OCTOBER NEAR SUWEILIH IN AN AREA ABOUT YA6345. THEY HAVE MOVED NOW. 50 REPEAT 50 CENTURION TANKS WERE REPORTED BY FERRIEFORCE ON 13TH OCTOBER TO BE MOVING ON TRACKS SOUTH AND TURNING EAST AT THE ROAD JUNCTION YA6933. WE THINK THESE TWO FORCES PROBABLY TWO REGIMENTS PLUS, INCLUDING ONE FROM 60 ARMoured BRIGADE (PATTON) AND ONE FROM ZERQA (CENTURION) (72 TANK REGIMENT) WERE THOSE ENGAGED IN THE AMMAN BATTLE AREA IN SUPPORT OF ROYAL GUARDS BRIGADE AND POSSIBLY A BRIGADE OF 1 DIVISION.
4. ASSUMING THE ABOVE, THEN ONE OR TWO ARMoured REGIMENTS FROM 62 ARMoured BRIGADE (PATTON) COULD HAVE BEEN AVAILABLE TO MOVE NORTH. IF WE ASSUME CASUALTIES TO 40 ARMoured BRIGADE COULD BE ABOUT 50% THEN ON PATTON REGIMENT MAY HAVE BEEN SENT UP THE VALLEY ROAD TO REINFORCE 40 BRIGADE. WITH THE IRAQI SITUATION BEING WHAT IT IS ANY OTHER TANK UNITS AVAILABLE FROM THE AMMAN AREA MAY NOT HAVE BEEN SENT TO REINFORCE 40 BRIGADE ONCE THE SYRIAN INCURSION WAS OVER BUT HELD BACK A BIT FURTHER SOUTH, SAY NORTH OF AJLUN TO WATCH DEVELOPMENTS IN THE JERASH AREA.

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5. WE DISCOUNT THE IDEA AT PRESENT THAT 45 AND 68 ARMoured BRIGADES HAVE CHANGED OVER, OR THAT MUCH MORE THAN ONE INFANTRY BRIGADE FROM 1 DIVISION HAS MOVED NORTH.

6. THE SITUATION IN THE AREA SOUTH OF MALABA AND WADI MUJIB IS NOT YET CLEAR AND IT MAY BE THAT TANK AND INFANTRY UNITS ARE STILL OPERATING IN THIS AREA.

7. DA IS TO DEE DMI ON 17TH OCTOBER AND WE MAY LEARN MORE THEN.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO JISNE AND JISGULF.

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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ST CLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 849

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
13 OCTOBER 1977

(399)

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ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 849  
DATED 15TH OCTOBER 1977 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO,  
BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, BAGHDAD, KUWAIT, TRIPOLI, WASHINGTON, JISRE  
AND MOD DI4.

KING HUSSEIN'S PRESS CONFERENCE.

pa  
22/10

KING HUSSEIN GAVE A PRESS CONFERENCE YESTERDAY (14TH OCTOBER).  
THE MAIN POINTS TO EMERGE WERE AS FOLLOWS

JORDAN WOULD SETTLE ONLY FOR THE RECOVERY OF ALL ARAB LAND LOST  
IN 1967 AND THE GRANTING TO THE PALESTINIANS THEIR RIGHTS AS  
RECOGNISED BY THE UN SINCE 1948. ASKED HOW THE CEASE-FIRE COULD  
BE SQUARED WITH JORDAN ARMY SUPPORT FOR FEDAYEEN ON THE FRONT,  
THE KING SAID THAT 'IT IS THE RIGHT OF OUR PEOPLE TO RESIST  
OCCUPATION AND AGGRESSION'.

2. IN REPLY TO FURTHER QUESTIONS, THE KING SAID THAT JORDAN WAS  
STRONGER NOW THAN BEFORE THE RECENT FIGHTING. THE AGREEMENT WITH  
THE FEDAYEEN WOULD NOT BE PUBLISHED. BOTH PARTIES WERE DETERMINED  
TO FIGHT FOR THE RECOVERY OF ALL ARAB LAND LOST IN 1967.  
RESISTED THROUGHOUT JORDAN.

3. ASKED ABOUT THE FEDAYEEN MILITIA, THE KING SAID THAT HE HOPED  
TO FIND WAYS 'BY WHICH OUR PEOPLE WILL BE ABLE TO DEFEND  
THEMSELVES AND THEIR COUNTRY AGAINST ANY THREAT TO THEM OR  
THEIR NATION. I HAVE NEVER ASKED FOR THE DISARMING OF THE PEOPLE,  
BUT I HAVE ALWAYS BEEN FOR THE RIGHT OF ALL THE PEOPLE TO FIGHT FOR THEIR  
COUNTRY'.

76. HE SAID

4. HE SAID THAT JORDAN HAS ALWAYS RECEIVED MILITARY EQUIPMENT FROM THE U.S., THE U.K. AND OTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRIES. THIS WOULD CONTINUE. "WE RECEIVED EQUIPMENT AND AMMUNITION BY AIR AND SOME BY SEA THROUGH AQABA". DURING THE RECENT CRISIS, JORDAN HAD BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE BIG FOUR, NOT JUST WITH BRITAIN AND THE U.S. AND HAD NOT ASKED FOR AID BECAUSE SHE HAD BEEN ABLE TO HANDLE THE SITUATION ALONE.

5. THE KING SAID THAT WHILE THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT HAD BEEN ACTIVELY COMBATING THE INFLUENCE OF THE PLO IN JORDAN, HE WAS DETERMINED TO REBUILD THE COUNTRY AND TO SUBJECT THE SYSTEM TO A COMPLETE OVERHAUL.

6. THE KING SAID THAT HE HOPED KUWAIT AND LIBYA WOULD RECONSIDER THEIR POLICY TOWARDS JORDAN. BUT JORDAN DID NOT DEPEND ON FINANCIAL AID, BUT ON THE SPIRIT AND FAITH OF HER PEOPLE. HE SAID THAT HE HOPED THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT WOULD REQUEST IRAQI TROOPS TO WITHDRAW FROM JORDAN BUT SAID THAT THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JORDAN AND THE IRAQI TROOPS WOULD BE DISCUSSED VERY SOON WITH THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT.

7. ASKED ABOUT THE GOVERNMENT'S RELATIONS WITH THE VARIOUS FEDAYEEN ORGANISATIONS, THE KING SAID THAT "WE DEAL WITH THE PLO AND THOSE WHO WORK UNDER IT AND THOSE WHO SIGNED THE AGREEMENT WITH US".

FCO PLEASE PASS TO WASHINGTON.

MR. PHILLIPS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]

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DDDDDD



CYPHER CAT A  
SECURITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO FOR 160810Z

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16 OCTOBER 1976

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160810Z

NET 1/4

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN  
AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, BEIRUT, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD,  
JISNE AND JISGULF.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

pm  
23/10

INCIDENT IN CENTRAL AMMAN ON 15TH OCTOBER. DURING THE LATE  
AFTERNOON OF 15TH OCTOBER A NUMBER OF SHOTS WERE HEARD. WE  
UNDERSTAND THAT A FEDAYEEN VEHICLE APPARENTLY DISTRIBUTING AN  
EDITION OF FATEH NEWSPAPER WHICH HAD BEEN BANNED EARLIER IN THE  
DAY WAS STOPPED BY SADIYA (SECURITY POLICE). IN THE ENSUING  
ALTERCATION SHOTS WERE FIRED AND ONE FEDAYEEN IS REPORTED AS  
BEING WOUNDED. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THIS INCIDENT DID NOT RESULT  
IN ANY NOTICEABLE RISE OF TENSION IN THE AREA.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO MOD DI4, JISNE AND JISGULF.

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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UTPHER CAT A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 150935Z

TO MINISTRY OF DEFENCE  
12 OCTOBER 1973

NE 51/4

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22/6

FORWARDED TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENCE TO BE  
AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, TEL AVIV, BEIRUT, CAIRO, BAGHDAD,  
JISNE AND JISGULF.

1. DA SAWI A/DNI JORDAN ARMED FORCES THIS MORNING 12TH OCTOBER  
AND WAS TOLD THAT ARMY/FEDAYEEN CLASH IN THE RAATHIA AREA WHICH  
OCCURRED ON 17TH OCTOBER WAS QUOTE DUE TO MISUNDERSTANDING WHILST  
BRIGADES WERE CHANGING OVER UNQUOTE. HE DID NOT TELL ME WHICH  
BRIGADES WERE CHANGING OVER AND CLEARLY DID NOT WISH ME TO THINK  
THAT THE CLASH WAS A SERIOUS ONE.

2. CHANGES IN APPOINTMENTS AT GHQ.

MAJOR GENERAL QASSIM MAJATA IS APPOINTED ASSISTANT (NOT DEPUTY)  
CHIEF OF STAFF, AND MAJOR GENERAL ABU BAKER CHIEF OF STAFF  
FROM DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF. BRIGADIER III SHERIF ZAID BIN SHAKER  
COS (OPS) IS RELIABLY SAID TO HAVE BEEN PROMOTED MAJOR GENERAL,  
BUT WE CANNOT CONFIRM DEFINITELY YET.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO MOD DIA, JISNE AND JISGULF.

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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(1/1)

Third Impressions, or Jordan Revisited

SUMMARY

19 OCT 1970

Difficulties of getting this despatch completed, in the face of interruptions from Fedayeen, hi-jackers, civil war, Seychelles nannies and other factors (paragraph 1).

My third tour of duty in Jordan.  
Diplomatic beagling (paragraphs 2 and 3).

The greatest change since I was last here: the emergence of the militant Palestinians, which has led to civil war (paragraph 4).

NET 1/4

Now that the fighting has stopped, what are the long-term internal prospects for Jordan? A Palestinian government? Continuance of Hashemite rule? Cooperation between moderate Palestinians and moderate Transjordanians, with or without King Hussein? Partition between Palestinians and Transjordanians? Carving up between neighbours? (paragraphs 5 to 11).

International consequences of the latest events in terms of the Arab/Israel dispute (paragraph 12).

What are the immediate internal prospects? (paragraph 13).

What is now in it for Britain? (paragraph 14).

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BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

15 October, 1970

(1/1)

Sir,

Third Impressions, or  
Jordan Revisited

I presented my credentials to King Hussein on the 4th of August. I started dictating this despatch on the 1st of September, but was interrupted by the attempted assassination of King Hussein which was both preceded and followed by some fairly heavy fighting. I resumed it on the 7th, but was again interrupted by the hijacking to Jordan first of a Swiss and of an American aircraft and then, within hours, of a BOAC aircraft filled with men, women and schoolchildren. On the 16th of September with the women and children released and out of the  
/country

The Right Honourable

Sir Alec Douglas-Home, K.T., M.P.,  
etc., etc., etc.

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2.

country (but with fifty-four hostages, including eight British, still held) I had another go and arrived near the end of paragraph 4 when the civil war started. I then gave up for about two weeks. When, with the last hostages safely home and a cease-fire in operation, I tried to resume, Nasser died, the Chancery was invaded by sixteen buxom Seychelles nannies demanding repatriation (a cynical security officer suggested that these were the sixteen who had not been molested by the soldiery during the battle and that the remaining sixteen or so were staying on for next time) and, worst of all, the telephones started working again. Now, having at last reached some sort of finishing line, I have decided to leave the interrupted paragraphs much as they were, with a few obvious interpolations, since they remain valid, I think as an introduction. But I ask indulgence for the despatch as a whole; William Rogers, George Habbash, the Bedouin of the Royal Guards Armour Units and Nasser by his death have given the book such a rock that one catches only intermittent glimpses of the horizon and some intellectual mal de mer may perhaps be forgiven.

/2. This

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3.

2. This is my third tour of duty in these parts, either as soldier or diplomat, so I cannot truthfully describe what follows in traditional terms as "first impressions" (indeed there have been moments during the past three or four weeks when I, in common with others, have wondered whether I might not be receiving my last). In 1940 I was an infantry subaltern in Palestine; I have painful memories of a visit to Jordan when my carrier platoon and I were humiliatingly routed, in the course of an intended demonstration of fire power before the Amir Abdullah near the Allenby Bridge, by a cactus hedge with a two-foot drop on the far side about which we had not been informed, which we had not been permitted to reconnoitre, and through which we plunged. My driver, by no means the only casualty, broke his teeth. In October, 1966, as Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires, I handed over this Embassy to my present predecessor, who two months ago handed it back to me: this must be unusual, and a personal handover by an outgoing Ambassador to his successor is probably unique.

/But

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4.

But if the theatre and most of the scenery are familiar there have been some dramatic changes of cast and theme, and more recently there has twice very nearly been a change of management. So, as I cannot make this an authentic first impressions despatch, I think I might more usefully attempt a survey of the various alternative ways, as I see them, in which the situation may develop. In view of the factors described at the end of my opening paragraph, speculation must be even more tentative than usual.

3. A former Sudan colleague, himself now an Ambassador to a neighbouring Arab country, has if I remember aright described an Ambassador's first duty as to find out where power resides and then get at it. Like Mrs. Beeton's legendary injunction "First catch your hare", this is succinct and sensible-sounding advice, but in Jordan power seems to be nomadic and there are unfortunately two hares pretty well equally matched for speed. The question is which will stay the longer.

/4. Life

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5.

4. Life here has for twenty-two years been lived or lost in the shadow of the Arab/Israel conflict. Between June 1967 and September 1970 it was dwarfed and dominated by it to the virtual exclusion of all else. In the last five weeks even the shadow of the Arab/Israel conflict has in turn paled in the glare of the fratricidal war between the two branches of the Arab family who form the State of Jordan. The biggest change by far since I was last here has been the enhanced strength and status of the Palestinians, and the emergence of the militant Fedayeen. Until 1966 Palestinians were, in the name of Arab solidarity against Israel, tolerated as an unavoidable nuisance. Their numbers, cleverness and capacity for hard work enabled them to compete successfully with the former Transjordanians for jobs, profits and office, including the highest. This was naturally resented, but resentment was mitigated by the frequently expressed belief (genuinely held and reflecting to some extent the traditional contempt of the Bedu for the townsman and the cultivator) that Palestinians were gutless and

/that

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6.

that, if it came to a showdown, they would quickly be put in their place. The rapid and crushing defeat of the Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian armies in 1967 changed all that. In the despairing realization that reliance on Arab States to restore the lost lands had failed them, the militant Palestinians concluded that they would henceforward to rely largely on themselves. The Fedayeen movement, already born before the 1967 defeat, grew rapidly; although not of course confined to Jordan it was here, where since 1948 so many Palestinians had found shelter, that it came to threaten the regime; by 1970 the tolerated nuisance had become an intolerant menace. An explosion was inevitable. After a whole series of clashes and less and less credible, patched-up truces, it came at dawn on the 17th of September, 1970, when King Hussein, giving way at last to the advice of his generals, backed by Wasfi Tel and Zaid Rifai, loosed the Army onto Amman. The story of the next 12 days belongs elsewhere.

/5. The firing

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5. The firing has stopped and the smoke drifted away but the two questions, one internal and one international, which have posed themselves for so long, are still there waiting for answers, which themselves will need reconsideration in the light of the battle and of Nasser's death. First what are now the prospects for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, or indeed for any Jordanian State resembling the one we know? Second what are now the likely international consequences of these latest tragic events for a settlement of the Arab/Israel dispute?

6. A truth which has emerged all the more clearly from the bombardment is that neither the Hashemites nor the Palestinians are strong enough for one side effectively to crush the other. The Army have undoubtedly killed many more Fedayeen and civilians than they have lost themselves. But the Palestinians have not given in and remain a majority more defiant and bitter than ever, with indignant sympathy reinforcing the moral and material support which they were already receiving

/from

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from other Arabs. They could not, for two main reasons, form a Palestinian Government of Jordan even if they wanted to, and they have repeatedly said that they do not. For one thing the diehard, largely country-bred, Transjordanian element is a large, tough and well-armed a minority for any Palestinian Government of Jordan to digest. For another, even if a Palestinian Government of Jordan were conceivable, they would quickly find themselves in the dilemma of either having to mitigate their militancy towards Israel, thus forfeiting the support of the active elements on whom they would have to depend in order to keep in power, or risk destruction by the Israelis who, well aware of Hashemite lukewarmness in the struggle against Zion have (except for a few days in 1967) let Jordan off relatively lightly and concentrated their heaviest blows elsewhere.

7. On the other side this year's bloody clashes, culminating in civil war, demonstrate that the Hashemites cannot govern Jordan either; they can only, with the threatened or, as September showed,

/actual

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actual assistance of tanks and artillery, rule it. Time was when the disparate elements which composed the State of Jordan were indeed to some extent held together by the old Harrovian whose family hailed neither from Transjordan nor Palestine but from the Hejaz. The King used some years ago to speak of himself, engagingly and fairly credibly, as the "Head of the Jordanian family". Credibility was wearing thin long before September 1970 and has now disintegrated. Can he or any other Hashemite really continue to be a unifying factor? If not, are there any elements left which can hold Jordan as we know it together? Or is partition a third practicable alternative? Or, finally, is Jordan destined to be carved up between her neighbours, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and perhaps Israel?

8. I have no doubt at all that King Hussein is far and away the best Hashemite we have

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11.

cooperate with Palestinians until, all real authority gone, he will I suppose be forced or persuaded to leave the country.

9. The best hope of holding Jordan together lies. I believe, in cooperation between, on the one hand the mass of relatively moderate Palestinians, by which I mean those who by and large regard Arafat as their leader and who, sick to death of instability and violence, would in a settlement accept a return to something like the pre-1967 frontiers rather than the pre-1948 ones; and, on the other, the fairly numerous Transjordanians, both bourgeois and peasant, who are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, even more sympathetic to the idea of living their lives in comparative peace, and who, by their dissent or silence before the recent onslaught, seem to have nailed their colours to the fence rather than to the Hashemite mast. They do not, of course, include the fifty or so richest men in Jordan,

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I nor at the other end of the scale do they include the Bedouin who manned the tanks and guns of the hand-picked units which blasted their way into Amman on the 17th of September. Jordan can do without the first category; the Bedouin pose a tougher problem but I think there is hope to be derived from the proposition (which I myself hold to be true) that Bedouin cannot be bought but only hired, and that even the most devoted are not inclined for long to continue fighting in a lost cause. Such cooperation does not preclude the continued presence, for a time, of King Hussein as Head of State, on the lines suggested in my preceding paragraph.

10. I do not believe partition to offer a practicable solution. It is comparatively easy to conceive of a Palestinian State composed of the West Bank on roughly pre-1967 lines, together, it may be, with an area on the East Bank adjacent to the Syrian border, running perhaps as far east as Ramtha and as far south as Irbid; and of a Hashemite Kingdom of

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Jordan composing the rest of the East Bank. But two major obstacles to partition of Jordan between Transjordanians and Palestinians are viability, and the city of Amman. The viability of an unsubsidised Jordan was in question even before June 1967; without Jerusalem and the West Bank it was out of the question except on the basis of massive foreign subsidies. Further truncation could only aggravate this situation. And it is difficult to conceive of any capital for Jordanian Jordan other than Amman, whose population of something like half a million is about seventy per cent Palestinian.

11. The dismemberment of Jordan as a state and its incorporation into its neighbours is conceivable but I do not somehow see it happening. Syria and Iraq would each surely resent and probably try to prevent any move in this direction by the other. Saudi Arabia would be most reluctant to see the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan disappear and would likewise, no doubt, try to prevent it. Israel would not, I am sure, wish to incorporate any more

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inhabited Arab land unless she was forced to, and could at the same time hardly tolerate the substitution of Syrian and Iraqi Baathists for the Hashemites along what are by far her longest frontiers.

12. As regards the international consequences of these latest events, it was becoming more and more obvious until Nasser's, followed by Hussein's, acceptance of the Rogers peace proposals took Arab in general by surprise and threw the Palestinians into disarray, that no settlement between governments to which the Palestinians were not a consenting party could be made to stick. Quick implementation of a settlement following Rogers successful initiative for a cease-fire probably offered the last chance of such a settlement without Palestinian participation; despite the oral pronouncements of their leaders most Palestinians would in the event probably have gone along with it. As it is, Egyptian cheating over missile sites, Israeli refusal to overlook this cheating and to cooperate with Jarring, and

/Nasser's

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Nasser's death have, I believe, destroyed this last chance. Moreover King Hussein's latest attempt to crush the Fedayeen movement in Jordan has failed, although no doubt he has, for some time to come, damaged their fighting capacity in Amman as severely as he has damaged his own political credit in the Arab world. It follows that Palestinians will have to be associated at an early stage with negotiations, and herein lies a further problem. The Fedayeen movement is not monolithic although, as we have seen, it unites under attack. Nevertheless I think it more likely than not that Arafat could, if he wished, carry a sufficient majority of Palestinians in accepting a solution based on Resolution 242, provided that such a solution is propounded very soon. The longer the delay the more the likelihood that he will lose support to the extremists such as Habbash, for whom the Palestine struggle is really a means to an end, namely the overthrow of Arab bourgeois governments everywhere: as Habbash puts it, "the liberation of Palestine is only a step in the liberation of man".

/13. Reverting

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13. Reverting to the internal scene, what is going to happen next and what are the implications of the situation for Britain? Assuming that no outside power intervenes seriously in Jordanian affairs (and among outside powers I include the Americans and Israelis as well as the Syrians and Iraqis), I should expect, on a "more likely than not" basis, to see over the next few weeks and months a slow re-building of the civilian administration, with the participation of Jordanians and Palestinians as before. I suspect that with the capture or destruction of so many of their bases in Amman and the departure of so many of them from it, the capacity of the Fedayeen to renew the battle in the city with any hope of success is finished for a while to come. Further afield in the north there may be further clashes between the two sides. If so I should expect the Syrians and Iraqis to huff and puff without getting directly involved. I think that an ostensibly civilian government will, within weeks rather than

/months

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months, be formed, although if, as I suspect, Wasfi Tel becomes Prime Minister, the civility will be superficial. I foresee that Wasfi would, if appointed, eventually find something to resign about as he has in the past, and a more conciliatory administration would be formed, more in line with Arab socialism and the trend of the younger generation. Jordan would then be on the way to the situation outlined in paragraph 9 above. Having climbed thus far up the tree of prediction I find that while the view is deceptively clear, the branches are getting alarmingly few and thin.

14. Descending, therefore, to earth, my first priority in the cause of British interests, indeed in the continuation of a British presence here, is earthy; a literal interpretation of the "low risk" policy, enjoined upon us in a recent Research Department paper, namely to excavate a basement under the Embassy and to put our invaluable communications equipment in it. It is sheer luck that of all the hits (35 I am now told) on this

/Chancery

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18.

Chancery during September, only one got "the box" and that had largely disintegrated on its way through the outer wall. Having secured our base, so to speak, we can operate more freely in directions which we judge to suit our interest. These will shortly be the subject of discussions in London and this despatch has gone on too long already. I will therefore only make two general points here. First we have to try to resolve the dilemma that while our interests in promoting stability, arresting the spread of communism and indeed anarchy, and keeping more or less in step with the Americans seem likely to be served best by supporting King Hussein and the Jordanian Government, our general commercial interests in the Middle East, which greatly outweigh those of the Americans, undoubtedly require that we keep on the best possible terms with other Arabs, most of whom support the Palestinians. Second, the immediate interests of humanity, whether Transjordanian or Palestinian, as well as of stability, and thus also

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the material interests of ourselves, demand that we contribute to the rebuilding of this shattered country as generously as we can afford and as soon as is consistent with the reasonably security of those British citizens who will have to live here in order to do the job.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Cairo, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Beirut, Jedda, Washington and Jerusalem.

I have the honour to be,  
with the highest respect,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

*John Phillips*

(J.F.S. Phillips)

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Recd. 10/16 p.m.

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Mr. Kirby

Thank you. *Jimmy*  
... - 2/xi

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I attach copies of Amman Despatch 1/1 of 15 October in which Mr. Phillips makes an assessment of the outlook for Jordan, and of Amman telegram No.853 reporting a conversation which Mr. Anthony Nutting had with the Fedayeen leader, Yasser Arafat. I told the Parliamentary Under-Secretary that I would ensure that he saw these.

*Philip Adams*

(Philip Adams)  
30 October, 1970.

*All 2 Nov*

*M. for file 4/11*

*11/11/70*

*PAY 4/xi*

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Amman Despatch 1/1 A 15/10/70

This despatch has been seen by Sir P Adams & Mr Evans (who have copies) & discussed with Mr Phillips, who has been thanked orally for it. On Mr Evans' instructions I have sent a copy direct to the printer for printing for general distribution with no Commonwealth distribution. No further action is now required.

Pl. p.a.

am

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FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

DIPLOMATIC REPORT No. 495/70

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ACT 1950 UNTIL 2010

JORDAN  
19 October, 1970

THIRD IMPRESSIONS, OR JORDAN REVISITED

*The British Ambassador in Jordan to the  
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs  
(Received 19 October)*

SUMMARY

Difficulties of getting this despatch completed, in the face of interruptions from Fedayeen, hijackers, civil war, Seychelles nannies and other factors. (Paragraph 1.)

My third tour of duty in Jordan. Diplomatic beagling. (Paragraphs 2-3.)

The greatest change since I was last here: the emergence of the militant Palestinians, which has led to civil war. (Paragraph 4.)

Now that the fighting has stopped, what are the long-term internal prospects for Jordan? A Palestinian Government? Continuance of Hashemite rule? Co-operation between moderate Palestinians and moderate Transjordanians, with or without King Hussein? Partition between Palestinians and Transjordanians? Carving up between neighbours? (Paragraphs 5-11.)

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What are the immediate internal prospects? (Paragraph 13.)

What is now in it for Britain? (Paragraph 14.)

(Confidential)  
Sir,

*Amman,  
15 October, 1970.*

I presented my credentials to King Hussein on 4 August. I started dictating this despatch on 1 September, but was interrupted by the attempted assassination of King Hussein which was both preceded and followed by some fairly heavy fighting. I resumed it on the 7th, but was again interrupted by the hijacking to Jordan first of a Swiss and of an American aircraft and then, within hours, of a BOAC aircraft filled with men, women and schoolchildren. On 16 September with the women and children released and out of the country (but with 54 hostages, including eight British, still held) I had another go and arrived near the end of paragraph 4 when the civil war started. I then gave up for about two weeks. When, with the last hostages safely home and a cease-fire in operation, I tried to resume, Nasser died, the Chancery was invaded by 16 buxom Seychelles nannies demanding repatriation (a cynical security officer suggested that these

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were the 16 who had *not* been molested by the soldiery during the battle and that the remaining 16 or so were staying on for next time) and, worst of all, the telephones started working again. Now, having at last reached some sort of finishing line, I have decided to leave the interrupted paragraphs much as they were, with a few obvious interpolations, since they remain valid, I think, as an introduction. But I ask indulgence for the despatch as a whole; William Rogers, George Habbash, the Bedouin of the Royal Guards Armoured Units and Nasser by his death have given the boat such a rock that one catches only intermittent glimpses of the horizon and some intellectual *mal de mer* may perhaps be forgiven.

2. This is my third tour of duty in these parts, either as soldier or diplomat, so I cannot truthfully describe what follows in traditional terms as "first impressions" (indeed there have been moments during the past three or four weeks when I, in common with others, have wondered whether I might not be receiving my last). In 1940 I was an infantry subaltern in Palestine; I have painful memories of a visit to Jordan when my carrier platoon and I were humiliatingly routed, in the course of an intended demonstration of fire power before the Amir Abdullah near the Allenby Bridge, by a cactus hedge with a 2-foot drop on the far side about which we had not been informed, which we had not been permitted to reconnoitre, and through which we plunged. My driver, by no means the only casualty, broke his teeth. In October 1966, as Counsellor and Chargé d'Affaires, I handed over this Embassy to my present predecessor, who two months ago handed it back to me: this must be unusual, and a personal handover by an outgoing Ambassador to his successor is probably unique. But if the theatre and most of the scenery are familiar there have been some dramatic changes of cast and theme, and more recently there has twice very nearly been a change of management. So, as I cannot make this an authentic first impressions despatch, I think I might more usefully attempt a survey of the various alternative ways, as I see them, in which the situation may develop. In view of the factors described at the end of my opening paragraph, speculation must be even more tentative than usual.

3. A former Sudan colleague, himself now an Ambassador to a neighbouring Arab country, has if I remember aright described an Ambassador's first duty as to find out where power resides and then get at it. Like Mrs. Beeton's legendary injunction "First catch your hare", this is succinct and sensible-sounding advice, but in Jordan power seems to be nomadic and there are unfortunately two hares pretty well equally matched for speed. The question is which will stay the longer.

4. Life here has for 22 years been lived or lost in the shadow of the Arab/Israel conflict. Between June 1967 and September 1970 it was dwarfed and dominated by it to the virtual exclusion of all else. In the last five weeks even the shadow of the Arab/Israel conflict has in turn paled in the glare of the fratricidal war between the two branches of the Arab family who form the State of Jordan. The biggest change by far since I was last here has been the enhanced strength and status of the Palestinians, and the emergence of the militant Fedayeen. Until 1966 Palestinians were, in the name of Arab solidarity against Israel, tolerated as an unavoidable nuisance. Their numbers, cleverness and capacity for hard work enabled them to compete successfully with the former Transjordanians for jobs, profits and office, including the highest. This was naturally resented, but resentment was mitigated by the frequently expressed belief (genuinely held and reflecting to some extent the traditional contempt of the Bedu for the townsman and the cultivator) that Palestinians were gutless and

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5. The firing has stopped and the smoke drifted away but the two questions, one internal and one international, which have posed themselves for so long, are still there waiting for answers, which themselves will need reconsideration in the light of the battle and of Nasser's death. First what are now the prospects for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, or indeed for any Jordanian State resembling the one we know? Second what are now the likely international consequences of these latest tragic events for a settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute?

6. A truth which has emerged all the more clearly from the bombardment is that neither the Hashemites nor the Palestinians are strong enough for one side effectively to crush the other. The army have undoubtedly killed many more Fedayeen and civilians than they have lost themselves. But the Palestinians have not given in and remain a majority more defiant and bitter than ever, with indignant sympathy reinforcing the moral and material support which they were already receiving from other Arabs. They could not, for two main reasons, form a Palestinian Government of Jordan even if they wanted to, and they have repeatedly said that they do not. For one thing the dihard, largely country-bred, Transjordanian element is too large, tough and well-armed a minority for any Palestinian Government of Jordan to digest. For another, even if a Palestinian Government of Jordan were conceivable, they would quickly find themselves in the dilemma of either having to mitigate their militancy towards Israel, thus forfeiting the support of the active elements on whom they would have to depend in order to keep in power, or risk destruction by the Israelis who, well aware of Hashemite lukewarmness in the struggle against Zion have (except for a few days in 1967) let Jordan off relatively lightly and concentrated their heaviest blows elsewhere.

7. On the other side this year's bloody clashes, culminating in civil war, demonstrate that the Hashemites cannot govern Jordan either; they can only, with the threatened or, as September showed, actual assistance of tanks and artillery, rule it. Time was when the disparate elements which composed the State of Jordan were indeed to some extent held together by the old Harrovian whose family hailed neither from Transjordan nor Palestine but from the Hejaz. The King used some years ago to speak of himself, engagingly and fairly credibly, as the "Head of the Jordanian family". Credibility was wearing thin long before September 1970 and has now disintegrated. Can he or any other Hashemite really continue to be a unifying factor? If not, are there any elements left which can hold Jordan as we know it together? Or is partition a third practicable alternative? Or, finally, is Jordan destined to be carved up between her neighbours, Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and perhaps Israel?



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8. I have no doubt at all that King Hussein is far and away the best Hashemite we have

He has, before this latest catastrophe, shown a marvellous capacity for survival and a remarkable speed of footwork to achieve it. To vary the metaphor, teams and captains have been picked, played, relegated, sacked, re-engaged and replayed in a variety of combinations and formations; victory has eluded them, but after a series of draws the manager has stayed put. I believe that for a while he still can; the latest blood-letting has gained time. How much time, I find it (in the aftermath of Nasser's death) very hard even to guess; if neither Syrians nor Iraqis seriously intervene, he might well last for years. But, given the Palestinian majority in Jordan and the Republican, Socialist trend in the generation which is coming to power in virtually all parts of the Arab world, it cannot be for very long. Abdication is not, I think, in his nature, but if he continues to avoid assassination he may well over the years be forced to concede more and more power to Palestinians and to those Transjordanians who are prepared to co-operate with Palestinians until, all real authority gone, he will I suppose be forced or persuaded to leave the country.

9. The best hope of holding Jordan together lies, I believe, in co-operation between, on the one hand the mass of relatively moderate Palestinians, by which I mean those who by and large regard Arafat as their leader and who, sick to death of instability and violence, would in a settlement accept a return to something like the pre-1967 frontiers rather than the pre-1948 ones; and, on the other, the fairly numerous Transjordanians, both bourgeois and peasant, who are sympathetic to the Palestinian cause, even more sympathetic to the idea of living their lives in comparative peace, and who, by their dissent or silence before the recent onslaught, seem to have nailed their colours to the fence rather than to the Hashemite mast. They do not, of course, include the 50 or so richest men in Jordan,

nor at the other end of the scale do they include the Bedouin who manned the tanks and guns of the hand-picked units which blasted their way into Amman on 17 September. Jordan can do without the first category; the Bedouin pose a tougher problem but I think there is hope to be derived from the proposition (which I myself hold to be true) that Bedouin cannot be bought but only hired, and that even the most devoted are not inclined for long to continue fighting in a lost cause. Such co-operation does not preclude the continued presence, for a time, of King Hussein as Head of State, on the lines suggested in my preceding paragraph.

10. I do not believe partition to offer a practicable solution. It is comparatively easy to conceive of a Palestinian State composed of the West Bank on roughly pre-1967 lines, together, it may be, with an area on the East Bank adjacent to the Syrian border, running perhaps as far east as Ramtha and as far south as Irbid; and of a Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan composing the rest of the East Bank. But two major obstacles to partition of Jordan between Transjordanians and Palestinians are viability and the city of Amman. The viability of an unsubsidised Jordan was in question even before June 1967; without Jerusalem and the West Bank it was out of the question except on the basis of massive foreign subsidies. Further truncation could only aggravate this situation. And it is difficult to conceive of any capital for Jordanian Jordan other than Amman, whose population of something like half a million is about 70 per cent Palestinian.

11. The dismemberment of Jordan as a State and its incorporation into its neighbours is conceivable but I do not somehow see it happening. Syria and Iraq would each surely resent and probably try to prevent any move in this

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direction by the other. Saudi Arabia would be most reluctant to see the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan disappear and would likewise, no doubt, try to prevent it. Israel would not, I am sure, wish to incorporate any more inhabited Arab land unless she was forced to, and could at the same time hardly tolerate the substitution of Syrian and Iraqi Baathists for the Hashemites along what are by far her longest frontiers.

12. As regards the international consequences of these latest events, it was becoming more and more obvious until Nasser's, followed by Hussein's, acceptance of the Rogers' peace proposals took Arabs in general by surprise and threw the Palestinians into disarray, that no settlement between Governments to which the Palestinians were not a consenting party could be made to stick. Quick implementation of a settlement following Rogers' successful initiative for a cease-fire probably offered the last chance of such a settlement without Palestinian participation; despite the oral pronouncements of their leaders most Palestinians would in the event probably have gone along with it. As it is, Egyptian cheating over missile sites, Israeli refusal to overlook this cheating and to co-operate with Jarring, and Nasser's death have, I believe, destroyed this last chance. Moreover King Hussein's latest attempt to crush the Fedayeen movement in Jordan has failed, although no doubt he has, for some time to come, damaged their fighting capacity in Amman as severely as he has damaged his own political credit in the Arab world. It follows that Palestinians will have to be associated at an early stage with negotiations, and herein lies a further problem. The Fedayeen movement is not monolithic although, as we have seen, it unites under attack. Nevertheless I think it more likely than not that Arafat could, if he wished, carry a sufficient majority of Palestinians in accepting a solution based on Resolution 242, provided that such a solution is propounded very soon. The longer the delay the more the likelihood that he will lose support to the extremists such as Habbash, for whom the Palestine struggle is really a means to an end, namely the overthrow of Arab bourgeois Governments everywhere: as Habbash puts it, "the liberation of Palestine is only a step in the liberation of man".

13. Reverting to the internal scene, what is going to happen next and what are the implications of the situation for Britain? Assuming that no outside Power intervenes seriously in Jordanian affairs (and among outside Powers I include the Americans and Israelis as well as the Syrians and Iraqis), I should expect, on a "more likely than not" basis, to see over the next few weeks and months a slow rebuilding of the civilian Administration, with the participation of Jordanians and Palestinians as before. I suspect that with the capture or destruction of so many of their bases in Amman and the departure of so many of them from it, the capacity of the Fedayeen to renew the battle in the city with any hope of success is finished for a while to come. Further afield in the north there may be further clashes between the two sides. If so I should expect the Syrians and Iraqis to huff and puff without getting directly involved. I think that an ostensibly civilian Government will, within weeks rather than months, be formed, although if, as I suspect, Wasfi Tel becomes Prime Minister, the civility will be superficial. I foresee that Wasfi would, if appointed, eventually find something to resign about as he has in the past, and a more conciliatory Administration would be formed, more in line with Arab Socialism and the trend of the younger generation. Jordan would then be on the way to the situation outlined in paragraph 9 above. Having climbed thus far up the tree of prediction I find that while the view is deceptively clear, the branches are getting alarmingly few and thin.

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14. Descending, therefore, to earth, my first priority in the cause of British interests, indeed in the continuation of a British presence here, is earthy; a literal interpretation of the "low risk" policy, enjoined upon us in a recent Research Department paper, namely to excavate a basement under the Embassy and to put our invaluable communications equipment in it. It is sheer luck that of all the hits (35 I am now told) on this Chancery during September, only one got "the box" and that had largely disintegrated on its way through the outer wall. Having secured our base, so to speak, we can operate more freely in directions which we judge to suit our interest. These will shortly be the subject of discussions in London and this despatch has gone on too long already. I will therefore only make two general points here. First we have to try to resolve the dilemma that while our interests in promoting stability, arresting the spread of Communism and indeed anarchy, and keeping more or less in step with the Americans seem likely to be served best by supporting King Hussein and the Jordanian Government, our general commercial interests in the Middle East, which greatly outweigh those of the Americans, undoubtedly require that we keep on the best possible terms with other Arabs, most of whom support the Palestinians. Second, the immediate interests of humanity, whether Transjordanian or Palestinian, as well as of stability, and thus also the material interests of ourselves, demand that we contribute to the rebuilding of this shattered country as generously as we can afford and as soon as is consistent with the reasonable security of those British citizens who will have to live here in order to do the job.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Cairo, Tel Aviv, Baghdad, Beirut, Jedda, Washington and Jerusalem.

I have, etc.,

J. F. S. PHILLIPS.

THIS IS  
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN  
SECTION 5(1) OF  
ACT 1958 UNTIL 2010

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RESTRICTED

IMMEDIATE BAGHDAD TEL.NO. 128 TO BEIRUT OF 18 OCTOBER 1976  
RESTRICTED

ADDRESSED TO BEIRUT TELNO 128 OF 18 OCTOBER AND R F I IMMEDIATE  
TO AMEMB AND F C O .

DOWN AND DAINLER ARRIVED SAFELY BY RAMTHA/MAFRAQ ROAD.  
THEY EXPERIENCED NO DIFFICULTIES IN NORTH JORDAN, WHERE ROAD  
BLOCKS ( ALL MANNED BY REGULAR JORDAN ARMY) WERE FEW IN NUMBER.  
BORDER POSTS AT RAMTHA AND H 4 BOTH MANNED BY JORDAN ARMY  
PERSONNEL WITH MILITARY OFFICERS FROM ARAB CONCILIATION MISSION  
IN SUPERVISORY CAPACITY IN RAMTHA REST HOUSE. NO FEDAYEEN  
OBSERVED. TRAPS STILL IN EVIDENCE FROM JORDANIAN BORDER TO  
ENTER POINT, BUT DUE TO DARKNESS NO OTHERS OBSERVED INSIDE JORDAN.  
FIFTY TRAPS OBSERVED TRAVELLING WEST JUST EAST OF MAFRAQ ( AGAIN  
NOT IDENTIFIED BECAUSE OF DARK)

2. GRATEFUL IF FCO COULD INFORM MRS DOWN (CHIEF MAGNA FCB ) OF  
HUSBAND'S SAFE ARRIVAL.

MR. BALFOUR PAUL

FILES

N.E. DEPT.

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DEFENCE DEPT.

NEWS DEPT.

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CYPHER CAT A

IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO MOD DIA

TELEGRAM NO 190850Z

19 OCTOBER 1970

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190850Z

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*Pm*  
*25/10*

ADDRESSED TO MOD DIA REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO FOREIGN AND  
COMMONWEALTH OFFICE, TEL AVIV, CAIRO, BAGHDAD, BEIRUT, JISNE  
AND JISGULF.

SITUATION AS AT 190800Z OCTOBER.

1. JORDANIAN ARMY OFFICIAL SPOKESMAN HAS STATED THAT BETWEEN  
1700 AND 1705 HOURS ON SATURDAY 17TH OCTOBER JORDANIAN ARMY FORCES  
IN THE VILLAGES OF AL MUGHAIYIR (YB 7613), HARU (YB7212),  
AL AL (YB7314) AND AS SHAJARA (YB7615) NORTH EAST OF Irbid AND  
NEAR THE SYRIAN FRONTIER CAME UNDER FIRE FROM FEDAYEEN MORTARS,  
ROCKETS AND MACHINE GUNS. AT FIRST JORDANIAN FORCES DID NOT  
RETURN FIRE BUT AS FEDAYEEN FIRE INCREASED JORDANIAN FORCES  
RETURNED FIRE IN SOME AREAS. A MEMBER OF THE ARAB TRUCE  
SUPERVISORY COMMITTEE VISITED THE SPOT, OBSERVED THE SITUATION  
AND SUPERVISED CEASE FIRE ARRANGEMENTS.

2. COMMENT.

DA WAS TOLD BY A/INT YESTERDAY THAT FIRING HAD BROKEN OUT NORTH  
EAST OF Irbid DURING THE CHANGEOVER OF TROOPS IN THAT AREA. THESE  
TROOP MOVEMENTS COULD HAVE BEEN THE CAUSE FOR FEDAYEEN TO OPEN  
FIRE, BUT, WHATEVER THE REASON THE INCIDENT REFLECTS THE LACK OF  
CONFIDENCE OF THE FEDAYEEN IN THE CEASE FIRE ARRANGEMENTS.

3. SHOTS WERE HEARD IN SEVERAL PARTS OF AMMAN YESTERDAY. IN  
AN INCIDENT IN CENTRAL AMMAN DURING THE AFTERNOON ONE CIVILIAN  
(BELIEVED FEDAYEEN) WAS KILLED AND ANOTHER WOUNDED. THE LATTER  
WAS TAKEN TO ASHRAFIYEH HOSPITAL. THE SOUK AREA CLEARED QUICKLY  
AND SIGHTSEEING MEMBERS OF DA'S STAFF ACCOMPANYING A PARTY FROM  
FERRIEFORCE BEAT A SOMEWHAT UNDIGNIFIED RETREAT. AMMAN APPEARS  
NORMAL THIS MORNING AND NO OFFICIAL REPORT HAS YET BEEN ISSUED  
ON THIS INCIDENT.

/G. MEMBERS

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- 2 -

4. MEMBERS OF FRONT FORUM VISITED JERASH RUINS ON 17TH AND 18TH OCTOBER. ON 17TH OCTOBER THEY WERE SHOWN ROUND BY FEDAYEEN OFFICERS, ON 18TH BY TOURIST POLICE. FEDAYEEN AND SOME IRAQIS CAN STILL BE SEEN IN JERASH AND THE MAIN ROAD FROM AMMAN NORTHWARDS TO JERASH IS NOT USED BY THE ARMY. THE PARTY SAW SHELLS OR MORTAR BOMBS FALLING NEAR A VILLAGE ABOUT ONE MILE NORTH OF JERASH.

5. ZERQA. IRAQI ADMINISTRATIVE VEHICLES ARE STILL ABOUT THE TOWN.

6. SOUTH SHURA. A RELIABLE OBSERVER WHO VISITED SOUTH SHURA ON 17TH OCTOBER REPORTS THAT DURING HIS 2 HOUR STAY THERE AND ON THE DRIVE FROM AND TO AMMAN NO FEDAYEEN WERE SEEN.

KZDAUGA E PASS IMMEDIATE TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATE TO HQI DIA AND PRIORITY TO JISNE AND JISGULF.

MR. PHILLIPS

/SENT TO D.C.C./

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MOD INTERNAL

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CYPHER CAT A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 818

S E C R E T

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

20 OCTOBER 1970

SECRET.

201010Z

IS A COPY

THE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY  
IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ADDRESSED TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE TELEGRAM NO 818  
DATED 20TH OCTOBER AND REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT,  
CAIRO, TEL AVIV, MOD DI4 AND JISNE.

OUR TEL NO 802 OF 14TH OCTOBER:- GOVERNMENT/FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT.

WE HAVE NOW OBTAINED A COPY OF THE TEXT OF  
THE AGREEMENT SIGNED ON 13TH OCTOBER BETWEEN THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT  
AND THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PLO, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE  
SECTION DEALING WITH THE SITES OF FEDAYEEN HOUSES. FULL TEXT  
WITH COMMENTS WILL BE SENT BY NEXT CLASSIFIED BAG. THE PREAMBLE  
MAKES IT CLEAR THAT THE AGREEMENT IS AN AMPLIFICATION OF THE  
CAIRO AGREEMENT OF 27TH SEPTEMBER. (ESPECIALLY ARTICLES 8 AND 12),  
WHICH REMAINS VALID, AS DOES THE AGREEMENT ON WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES  
OF 1 ST OCTOBER. THIS LATTER IS ATTACHED TO THE AGREEMENT AS  
AN ANNEX.

2. THE FIRST SECTION OF THE AGREEMENT CONCERNS SUPPORT FOR THE  
REVOLUTION AND RIGHTS THAT THE REVOLUTION SHOULD ENJOY TO  
MOBILISATION, ORGANISATION AND FREEDOM OF ACTION. IT CONTAINS  
A PROVISION THAT "THE PALESTINE PEOPLE ALONE, AS REPRESENTED IN  
THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION, HAS THE RIGHT TO DETERMINE ITS DESTINY."

3. THE SECTION ON FEDAYEEN OPERATIONS STATES THAT AMMAN IS THE  
HQ OF THE CONTROL COMMITTEE OF THE PLO, WHICH ALSO HAS THE RIGHT  
TO ESTABLISH BRANCH OFFICES IN OTHER TOWNS AND VILLAGES. THE  
COMMITTEE HAS THE RIGHT TO HAVE GUARDS ON ITS OFFICES AND LEADERS.  
IT WILL APPOINT A "GENERAL COMMAND OF THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION"  
WHICH WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL THE FORCES OF THE  
REVOLUTION. THE JORDAN GOVERNMENT IS TO GUARANTEE FREEDOM OF  
FEDAYEEN ACTION "PROVIDED IT DOES NOT INFRINGE UPON THE  
SOVEREIGNTY OF THE COUNTRY WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE LAW AND  
ITS OBSERVANCE". A NUMBER OF ORGANISATIONS ARE LISTED AS  
BEING "PRINCIPAL INSTITUTIONS" OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND ARE  
PERMITTED "TO PERFORM THEIR WORK IN COMPLETE FREEDOM". AMONG  
THESE IS "FATAH" NEWSPAPER AND RADIO. ("FATAH" NEWSPAPER  
HAS NOT YET RE-APPEARED, AND THERE SEEMS TO BE SOME DISPUTE  
AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT PERMIT THE  
GOVERNMENT TO CENSOR IT AS IT DOES WITH OTHER PAPERS.) /4. THE

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THE SECTION ON TRANSPORTATION AND MOVEMENT LAYS DOWN IN SOME DETAIL THE RIGHT OF FEDAYEEN TO FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT (INCLUDING MOVEMENT ALONG "THE ROAD LEADING INTO AND OUT OF THE COUNTRY".) AND THE FORMALITIES WITH WHICH THEY MUST COMPLY. MILITARY AND DISCIPLINARY OFFENCES BY FEDAYEEN WILL BE DEALT WITH BY THE "PALESTINE REVOLUTION COMMAND": OTHER OFFENCES WILL BE DEALT WITH BY CIVIL COURTS. MEMBERS OF THE REVOLUTION'S FORCES ARE TO RECEIVE THE SAME "SEEMLY TREATMENT" (SIC) AS THE JORDAN ARMED FORCES, AND ENJOY THE SAME RIGHTS AND FACILITIES. IN RETURN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE IS TO SEE THAT THERE IS NO INTERFERENCE WITH CITIZENS OR MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES, AND THAT THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS ARE OBSERVED "WITH DUE REGARD TO THE EXCEPTIONS NEEDED FOR FEDAYEEN ACTION". FEDAYEEN ARE TO CARRY IDENTITY CARDS, AND DRIVING LICENCES IF NECESSARY. MILITARY DEMONSTRATIONS ARE PROHIBITED AS IS SHOOTING, MANOEUVERS AND TRAINING WITH LIVE AMMUNITION IN POPULATED AREAS.

5. THE FINAL SECTION OF THE AGREEMENT FORBIDS THE ARREST OR DETENTION OF ANY ONE IN CONNECTION WITH THE RECENT INCIDENTS. A PERMANENT JOINT COMMITTEE IS TO BE SET UP, COMPRISING A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE GOVERNMENT, ONE OF THE PLO CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE CHAIRMAN OF THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE (BAHI AL-ADGHAM) OR HIS DEPUTY. THE COMMITTEE IS TO HAVE SUBSIDIARY OFFICES RESPONSIBLE FOR POLITICAL, MILITARY AND RELIEF MATTERS.

FCO PLEASE PASS TO DEFENCE COMMCEN.

DEFENCE COMMCEN PLEASE PASS TO MOD DI4 AND TO JISNE.

MR. PHILLIPS

/SENT TO D.C.C./

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
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


*With the compliments of*

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OFFICE

LONDON, S.W.1

Final 20/10  
on 10/11/10  
on 10/11/10



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BRITISH EMBASSY,  
KHARTOUM.

1/17

14 October 1970

Confidential

Dear Ronald,

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
In my telegram No. 561 of 6 October I reported the main points of a private conversation which Anthony Nutting had had with Nimeri as given to me by Nutting before leaving on a visit to the Southern Sudan.

2. I now enclose a full record of the talk which was made by Nutting on his return from the south. This is of some interest, not only for its contents but also for the light it throws on Nimeri's own attitude to the Jordan situation. It confirms Nimeri's pessimism about the durability of the agreement between the Jordanian Government and the guerrillas, his conviction that the PFLP and PDF are determined to overthrow Hussein, and his condemnation of their activities and those of their Syrian and Iraqi supporters. It seems clear that Nimeri's sympathies are with Arafat. It is worth noting that he made no criticism of Hussein, though it may simply be that he felt it impolitic to do so to Nutting (or perhaps he may have realized that his public attacks on Hussein and the allegations of "genocide" he made in Cairo had been excessive).

/ 3. When

R.G. Hope-Jones, Esq., CMG,  
North African Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

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3. When I was seeing the Foreign Minister yesterday I asked him what he thought of the prospects in Jordan, and in particular of the risk that the extremist groups of Habbash and Hawatmeh might provoke a resumption of the fighting. Farouk Abu Eisa said that although it was difficult to be completely confident, he thought that there was a good chance that the Cairo agreement would be observed, and that peace would be maintained between the Government and the guerrillas. The fact was, he said, that further hostilities would be as damaging to the guerrillas themselves and to the whole Arab cause as to anyone else, and this was increasingly understood by the Palestinians themselves. He added, which I did not know, that the Tunisian chairman of the supervisory commission set up by the Arab Heads of State had specifically asked that a Sudanese representative be appointed as deputy chairman and Amin Taher El-Shibly, their representative with the Arab League, had been selected for this post. Farouk Abu Eisa said that the other Arab States liked to engage the Sudanese as mediators because, being less directly involved in the conflict with Israel, they could take a more detached view. The Sudanese Government was receiving regular reports from Shibly and so far these indicated the outlook for a lasting settlement between the government and guerrillas in Jordan was hopeful.

*from me*

*Jordan*

(R.G.A. Etherington-Smith)

Copies to:

Chanceries at	Cairo	Tripoli
	Amman	Tel Aviv
	Beirut	Washington
	Baghdad	Moscow

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Mr. Anthony Nutting's interview with  
President Nimeri  
on Monday, 5 October

During the course of my discussion with President Nimeri on 5 October, I took the opportunity to raise the question of the Palestinians in Jordan, and to ask whether the bitterness engendered by the Jordanian Army's attempt to crush the PLO would ever subside sufficiently to allow the Palestinians and the Jordanians to co-exist in peace. In reply to my question the President spoke with a frankness only matched by his pessimism about the future. There was no doubt, he said, that the root cause of the recent troubles had been the activities of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine led by George Habbash, and the Popular Democratic Front led by Naif Hawatmeh. Unlike Fatah and the majority of the PLO under Yassir Arafat, with whom King Hussein had no quarrel and felt he could safely cooperate, these two groups had undoubtedly conspired to overthrow the regime and bring about a revolution in Jordan. The Jordanian Army had seized upon this fact to provide themselves with a pretext to fulfil their long standing desire to liquidate the Palestine resistance as a whole. Not only had they fired the first shot in the campaign but they had actually fired it at one of their own soldiers who was quarrelling with one of the Fatah guerrillas in order to stir up their own soldiers. Having thus started the shooting the army had wanted to fight it out to a finish, and they had hotly resented the arrival of the Nimeri peace mission. What is more, although King Hussein had given orders for a ceasefire in the clearest terms, both by public proclamation and by personal instructions to

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individual officers, the army had frequently paid no attention and had continued to fire on refugee camps and other areas containing Palestinians. And when they realised that Nimeri was not going to depart until the ceasefire had become effective, they tried to scare him and his colleagues into leaving by shelling the area where they were quartered during their stay.

In spite of the subsequent Cairo settlement the Army were therefore still spoiling for a fight, and although Nimeri had no doubt that Arafat would observe the truce he said that Habbash would revert to his revolutionary activities and that the fighting would therefore be resumed sooner or later. Nimeri said that the Iraqis who supported Habbash, and the Syrians who backed Hawatmeh, would in all probability be at the bottom of such a resumption of fighting. The Iraqis and the Syrians were, he said, solely out for cheap profits and gains for the Ba'athist cause, and really cared nothing for the Palestinians or for anybody else. The Iraqis had been constantly at work stirring the pot, and when President Nimeri landed at a desert air strip from where he was to be conveyed by helicopter to Amman to see King Hussein, he was told that Mr. Takriti, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, had only left there recently a few hours before President Nimeri arrived. He was said to have been visiting Iraqi troops in the neighbourhood, but both Nimeri and his colleagues thought that he had been more likely concocting some plan to profit from the situation in Jordan to stir up trouble either in Syria or in Jordan, or both. It had even been suggested by some of Nimeri's colleagues that the Iraqis were planning to move on Syria and take over Damascus in collaboration with the pro-Iraqi Ba'athist leader, Michel Aflak. Apart from this, Nimeri told me that George Habbash

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had constantly been seen in recent weeks in the company of the Iraqi Ambassadors either in Moscow or Beirut.

Nimeri made no attempt to disguise his unbounded admiration for Yassir Arafat and for the spirit of magnanimity and moderation which he had shown in the Cairo conference, and in spite of the attempt of the Jordanian Army to liquidate all his people. He told me that at that conference, Colonel Qaddafi, the Libyan leader, had attacked King Hussein very violently, saying that if he had as much bloodshed on his hands as King Hussein he would feel compelled to abdicate. King Hussein had responded to this attack by turning to the assembled presidents and kings and saying, "If this is the view of the majority of my Arab friends and colleagues I shall be prepared to do so". But Arafat had jumped in before anybody could reply and had assured King Hussein that he had no desire that the King should abdicate. On the contrary, he made it clear that it was in the interests of the Palestinians and the desire of the Palestinians that the King should remain. For without him the situation would be even more chaotic in Jordan than it was already.

Finally, I asked Nimeri whether he thought there was any way in which Habbash and Hawatmeh could be brought to heel. I said that when I had seen Yassir Arafat on the last occasion he had told me that he believed in a very wide measure of independence for the various member groups of the PLO, and he steadfastly refused to adopt the Algerian technique of liquidating all those who did not agree with the central leadership of the liberation movement. "We are Palestinians", Arafat had told me, "and not Algerians, and we go about our business in a more humane manner". Did Nimeri think that Arafat would now have to adopt the Algerian policy and liquidate the Habbash and Hawatmeh groups? Nimeri / could

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could not give me a direct answer to this but he did vouchsafe that in his judgement Arafat should adopt the Algerian technique and crush the Popular Front and the Popular Democratic Front, for he felt that Habbash and Hawatmeh, together with their Iraqi and Syrian backers, were quite irresponsible and completely unnegotiable that it was no good trying to plead with them to modify or moderate their activities; and that the only way to deal with them was by force.

Khartoum  
October 1970

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SYNOPSIS CAT/A

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IMMEDIATE AMMAN

TO MOD U.K.

TELEGRAM NO 211000Z

OCTOBER 1970

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ADMITTED TO MOD DIA TELNO 211000Z OCT 70 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION  
PRIORITY TO FCO TEL AVIV BEIRUT CAIRO BACHDAD JIS(NE) AND JIS(GULF)

JORDAN INTERNAL.

SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 210900Z.

NET 1/4

1., ON 27 OCTOBER DURING THE AFTERNOON FIRING WAS HEARD FROM THE  
EL JAUFIA AREA WHILE H.M. AMBASSADOR WAS IN AUDIENCE WITH KING  
HUSSEIN NEAR BY.

AT 0800 HRS ON 28 OCTOBER TWO BURSTS OF MACHINE GUN FIRE AND  
AN EXPLOSION- PROBABLY GRENADE- WERE HEARD BY MEMBERS OF  
FERRIEFORCE AT ASHRAFIYEH HOSPITAL.

LATER ONE DEAD JORDANIAN SOLDIER WAS BROUGHT TO THE HOSPITAL  
BY FEDAYEEN.

2., THIS MORNING ABOUT 7 ARMED FEDAYEEN DRESSED IN CIVILIAN  
CLOTHES ARE REPORTED IN THE GROUNDS OF ASHRAFIYEH HOSPITAL.  
BURSTS OF FIRING HAVE BEEN REPORTED IN THE AREA OF THE HOSPITAL  
THIS MORNING

DEFCONCEN PASS IMMEDIATE TO MOD DIA AND PRIORITY TO JIS(NE)  
AND JIS GULF.

FCO PASS IMMEDIATE DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

/SENT TO D.C.C./

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N.S.D.

ARABIAN DEPT.

U.N. DEPT.

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220930Z

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS(GULF)

SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 220930Z

FERRIFORCE REPORT THAT DURING NIGHT 21/22 OCTOBER SOME BURSTS OF AUTOMATIC FIRE AND THREE EXPLOSIONS WERE HEARD BY THE RADIO ELEMENT OF THE ITALIAN HOSPITAL FROM THE DIRECTION OF THE MUSLIM MOSQUE. A NUMBER OF ARMED FEDAYEEN WERE REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN SEEN IN AN AREA SOME 200 YARDS FROM THE ITALIAN HOSPITAL. FEDAYEEN PREVIOUSLY REPORTED IN THE AREA OF THE ASHRAFIYEH HOSPITAL HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN.

2. FERRIFORCE REPORT THAT ONLY A FEW UNARMED SOLDIERS HAVE BEEN SEEN IN THE JEBEL ASHRAFIYEH AREA BY DAY. NO ARMY UNIT HAS BEEN SEEN AND THE JORDANIAN LO AT 3 FIELD HOSPITAL IS NOT PREPARED TO TRAVEL TO ASHRAFIYEH IN UNIFORM.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS(GULF)

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN

MR. PHILLIPS

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY MOD DIA JIS(NE) AND JIS(GULF)

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CYPHER CAT/A  
PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 826

CONFIDENTIAL

TO F.C.O.  
22 OCTOBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 826 DATED 22 OCTOBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO BEIRUT CAIRO TEL AVIV BAGHDAD TUNIS JIS(NE) AND  
DI 4.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

THE ARAB HIGHER COMMITTEE HAS NOW FORMED A MILITARY COMMITTEE  
UNDER BRIG. AHMAD HILMI (UAR) AND INCLUDING SENIOR JAA AND PLA  
OFFICERS. IT IS DRAWING UP A PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTING THE MILITARY  
PROVISIONS OF THE 13 OCTOBER AGREEMENT.  
BRANCH MILITARY COMMITTEES ARE TO BE ESTABLISHED IN IRBID, SALT,  
AMMAN AND KERAK.

2.. MILITARY COMMITTEE HAS RECOMMENDED AN INVESTIGATION OF THE  
INCIDENTS WHICH OCCURED 'AT THE BEGINNING OF THE MONTH', THOSE  
ACCUSED OF PROVOCATION SHOULD BE HANDED OVER TO THE GOVERNMENT FOR  
TRIAL, SURPRISINGLY, THE TWO SIDES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE AGREED TO  
THIS. CONCERNING THE CLASHES IN THE NORTH ON 17 AND 18 OCTOBER,  
THE COMMITTEE RECOMMENDED THAT THE TWO SIDES SHOULD AVOID ANY  
CONTACT WITH EACH OTHER UNTIL THE IRBID MILITARY COMMITTEE COULD  
DEAL WITH THE PROBLEM. THE TWO SIDES ARE REPORTED TO HAVE ISSUED  
INSTRUCTIONS TO THIS EFFECT.

3.. THE HIGHER ARAB COMMITTEE DECIDED ON 20 OCTOBER TO SET UP A  
TRIPARTITE COMMITTEE TO SUPERVISE THE WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES FROM  
AMMAN IN ACCORDANCE WITH ARTICLE 2 OF THE CAIRO AGREEMENT.  
AS THE COMMITTEE HAD REPORTED ABOUT A FORTNIGHT AGO THAT THE  
WITHDRAWAL OF FORCES WAS GOING WELL, ITS LATEST MOVE SUGGESTS  
THAT THINGS ARE NOT PROGRESSING AS WELL AS THEY HAD EARLIER HOPED.  
IT APPEARS THAT ARMY UNITS HAVE BEEN WITHDRAWN AS AGREED, THOUGH  
THERE ARE RUMOURS THAT SOME OF THE POLICE WHO HAVE TAKEN OVER  
FROM THEM ARE IN FACT SOLDIERS IN POLICE UNIFORM.  
THE MAIN PROBLEM IS THE CONTINUED PRESENCE IN AMMAN OF THE FEDAYEEN

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-2-

MILITIA, WHOSE WITHDRAWAL IS NOT REQUIRED BY THE AGREEMENTS. IF THERE HAS BEEN TARDINESS IN WITHDRAWING REGULAR FORCES IT HAS BEEN LARGELY ON THE FEDAYEEN SIDE. THIS IS NOT SURPRISING, FOR CONTROL OF KEY POINTS IN THE CITY WOULD BE VITAL TO THE FEDAYEEN IN ANY RENEWED FIGHTING. THEY MUST ALSO FEAR THAT POSITIONS THAT THEY LEAVE WILL BE OCCUPIED BY THE ARMY.

4.. A JOINT INFORMATION COMMITTEE HAS BEEN SET UP WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE TWO SIDES UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE TUNISIAN AMBASSADOR. ITS TASK IS TO SCOTCH RUMOURS THAT ARE CREATING FEAR AND INSTABILITY. WE HAVE HEARD THAT THE GOVERNMENT SIDE HAS REJECTED FEDAYEEN REQUESTS FOR THE PUBLICATION OF THE 13 OCTOBER AGREEMENT AND OF DETAILS OF THE MINOR CLASHES THAT HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN AMMAN AND ELSEWHERE. THE GOVERNMENT APPEARS TO HAVE TWO INCOMPATIBLE OBJECTIVES, TO SCOTCH RUMOURS AND AT THE SAME TIME TO SUPPRESS NEWS OF THE CLASHES WHICH GIVE RISE TO MANY OF THEM.

5.. SOME OF THE HIGHER ARAB COMMITTEE'S COMMUNIQUE HAVE LISTED THE FEDAYEEN REPRESENTATIVES AT ITS MEETINGS. THESE HAVE NEARLY ALL BEEN PLA AND FATAH OFFICERS (INCLUDING SALAH KHALAF OF FATAH AND AHMED ZA'AROUR OF APO).

IT SEEMS THAT SA'IQA, ALF, PFLP AND PDFLP LEADERS HAVE PLAYED NO PART IN THE PROCEEDINGS IN CONTRAST TO THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT FOLLOWED THE JUNE FIGHTING.

6.. THE ARAB COMMITTEE HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT WILL REMAIN IN JORDAN 'UNTIL CONDITIONS RETURN TO NORMAL'. A SOURCE IN THE MFA TELLS US THAT BALU AL-ADCHAM IS LIKELY TO RETURN TO TUNISIA WITHIN THE NEXT WEEK.  
DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO JISNE AND DI4

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN AND TUNIS

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED TO TUNIS]

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 231120Z

TO MOD (U.K.)

OCTOBER 1970

CONFIDENTIAL.

231120Z

ADDRESSED TO MOD DI4 TELEGRAM NO 231120Z OCT 70 REPEATED FOR  
INFORMATION PRIORITY TO FCO TEL AVIV BEIRUT CAIRO BAGHDAD  
JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF.

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SITUATION IN AMMAN AS AT 231000Z OCTOBER.

- 1.. WE HAVE HAD REPORTS OF FIRING DURING THE EARLY EVENING OF OCT  
22 OCTOBER IN THE MARKA, NEAR THE AIRPORT AND STATION AREA IN  
EAST AMMAN.
- 2.. SAVE THE CHILDREN FUND NURSES REPORT THAT WOMEN AND CHILDREN  
IN BAQAA REFUGEE CAMP NORTH EAST OF AMMAN STILL SLEEP IN SHELTERS  
AND TELL THEM THAT, AT NIGHT, SMALL ARMS ROUNDS ARE FIRED INTO THE  
CAMP INDISCRIMINATELY. WE THINK THAT THIS TYPE OF INCIDENT IS  
CAUSED BY THE ARMY STATIONED IN THE SUWEILIH AREA.  
WE HAVE HAD A SIMILAR REPORT OF INDISCRIMINATE FIRING BY THE ARMY  
AT NIGHT FROM INDIVIDUALS LIVING IN ZERKA.
- 3.. BY DAY AMMAN SEEMS ENTIRELY NORMAL AND NO SIGHTINGS OF ARMED  
FEDAYEEN ARE REPORTED.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 JIS(NE) AND JIS GULF

FCO PASS PRIORITY DEFCONCEN

MR. STRACHAN

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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Mr. Long

مركز زركا

مشروع قرية البسية

Mr. Long

ZERKA INDUSTRIAL & AGRICULTURAL CO.

ADDELYEH VILLAGE PROJECT

Mr. Long

The author is a Jordanian and the

Miss W. St. East. M.D.C.B.S.

الآنسة وندرد. مشورت

P. O. Box 49  
Zerka, Jordan

is about Jordan and the  
refugees. I have been exposed to

م.ب. 49  
الزرقاء - الاردن

CIVIL WAR IN JORDAN. SEPTEMBER 1970.

Cirazu forum. R.E. 17/10

This account is of the experiences of one observer living in the outskirts of Zerka, but the events recorded are probably typical of many elsewhere. Almost the most exasperating feature of the situation was that of for transistor radios one was completely cut off from the outside world and had no means of knowing even what was happening in the next street. This isolation contributed to the atmosphere of alarm and despondency, which increased as the fighting was intensified and repeated appeals for cease-fires were disregarded.

The outbreak of hostilities was a surprise to most people. I had just returned to Zerka after a safe and comfortable air journey from England on Sept. 7th, and found the general situation much worse than I had expected. The situation had gone from bad to worse. There were frequent clashes between guerrillas and regular forces, all business was at a standstill and the life of the town was disrupted. Schools were closed; shops would open for an hour for the sale of food, but would close down hastily if news came that the road to Amman was closed because of disturbances in the capital. Zerka had been for many years under the control of the guerrillas; the regular police were impotent and had ceased to function.

In Zerka there was serious fighting on Sept. 12th and 15th. On Wednesday, Sept. 16th the town was closed and most people remained indoors. My Arab neighbours welcomed the announcement that a military government had been formed. Ordinary, most unwarlike people, Jordanians and Palestinians alike, seemed to feel less insecure at the prospect of coming under martial law. Guerrilla organisations had been in control of the town for many years, but most of them were of a moderate type, and they had no idea what the struggle would be so fierce and violent as it was clear that the guerrillas still had the support of the refugee camp and the Palestinians in the predominantly refugee quarters of the town.

That Wednesday was a day of outward calm, but the atmosphere was tense. The people waited to know their fate. The empty streets were patrolled by guerrillas. Here we had no knowledge of what was happening in the centre of the town. The road to Amman was closed and no cars passed. Just after sunset I was standing outside my house with one of my neighbours when a night watchman passed having walked from Zerka to go to his duty at a nearby town. My neighbour called to him, asking him if the town was closed or whether there were any people in the streets. The old man, who is of Bedouin origin, replied in picturesque phrase; "Only Iblis (the devil) is playing there".

Next morning, Thursday, September 17th, the struggle started in earnest. I was awakened at 4 a.m. by a tremendous artillery bombardment. I went to the 7 hours sheltering with my family in the house opposite, which was filled with mattresses in a small inner courtyard, which had no windows. At first, as it was realised that there was to be no speedy end to the fighting, people grew tired of sheltering and boredom prevailed over fear.



women occupied themselves making tea and coffee as long as supplies lasted and in slapping their children in the attempt to keep them indoors. The men were busy with their rifles, hoping and fearing for news, and arguing as to which of the many versions of current incidents was most credible. All of them listened daily to Arabic news broadcasts of the BBC. Electricity supplies had been cut in previous clashes; it was very hot and refrigerators were out of action. Water supply soon gave out. For two days there was barely enough for drinking, none for washing. After that we were able to get a little water daily from neighbours who had a small well.

My Arab neighbours were very kind. They shared their dwindling stock of food and water with me as they did with each other and when I was wounded they did their utmost for me. All the families in our private road pooled their resources, but food supplies were soon depleted. We were soon reduced to dining on rice and bread and very little of the latter.

On the fourth day, Sunday, Sept. 20th, as I stood in my own house I was struck in the thigh by a bullet shot from the main road outside. Luckily all my windows had been blown out by blast several days earlier. I shouted for help and neighbours came running. One of them who is the chief mechanic in Abdelliyeh -project carried me across our private road to the house opposite where his relatives looked after me for 6 days till I was able to get to hospital. He also fixed a First Aid dressing very competently. A prodigious amount of blood spurted from the wound, splattering my clothes and furniture and the people who came near. Fortunately it was a flesh wound, not dangerous but inconvenient and at first painful. The bullet was found under the dining table. It was impossible to contact nurse or doctor; fierce fighting was raging around, telephones and all other means of communication were cut. There was a curfew, so that anyone venturing out of doors was liable to be treated as a combatant and shot.

We had from the first realised that there were two chief areas of guerilla resistance in Zerka. One was the Refugee Camp with the adjacent quarter called Jannaa. The other was the quarter where my house is situated, near the southern boundary of the Municipality. We were ringed around with pockets of guerillas who fought fiercely to the end. Where their stocks of ammunition were hidden I do not know, but it seemed that every day they were able to bring up reinforcements and start afresh. The main guerilla position was on the hill just to the west of my house, overlooking the main Amman-Zerka road, while the Army tanks and armoured cars stationed themselves to the east on high ground the other side of the dry river bed of the River Zerka, which runs at the bottom of our road. They were thus always shooting at each other over our heads and there was little respite night or day. For the first few nights the noise was more shattering and continuous than by day and sleep was impossible.

On the second day two Army tanks rolled slowly past my house, firing into the air as they went. On either side of them marched soldiers in full helmets and with fixed bayonets. Two of them turned into our road, knuckled at the first gate and asked politely if there were any weapons hidden. The elderly owner of the house welcomed them with cups of water and assured them that there were no "Fedayeen" (guerillas) or arms in our road. They believed him and did not approach any other house. Later there arrived a few more soldiers, one of whom was wounded and had lost his tin hat. They were invited in and given glasses of tea, but refused food.

Next day guerilla stragglers arrived fleeing from the refugee camp and begging the neighbours to hide them or their weapons, but they were refused. One poor terrified little boy guerilla tore off his uniform and begged for shelter. They were sorry to refuge this child, but they said the Army had been told that there were no guerillas in our houses and they could not harbour them.



harbour them.

On the fourth day crowds of refugees, mainly women and children, were seen fleeing from the direction of the refugee camp. They passed going along the "wadi" (dry river bed) of the Zarqa river, the women carrying goods on their heads and their babies in their arms. Another group was climbing the hill to the west. I was reminded of the exodus from 1948. I remember the description given me by one of the women who was helping in Zerka, as she told how she and hundreds of others had fled to Ramallah, travelling all through a hot summer day. "We went like ants", she said.

In addition to the refugees of 1948 and 1957 there is now a third refugee population. Every day we saw more people fleeing. How many of them had lost their homes is not known, but it was the declared policy of the army to blow up any house which these had been fired. Whatever the political results of this revolution and whatever kind of Government eventually takes charge, there is no doubt that it has been a major attack and a colossal relief operation. It will be needed to cope with the resultant human need and misery.

I wish the relief this time could take the form of work and the United Nations be persuaded to disregard the vociferous objections of Arab politicians and abolish the system of ration relief, so demoralising for all concerned. For all these years the nation has been a disaster ration, insufficient for ordinary living; 1950 calories only. If the family were to survive, some member had to find work. For the past three years the army have welcomed all the workless into their forces and paid them at a high rate than the ordinary soldier's pay.

Surely the present should provide an opportunity to change this. There should be no free distribution of food, but all able-bodied men should be given paid employment, paid at current rates for the job, to feed their own children. Public works should be started for rebuilding of houses and bridges, re-making of roads and developing new projects. For authenticated cases of widows and old people who really had no people to support them - and owing to the solidarity of Arab family life such cases would be rare - could be given relief by the Charitable Societies, who receive grants for the purpose.

The new refugees, homeless and workless owing to the War, are Jordanian as well as Palestinian. It would be far better if the United Nations services could be merged with that of the Government. The money now spent on separate refugee clinics could improve and extend the Government system, so that free medical attention was available to all the needy, Jordanians and Palestinians alike. The same applies to the educational system. Pooling of resources would reduce administrative costs, while improving services.

JARRA was intended to be a Works as well as a Relief Agency. The separate relief systems have always caused jealousy and envy. Their abolition might help to bring about that unity in the population for which the Government is constantly appealing.

The natural resources of Jordan have not been fully exploited. There is much technical skill available among the local population but foreign capital is needed. The aim should be not merely to repair damage but to embark on new development. Small projects which can be implemented without delay are best at the start. Any effort to relieve unemployment immediately should be welcomed. This should help to remove the stigma of laziness often attached to the refugees. Arabs prefer to work if given the opportunity. They often have been offered demoralising charity instead of encouragement to help themselves.



On Sept. 23rd we listened to speeches from the President of the Sudan from Khartoum, telling of a cease-fire agreement and spirits were high. But agreements reached in Cairo or Amman are not binding in Zerkia. Except that we had one quieter night, fighting continued. On the ninth day foreign broadcasts announced the resignation of the Prime Minister. On the 10th day a broadcast from Amman, assuring us that there really would be a proper cease-fire, but nobody ceased firing and the fighting in Zerkia continued with doubled force. That was one of the worst days. By that night none had any food left, but next day the curfew was lifted for three hours in Zerkia, just for the Jarnaa Quarter where heavy fighting continued. In spite of the proximity of the battle area some of our more intrepid neighbours went to Zerkia and were able to buy a little flour. Of course during the period of complete curfew there had been no fresh fruit, meat or vegetables. There was still nothing of that kind available. Cars were not allowed to move.

On the same day I was removed to the Military Hospital, where I stayed for a week. On the way I saw something of the destruction caused by the war. In the main street, opposite the refugee camp, a-a- there was no sign of life. Shops, houses and houses, nearly all had been badly damaged or demolished. As we turned the corner I saw a large group of homeless women and children cowering on the ground in a small space between two damaged blocks of buildings. Inside the hospital the sights and sounds of terribly wounded men and children were pitiful. Casualties were pouring in and doctors and nurses were working night and day.

The agriculture of many districts in Jordan also faces ruin, though for a different reason. As soon as the curfew was lifted for a few hours in Zerkia, one of our mechanics came walking the 22 kilometres from Abdelliyeh to tell us of the plight of our 50 farmers there. Good vegetables were rotting on the ground as they could not be transported to the towns. All in the way was prohibition on the roads and in any case the auction markets were closed. This man and the other three mechanics living there had been able to keep going the irrigation from our 4 wells, but fuel was almost at a end. He believed the Refinery was working, but cash was needed before a tanker could be sent. At these times of crisis nobody will give credit. Last year was a poor year and many of our farmers were still in debt to us at the end of the summer season. Our reserves had been exhausted by this and by increased prices and interruptions to the work caused by the earlier disturbances. For many months past it has frequently been impossible to get the farm produce to market and when breakdowns in machinery occurred, there was often serious delay in obtaining spare parts.

For Abdelliyeh and Wadi Dheil the war could not have come at a more unfortunate time. The crops this year were good and we had relied on the three months to set us right again. The three summer months are always the most profitable, when good money is made, past debts settled and savings made for the winter months of the year ahead. Now, less than half our normal income is received during the three summer months. Now there have been no sales for 3 weeks. The farmers cannot pay for their water; we have no money for the salaries of mechanics and drivers. There must be many farms in the Wadi Dheil Area in like case. Some of them are owned by rich men, but many are "smallholders" ( ~~peasants~~ ) who, like our 50, have no other resources on which to draw. If we cannot keep up the irrigation of the wells, the winter crops, less than the summer, will fail also, as well as in that desert area is negligible. If something is not done immediately, our 50 farmers, of whom now 27 own their farms, face poverty and starvation.

After taking an average of the receipts of the past two years, one can see that, I am afraid, that our losses in the last few weeks have amounted to more than 50,000. There will certainly be more. The town is still confused and a partial curfew still in force. In fact, taking into account these losses with those of the previous months, it is no doubt that we need about £ 14,000 (fourteen thousand sterling), or about \$ 14,000, if we are to save the project from ruin.

I returned from hospital yesterday, the first day that private cars are allowed to drive within the Naria Municipality. There is not much to report that the more serious fighting has stopped. There is still no electricity, no telephones, posts or newspapers. The curfew is lifted every few hours, but there is little to buy in the shops. There is a serious shortage of bread and flour. Everyone is uneasy and apprehensive. "The war is not over, we cannot think", one man said to me today. "Still there are", the people often whisper.

Today I drove round the chief streets of Naria and saw many ruined houses in every street. Many shops have been damaged beyond repair and many have been looted. Today there are a few public buses running, but many could not get to work and indeed for many people there is now no work. Some shops are open selling vegetables and meat, so we hope that life will gradually return to normal. But the people are growing desperate. They are begging the Government offices for flour. Contrary to the reports, the Army is still in the town; tanks and armed soldiers down every street. Rumour has it that they will soon move out. Everyone is still afraid of the Army. Arrests continue. There was a shooting again last night. While in hospital I heard many stories of violence, atrocities and looting; the tales varying only with the politics of the teller. This war has been waged with savagery on both sides.

The conflict between the Jordanian and the Palestinian populations, which has existed, has been very much deepened by this horrifying war, which is now being waged against itself. The basic problems remain and this civil war, with its inevitable aftermath of increased bitterness and resentment, will have nothing to solve them.

There is now an uneasy truce. Fifty years of life in the Middle East have shown that peace never prevails here for long. All the more urgent that advantage should be taken of this lull to do some constructive work and to get something new started quickly.

There is an Arabic proverb, "B'il karakeh, barakeh", which may be translated colloquially, "Blessed is he who gets a move on".


Amman, Jordan 4th, 1970.

*W. A. Galt*



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(415)



BRITISH EMBASSY,

AMMAN.

15 October, 1970

*Mr. Long 26/10*  
*(with apologies for the delay)*

Dear Peter, *Enig. R.E. 24/10*  
*x up R.E. done*

--- I enclose the record of a most interesting conversation this week between Ben Strachan and Ali Abu Nuwar, in which Ben made some useful points as well as getting the views of this highly intelligent if erratic figure. I do not myself hold much brief for Ali, and he has a lot of enemies, but he is well-informed, and is even being tipped in some quarters (including his own!) as Prime Minister in the not too distant future. We are intrigued by the persistence of the belief in some kind of dark liaison between H.M.G. and the Iraqis; Ali Abu Nuwar is by no means the only source here from which we get hints of this. I also find Ali's views on the future of the Fedayeen (paragraph 8) interesting and credible, but then I want to believe them.

*Yours etc,*

*to him*

(J.F.S. Phillips)

J.P. Tripp, Esq.,  
Near Eastern Department,  
Foreign and Commonwealth Office,  
London, S.W.1.

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*Mr. Berkett to see*

*GM*

*Mr. Makins*

*182/4 30/11*

*② Alka Dept (pan 6)*


*③ NAD (pan 7+10)*

*Mr. Jones 16/11*

*for him 18/11*

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
I called on Ali Abu Nuwar at his home yesterday afternoon. We had an hour's talk until he had to leave for an appointment with Kamal Adwan who was to take him to see Arafat. He asked me to keep this confidential.

2. Nuwar said that the recent confrontation had been most unfortunate. He was sure the King had not wanted it. Did I think it could have been avoided? I said that I thought things had reached such a stage that it had become inevitable. I had always had the impression that the King saw no advantage in a confrontation so long as he was not in a position to offer his people an honourable settlement with Israel. I thought he had all along hoped that the mainstream fedayeen i.e. Fateh and their associates, would discipline the extremist groups. Unfortunately some of the activities of the King's loyal supporters had given Fateh the impression that he was out to smash them and this of course had had the effect of making all the fedayeen groups close their ranks. Nuwar entirely agreed. We had got into a vicious circle of lack of confidence: because the fedayeen did not trust the King they had brought in large stocks of arms to Amman. This had made the King believe they were seeking to overthrow him and he had taken precautions which in turn had served further to increase fedayeen mistrust. I asked if Nuwar saw any way in which confidence could be established. He believed that once a formal agreement was signed, which would be endorsed by a majority of the heads of Arab states, this should give the fedayeen confidence because, as he had pointed out to the fedayeen, were the King to break the agreement he would have to answer to the heads of state who of course included those who provided finance under the Khartoum Agreement. Nuwar said that the two main points the Central Committee were still sticking on were the release of all prisoners and the dismissal of the military

/members

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members of the Government. He would tell them that the prisoners would certainly be released and that there was no need to delay signature on that account. As regards the military ministers, there would be no question of the King picking scapegoats, and he stated that then the King might demand scapegoats from the fedayeen. Furthermore the choice of ministers was an internal matter for Jordan and no concern of the Central Committee. In any case, the ministers concerned had had no part in formulating policy. Nuwar hinted that the King would in fact be making changes but would wait until it was clear he was not doing so under duress.


### American policy

3. Nuwar said he was convinced the Americans had pressed the King to try and smash the fedayeen. What did I think? I said I had no idea. If they had, they had not confided in us. Speaking personally, I was convinced that American intentions towards the Arabs were much more friendly than the Arabs believed. American policy was not Israeli policy. Russian support for the Arabs, particularly Egypt, was a complicating factor for them since they had been manoeuvred into a position where to meet Arab demands could be represented, particularly by pro-Israeli commentators, as backing down in the face of Soviet pressure and this was something President Nixon could not do.

### Background to the confrontation

4. Nuwar alleged that he and a number of other political leaders spent the night up at the Palace a day or two before the confrontation. Various leaders gave tough advice, but when the King then asked them if they would form a government to carry out their advice, they had each backed down except for Nuwar who had undertaken to form a government provided that he were given a free hand in doing so and could count on the King's full backing for whatever steps he decided to take. The King then left him while he wrote down his list of ministers, but when he re-joined the King he found that the

/others



others had dissuaded him from appointing Nuwar. Nuwar then went home in disgust and the luckless Mohammed Daoud was propelled into the hot seat. Nuwar felt extremely sorry for him.

### Iraq

5. Nuwar said he understood we had good relations with Iraq. Tricked by First Secretary's warning that the Palace were suspicious of our relations with Iraq, a warning reinforced by Nuwar's elaborate casualness when asking, I said this was news to me. While I did not follow events in Iraq very closely, I had the impression that our relations with the Iraqis were very bad, much worse than, for example, our relations with Egypt. This shook him and he replied "But what about your mutual oil interests?". I said that when last I heard about those our oil relations were worst of all! Nuwar then asked who had influence with the Iraqis. I said that since Iraqi foreign policy appeared to be to make as many enemies as possible, presumably for internal reasons, I could think of no one except perhaps the Soviet Union. Nuwar said he doubted whether the Soviet Union had very much influence, certainly not as much as they had on Syria.

### Other Arab states

6. Nuwar asked did we not have influence on Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states. I said that while our relations with these countries were very cordial, we had very little influence on them, nor would we wish to use it since this would be construed as counter-productive meddling. I thought the Kuwaitis' attitude to Jordan, though basically they fully supported the King, would have to take account of their large Palestinian population. The Amir was rather touchy and sensitive to flattery and it was possible that he had been upset by the scant regard paid to his mediation offer. Nuwar said that the Amir had told the King privately that Kuwait would resume payments but he was very grateful for my tip and would see to it that it was put right. He himself would probably be visiting


/Kuwait

Good!

R.E.

24/10





Kuwait shortly as the King's special representative. Nuwar remarked in exasperation that Jordan really must realise that she was a small and poor country who simply could not afford gratuitously to give offence to other countries. The row with India at the Rabat Moslem summit had been a similar piece of ineptitude. It would have been quite possible to have placated the Pakistanis, with whom Jordan had the warmest of relations, without so offending India that Jordan had lost her phosphate market there.

Nasser is  
me.

R.E.

24/10

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7. On Egypt, Nuwar claimed to know the Egyptian leaders very well. Sadat was a simple and honourable man with little brains or ability. His chief characteristic had been his fanatical and unswerving devotion to Nasser. Nuwar thought that the other contenders for power would try to maintain an outward appearance of unity, since what they most had to fear was some other unknown Army officer who might do a Nasser on them. Nuwar was convinced that Egypt and the Egyptian Army wanted peace.


### Future of the fedayeen

8. Nuwar thought that Fateh had over the past year revised their militant all-or-nothing stand on the Israeli question. They now had a more realistic assessment of their chances of overthrowing Israel by force. I asked whether, as it became apparent that the Fateh line was not going to get Palestine back, more support would not switch to left wing revolutionary views. Nuwar doubted it: the PFLP could still only exist under Fateh protection. He was convinced that Fateh still entirely dominated the resistance movement. He knew the Sa'iqa leaders very well, for nearly all of them were ex-Jordanian Army Officers, and he knew that Sa'iqa was "terrified" of Fateh.

### Future of Jordan

9. An immediate start must be made on stamping out corruption in high places. Much more should be done to improve the lot of the Jordanian peasants who were exploited by landlords and

/middlemen



7 middlemen. Much would now have to be done to restore the confidence of small businessmen and he hoped the banks would be helpful. I remarked that I had discussed this with one of the British banks who were anxious to be as helpful as they could. But the Jordan Government should take a close look at the Agricultural Credit Corporation which seemed to be far too rigid in its rules so that many of the poorer and deserving farmers, whom it was established to help, got no assistance at all. Nuwar entirely agreed. Looking at the longer term, he found it difficult to see how Jordan could survive economically, if a settlement returned the West Bank but required them to absorb all the refugees. The return of the West Bank meant the immediate cessation of the Khartoum payments.

10. Finally I asked Nuwar what single thing he thought H.H.G. could do to help Jordan. He replied "Establish good relations with Egypt".

(B.L. Strachan)  
14 October, 1970



(4/6)

NEJ 1/4

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26/10

Mr. Evans

c.c.

Miss Garrod, PUS' Office

Mr. Haydon, News Dept.

① Mr. Mahins

② Mr. Lang.

23/10

22/10

Jordan : Events of 12 September

Your minute below on Ummis Telegram No. 2496 (Mr. Maitland to Mr. H. James at No. 10).

2. It turned out that Mr. James did not have time to concert a line with anybody in the F.C.O.

3. I telephoned him after speaking to Sir P. Adams to say that we would prefer him in briefing Mr. Philips to draw principally on paragraphs 2 to 4 (marked passages) of Amman Telegram No. 783, and only to volunteer the marked passages on pages 3 and 4 of the telex conference at 1600Z on 12 September (below) if Mr. Philips pressed for information dating from that day itself.

4. Mr. James said that he saw Mr. Philips of ITN on 21 October. He read to him the passages marked "M" to "N" and "O" to "P" on pages 3 and 4 of the telex report. He also gave him the gist, in summary form, of Amman Telegram No. 783. He said that Philips appeared to accept, as a result of this briefing, that there had been a concentration of a number of refugees near the Second Circle and south of the Third Circle.

5. Mr. James apologised for not clearing what he did with us in advance, but said that ITN had been very pressing, as they want to get the book on Leila Khalid out as soon as possible.

6. You Sir P. Adams may wish to brief H.M. Ambassador, Amman on all this soon after he comes into the Office. I expect the press may tackle him direct on the events of 12 September during his stay in the U.K.

(S. J. Norton)  
Near Eastern Department  
23 October, 1970

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EN CLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 835

TO F.C.O.

26 OCTOBER 1973

UNCLASSIFIED.

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NEJ 1/4

ADMITTED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 835 DATED 25 OCTOBER 1973 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO BEHUT CAIRO TEL AVIV MOD DIA AND JIS RE

GOVERNMENT-FEDAYEEN AGREEMENT.

A PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT REPORTED IN OUR TEL 818 HAS BEEN  
SIGNED. THE TEXT HAS NOT BEEN RELEASED, BUT 'FATAH' NEWSPAPER  
(WHICH HAS NOW REAPPEARED) SAYS THAT IT DEALS WITH PRATICAL DETAILS  
OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AMMAN AND CAIRO AGREEMENTS, IN PARTICULAR  
WITH FEDAYEEN OFFICES IN THE CITIES, THE STATIONING OF ARMED  
STRUGGLE COMMAND PATROLS AT THE CHECK-POINTS AT THE ENTRANCES TO  
AMMAN, FEDAYEEN MILITARY DISCIPLINE IN THE CITIES, TRANSPORT MATTERS  
ETC. REUTERS REPORT THAT THE PLO WILL BE ALLOWED TO HAVE 10 ADMIN-  
ISTRATIVE OFFICES IN AMMAN, AND THAT THE NUMBER OF PLA AND ARMED  
STRUGGLE COMMAND PERSONNEL IN THE CITY WILL BE LIMITED TO 300.  
THEIR CORRESPONDENT UNDERSTANDS THAT INDIVIDUAL FEDAYEEN  
ORGANISATIONS WILL NOT BE ALLOWED TO RE-OPEN THEIR OFFICES IN  
AMMAN, BUT WILL BE REPRESENTED BY PLO OFFICES.

2. AN ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE ARAB MILITARY COMMITTEE WAS ISSUED  
ON 24 OCTOBER. AL-DIFA'A NEWSPAPER SAYS THAT IT CONTAINS THE MOST  
IMPORTANT POINTS IN THE PROTOCOL. A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD OF 2 WEEKS  
FROM 25 OCTOBER IS LAID DOWN FOR THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO RE-  
ORGANISE ITS OFFICES AND ISSUE IDENTITY CARDS AND PASSES. THE  
MILITARY POLICE OF THE ARMED STRUGGLE COMMAND WILL EXERCISE THEIR  
DISCIPLINARY POWERS IN THE CITIES AND AT CERTAIN CHECK-POINTS.  
DURING THIS PERIOD.

THERE WILL BE NO HOUSE-TO-HOUSE SEARCHES IN THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD  
EXCEPT UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF THE JOINT ARAB OBSERVER COMMITTEE.  
THE OBSERVERS ARE TO VISIT ALL THE MAJOR TOWNS OF NORTH AND CENTRAL  
JORDAN DURING THE PERIOD TO MAKE SURE THAT THE AMMAN AGREEMENT IS  
TO BE CARRIED OUT. AT THE END OF THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD THE  
PUBLIC SECURITY FORCES WILL START TO EXERCISE THEIR FULL POWERS  
ACCORDING TO THE LAW.

MR. STRACHAN

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17/10/73



(4/8)

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PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 845

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
26 OCTOBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 840 DATED 26 OCTOBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION PRIORITY TO CAIRO BEIRUT TEL AVIV BAGHDAD MOD DIA  
JIS(HE) AND TUNIS.

JORDAN INTERNAL.

1. I WAS SUMMONED TO SEE THE TUNISIAN PRIME MINISTER THIS MORNING.

2. MR AL ADGHAM SAID THAT HE WAS ABOUT TO LEAVE JORDAN AS HIS  
MISSION WAS SUBSTANTIALLY ACCOMPLISHED.  
HE WAS CONVINCED OF THE FIRM INTENTION OF KING HUSSEIN AND OF THE  
MAIN STREAM FEDAYEEN, LED BY ARAFAT, TO AVOID ANY FURTHER CONFRONT-  
ATION. SUCH A POLICY WOULD, HOWEVER, TAKE TIME AND REQUIRE  
PATIENCE AND WISDOM.

3. THE AGREEMENT GAVE THE KING ASSURANCE OF HIS SOVEREIGNTY AND  
OF THE RULE OF LAW IN THE KINGDOM. SOME CONCESSIONS HAD BEEN MADE  
TO THE FEDAYEEN BUT THESE WERE MINOR AND OF A FACE SAVING NATURE,  
DESIGNED TO STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF ARAFAT AND THE MODERATES.

4. MR AL ADGHAM HOPED HIS WOULD VENT ITS BEST EFFORTS TO  
CONTINUE ITS MODERATING INFLUENCE, FOR WHICH HE WAS GRATEFUL, AND  
TO COUNSEL "ON BOTH SIDES" MODERATION AND STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE  
AGREEMENT.

5. WHILE IT WAS UNQUESTIONABLE THAT THE JORDAN ARMY WERE THE  
STRONGER OF THE TWO CONTENDANTS IN PHYSICAL TERMS, ACCOUNT HAD ALSO  
TO BE TAKEN OF THE "PHYSIO-POLITICAL" STRENGTH OF THE FEDAYEEN  
IN THE ARAB WORLD. IT WAS ABSOLUTELY VITAL FOR THE PRESERVATION OF  
STABILITY IN JORDAN, WHICH COULD UNDOUBTEDLY BE THREATENED BY  
SUBVERSIVE ADVENTURES ON THE PART OF HER SYRIAN AND IRAQI NEIGHBOURS,  
THAT EVERY EFFORT SHOULD BE MADE TO STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THE  
MODERATES WITHIN THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT. AT PRESENT, FORTUNATELY,  
THEY WERE DOMINANT, AND THE EXTREMISTS HAD BEEN GREATLY WEAKENED BY  
THE RECENT EVENTS.

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- 2 -

6. OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE NOW WAS THE NEED FOR THE 4 POWERS URGENTLY TO OBTAIN A SETTLEMENT WITH ISRAEL, WITHOUT WHICH NO LASTING STABILITY WAS POSSIBLE IN JORDAN.

DEFCONCEN PASS PRIORITY TO MOD DI4 AND JIS(NE)

FCO PASS PRIORITY TO DEFCONCEN AND TUNIS

MR. STRACHAN

[REPEATED TO TUNIS]  
[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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(4/9)

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CYPHER CAT/A

ROUTINE AMMAN

TELEGRAM NO 853

TO F.C.O. LONDON

29 OCTOBER 1970

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291130Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 853 DATED 29 OCTOBER 1970 REPEATED FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO BEIRUT MOD DI4 AND JIS HE

MR. NUTTING HAD A LONG TALK WITH YASSER ARABAT YESTERDAY MORNING. MR NUTTING FOUND HIM MUCH MORE 'REALISTIC' IN HIS ASSESSMENT OF FEDAYEEN STRENGTH VIS-A-VIS THE REGIME HERE. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS HE MADE THE FOLLOWING POINTS:-

John

(A) HE INTENDED TO HONOUR THE CAIRO AND AMMAN AGREEMENTS FULLY, BUT WAS HIGHLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE GOOD FAITH OF THE REGIME AND ARMY. THE FEDAYEEN WOULD HAVE TO REMAIN VERY MUCH ON THE ALERT..

(B) HE DID NOT BELIEVE THE ARMY COULD LIQUIDATE THE FEDAYEEN, BUT SAID THAT THEY COULD UNDOUBTEDLY PIN THEM DOWN AND THUS PREVENT THEM OPERATING AGAINST ISRAEL.

(C) HE CONCEDED THAT HIS YOUNGER HOTHEADS MIGHT GIVE HIM TROUBLE DURING THE COMING MONTHS WHEN THE MOVEMENT WOULD BE LARGELY OCCUPIED IN UNGLAMOROUS REORGANISATION AND REPLANNING, BUT BELIEVED THAT THE INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE FEDAYEEN (PRESUMABLY WITH A SINGLE AND DEFINED CHAIN OF COMMAND) WOULD ENABLE HIM TO TIGHTEN UP DISCIPLINE WHICH HE HAD THE MEANS AND INTENTION OF DOING.

(D) HE HAD OBTAINED A WRITTEN UNDERTAKING FROM HADRASHI THAT THE PFLP WOULD STAGE NO FURTHER HIJACKINGS. HE HAD BEEN PRESSED BY THE ALGERIANS TO LIQUIDATE THE PFLP BUT HAD RETORTED THAT THE PALESTINE REVOLUTION, UNLIKE THE ALGERIAN, WAS MERCIFUL.

(E) HE DENIED THAT NASSER'S DEATH HAD WEAKENED PQUB SUPPORT FOR THE MOVEMENT. ALTHOUGH HE HAD HAD A GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH NASSER, HE HAD 'MANY GOOD FRIENDS' IN THE NEW EGYPTIAN REGIME.

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2.. KUTTAN SUGGESTED TO HIM THAT THE MOVEMENT SHOULD BE STRENGTHENED POLITICALLY AND ITS IMAGE GREATLY IMPROVED IF HE WERE TO SET UP A PALESTINIAN GOVERNMENT IN EXILE. HE SAID THAT THE PLO AS A MEMBER OF THE ARAB LEAGUE ALREADY HAD QUASI GOVERNMENTAL STATUS. IN SHUKHEIRY'S DAY IT HAD HAD SHADOW BUT LITTLE SUBSTANCE, NOW IT HAD SUBSTANCE BUT PERHAPS TOO LITTLE SHADOW. HE WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT IT.

3.. ARAFAT THEN LAUNCHED A BITTER ATTACK ON THE AMERICANS WHO HE WAS CONVINCED HAD MASTER-MINDED THE JORDANIAN CONSPIRACY TO LIQUIDATE THE FEDAYEEN MOVEMENT.

4.. THE BRITISH WERE NOT MENTIONED AT ALL DURING THE INTERVIEW.

DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO MOD DIA AND JISNE

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFCONCEN

MR. SERACHAN [SENT TO D.C.C.]

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EN CLAIR

PRIORITY AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 849

TO FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE  
29 OCTOBER 1970

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ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 849 DATED 29 OCTOBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION ROUTINE TO CAIRO BEIRUT TEL AVIV BAGHDAD PARIS  
WASHINGTON MOSCOW UKNIS NEW YORK JIS(NE) MOD DIA.

A NEW JORDANIAN CABINET WAS ANNOUNCED ON 28 OCTOBER, AS FOLLOWS:-

WASFI AL-TELL  
(LPR NO 106)

PRIME MINISTER AND MINISTER  
OF DEFENCE.

DR. SUBHI AMIN'AMR  
(LPR NO22)

MINISTER OF RECONSTRUCTION  
AND DEVELOPMENT.

AHMAD AL-LOZI  
(LPR NO69)

MINISTER OF FINANCE.

ABDULLAH SALAH

MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MAJ-GEN DR. ABDUL SALAM AL-MAJALI  
(LPR NO71)

MINISTER OF HEALTH AND  
MINISTER OF STATE FOR PRIME  
MINISTERIAL AFFAIRS)

FAWVAZ AL-ROUSAN

MINISTER OF JUSTICE

BRIG MAZIN AL-AJLOUNI

MINISTER TO THE INTERIOR

MAJ. ADNAN ABU AUDEH

MINISTER OF INFORMATION,  
CULTURE, TOURISM AND  
ANTIQUITIES.

FU'AD AL-QAQISH

MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR  
(MUNICIPAL AND RURAL AFFAIRS

OMAR AL-NABULSI

MINISTER OF NATIONAL ECONOMY

OMAR ABDULLAH

MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE  
/MOHAMMED KHALAF



MOHAMMED KHALAF

MINISTER OF COMMUNICATIONS

IBRAHIM AL-HABASHNEH

MINISTER OF TRANSPORT

DR. MOHAMMED AL-BASHIR

MINISTER OF STATE FOR PRIME  
MINISTERIAL AFFAIRS

DR. IZHAQ AL-FURHAN

MINISTER OF EDUCATION AND  
ISLAMIC AFFAIRS

MUSTAFA DODIN

MINISTER OF SOCIAL AFFAIRS  
AND LABOUR

MUNIB AL-MISRI

MINISTER OF PUBLIC WORKS

2.. ONLY THE MINISTERS OF JUSTICE, INFORMATION AND NATIONAL ECONOMY  
SURVIVE FROM THE PREVIOUS CABINET IN THE SAME JOBS.

BRIG. MAZEN AL-AJLOUNI HAS MOVED FROM THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE  
TO THE MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, AND FU'AD QAQISH HAS BECOME  
MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR (MUNICIPAL AND RURAL AFFAIRS) INSTEAD OF  
MINISTER OF TRANSPORT, LABOUR AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS.

DEFCOMCEN PASS ROUTINE TO JIS(NE) AND DIA

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO PARIS WASHINGTON NEW YORK

MR STRACHAN

[REPEATED AS REQUESTED]  
[PASSED TO MOD]

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CYPHER CAT/A

ROUTINE AMMAN  
TELEGRAM NO 853

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TO F.C.O. LONDON  
29 OCTOBER 1970

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291130Z

ADDRESSED TO FCO TELEGRAM NO 853 DATED 29 OCTOBER 1970 REPEATED  
FOR INFORMATION TO CAIRO BEIRUT MOD DIA AND JIS NE

MR ANTHONY NUTTING HAD A LONG TALK WITH YASSIR ARAFAT  
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NEJ 1/4

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DEFCONCEN PASS ROUTINE TO MOD DI4 AND JISNE

FCO PASS ROUTINE TO DEFCONCEN

MR. STRACHAN

[SENT TO D.C.C.]

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